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Java Card is the dominant smartcard technology in use today, with over 12 billion Java Card smartcards having
shipped globally in the last 15 years. Almost exclusively, the deployed Java Card smartcards are instances of
a Classic edition for which garbage collection is an optional component in even the most recent Classic edition.
Poorly written or malicious Java Card applications may drain the available memory of a Java Card Virtual Machine
to the point the card becomes unusable, and undisciplined use of the transaction mechanism may exhaust the
available transaction buffers, resulting in programmatic abort by the Java Card Runtime Environment and so limit
the range of services a Java Card application may successfully be able to offer. Given the size and global nature of
the user base, and the commercial importance of Java Card , there is a stunning lack of tools supporting analysis
or certification of the memory, transactional or CPU usage of Java Card applications.
In this thesis we present a worst-case resource-usage analysis tool for Java Card which is capable of producing
worst-case memory usage and worst-case execution-time estimates for Java Card applications (also known as
applets). Our main theoretical contribution is a static analysis for Java Card applets at the bytecode level which
conservatively approximates properties of interest affecting memory usage, input-output/APDU usage and trans-
action usage.
Our static analysis provides the high-level information for subsequent worst-case resource-usage analysis in our
tool which exploits well-known results and techniques from hard real-time systems. We generate a resource
usage graph per registered applet lifecycle method entry point as the start node and the control-flow returning
to the Java Card Runtime Environment as the final node. We use the Implicit Path Enumeration Technique to
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• the central proposition of this thesis is stated and initial high–level arguments advanced to support the claim;
• the structure of this thesis is outlined;
• the scope and assumptions of this thesis are specified;
• a clear account is given of my individual contributions/work. This is particularly important in this thesis
as it builds on top of the substantial and successful SecSafe project [HSN+03, Pro02] and related work
[HS05, NN02, Han05].
1.1 Thesis statement and high-level supporting arguments
Formally speaking, our thesis statement is:
“The Java Card Classic edition platform is worst-case resource-usage analysis-friendly. In particular, the Java Card
platform is highly amenable to worst-case execution-time analysis and worst-case dynamic memory allocation
analysis through a combination of techniques from the fields of static analysis and integer linear programming”.
1.1.1 Definition of a worst-case resource-usage analysis
The seminal papers for determining conservative worst-case execution-time estimates for programming languages
recast the classical search problem of explicitly finding the worst-case execution path through a program to one of
13
generating and solving an integer linear programming problem implicitly representing all possible paths of execu-
tion through the program [LM95, PS97] and essentially reduces the problem to one of:
• decomposing the program into basic blocks and determining control-flow between basic blocks
• identifying the resource cost (execution time) of each basic block
• identifying loops in the program under consideration in terms of basic blocks (loop-header detection)
• finding maximum number of iterations for each loop in the program under consideration (loop-bounds)
• ensuring isolated entry and exit points exist in the control-flow of the program under consideration
• ensuring no recursive calls occur in any basic block reachable from the isolated entry point
of which determining maximum loop-bounds for each loop remains a “hard” problem and an area of active re-
search. Indeed in his excellent survey paper [WEE+08], the author identified the need for novel and more powerful
static program analyses capable of capturing loop-bound information as the most pressing and significant out-
standing issue in worst-case execution-time analysis. This is where we make our most significant contribution: our
program analysis is the most precise static analysis for Java Card of which we are aware, and has been designed
to capture sufficient information to facilitate loop-bounds calculation.
Determining the maximum of the objective function for the integer linear programming yields both the worst-case
execution-time of the program under consideration and sufficient information to identify the set of worst-case ex-
ecution paths. This is known as the Implicit Path Enumeration Technique (IPET) and is the dominant approach
employed in industry to compute the worst-case execution-time in hard real-time systems [WEE+08].
By noting it is only the association of execution time as the cost of enacting a basic block which links this approach
to determining worst-case execution-time, we generalise the approach to any property of interest that may be
expressed as a resource cost function on each basic block. This is how we define a worst-case resource-usage
analysis: the combination of our static analysis and standard Implicit Path Enumeration Techniques with a resource
cost function defined on basic blocks. Of particular importance in this thesis are the worst-case dynamic memory
allocation analysis, where the resource cost function expresses the memory cost of dynamic memory allocation of
enacting a basic block, and the worst-case execution-time analysis, where the resource cost function expresses
either the number of instructions executed in a block or the number of CPU cycles of enacting a basic block; space
and time being the classical axes of interest wrt resource usage. Java Card applications follow a lifecycle model
and so a worst-case resource-usage analysis of a set of Java Card applications generates a family of integer linear
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programming problems and corresponding worst-case resource-usage metrics, one per applet lifecycle method,
per applet in the program under consideration.
1.1.2 High-level supporting arguments
We deem the high-level arguments for believing the Java Card Classic edition platform to be worst-case resource-
usage analysis-friendly to be comprehensible without prior knowledge of the Java Card platform1. Many of these
directly or indirectly suggest the determination of loop-bounds in Java Card applications is inherently simpler than
in other languages. Since as noted above, the calculation of loop-bounds is both a necessary condition and the
hardest subtask of formulating a worst-case resource-usage analysis, this augurs well for the precision of the
worst-case resource-usage estimates we produce – always a safe/conservative estimate of the actual worst-case
resource-usage (i.e. the worst-case resource estimate we generate is always equal to or greater than the actual
worst-case) but we should prefer our estimates to be as close as possible to the actual worst-case resource-usage
as possible whilst still being safe.
1.1.2.1 Architecture-based
The Java Card Classic edition platform [Ora11a, Ora11b, Ora11c]:
• is a request-reply architecture with ISO well-defined input- and output-formats and sizes, and each Java Card
application invocation is expected to terminate in a finite number of steps and return control to the Java Card
Runtime Environment. A subtle corollary of this is that it is straightforward in our analysis to describe the set
of all possible input values – which necessarily includes the particular values that lead to the “worst-case”
resource usage2;
• supports a minimal set of primitive types and minimal API: only integral data types are supported and stan-
dard Java container/Collection types such as List, Set and Collections which use memory dynamically are
not built into the Java Card platform;
• has a purely-interpreted, single-threaded execution model3;
1In Chapter 2, we present an introduction to smartcards and the Java Card Classic Edition 3, and in Chapter 3 we detail a structured
operational semantics for the language Carmel which is a rationalisation of the Java Card Virtual Machine Language and its packaged-for-
deployment-on-card format.
2This is in stark contrast to the general case. Per [WEE+08]: “A reliable guarantee based on the worst-case execution-time of a task could
easily be given if the worst-case input for the task were known. Unfortunately, in general the worst-case input is not known and hard to derive”.
3In contrast to the Common Intermediate Language (CIL) into which languages such as C# and F# are compiled for execution in a Common
Language Infrastructure of .NET/Mono runtime engines, or Dalvik bytecode for execution on a Dalvik or Android Runtime Environment. In the
former case, CIL is always compiled into native code either at runtime or ahead-of-time. In the latter case, Dalvik bytecode may be executed




• Java Card application developers are expected to always be mindful of the extremely resource–constrained
nature of the smartcards on which their applications typically run and to follow certain coding conventions
when writing applications. These coding conventions reflect a need for developers to write Java code in a
way which minimises dynamic resource usage, particularly dynamic memory allocations and call-stack depth
(for this reason, the use of recursion is very strongly discouraged [Che00]);
• Java Card applications are expected to be smaller and simpler in nature than standard or Enterprise Java
applications and loop conditions are expected to be simpler and more likely to be tied to array lengths (due
to the lack of the Collections framework of discrete mathematical structures available, and widely used,
in standard Java) whose lengths are more likely to be statically known due to the coding convention of
applications reserving/allocating their normal life-long memory requirements upfront at applet creation and
registration/install time4;
• The general conditions to make the worst-case execution-time decidable (and so make the worst-case
resource-usage analysis decidable) for Java applications are likely to be satisfied by most Java Card ap-
plications [Sch09]:
1. Programs must not contain any recursion (our analysis will determine)
2. Dynamic class loading is forbidden (also a very natural Java Card platform restriction)
3. The upper bound of each loop has to be known (our analysis will determine)
1.2 Structure of this Thesis
So as not to bog down the reader with excessive technical detail on a first reading, this thesis has been written
and structured to communicate the high–level ideas and include sufficient technical content to engender confi-
dence in the correctness of the material presented in the main chapters while providing full technical details in the
appendices.
• Chapter 1: Introduction – this chapter;
• Chapter 2: Introduction to smartcards and the Java Card Classic Edition 3;
4This is recommended in [Che00] as – separate from programmatic transactions using the Java Card API – the applet install method is
wrapped in a card-specific/native transaction so it can claw back any allocated memory should any unhandled exceptions occur during that
method.
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• Chapter 3: Introduction to the Java Card virtual machine language equivalent language Carmel and specifi-
cation of the Java Card Virtual Machine bytecode instructions, including initial configurations and exception
handling. For brevity, the specification of operational semantics for Java Card platform API methods is given
in Appendix A;
• Chapter 4: Base control-flow analysis and proofs for a handful of key cases, including presentation of a
worklist algorithm capable of computing the least solution to the constraints generated by the control-flow
analysis. The development of the worklist algorithm follows naturally from the program analysis specification
as a compositional verbose flow-logic analysis [NN02] without stratified constraints. For brevity, the full
correctness proofs are given in Appendix B;
• Chapter 5: Evaluation of the ability of the base control-flow analysis to determine loop-bounds for simple
loops. Extended control-flow analysis with the ability to bound simple numeric loops, based on a reaching
definitions analysis for local variables, and refinement of the worklist algorithm presented in Chapter 4. Eval-
uation of the ability of the extended control-flow analysis to determine loop-bounds for simple loops. The
Reaching Definitions for Local Variable analysis is given in Appendix C;
• Chapter 6: Worst-case resource-usage analysis, including dominators approach, bounds analysis computed
from the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5, and generation of a max integer linear problem whose
solution yields the worst-case demands, generated per applet lifecycle method. Utilisation of exception
behaviour, and the ability to handle triangular loops makes the worst-case resource analysis superior to
other known WCET tools e.g. JOP and SWEET;
• Chapter 7: Related work;
• Chapter 8: Conclusions and further work;
1.3 Scope and Assumptions
To manage the scale and complexity of providing a worst-case resource-usage analysis for Java Card Classic edi-
tions, we limit the scope of this work to Java Card Classic 3.0.1 applications which do not use standard Java Card
cryptography or the optional Java Card packages from the Java Card Platform 3.0.1 API. In particular our program
analysis specifies operational semantics and abstract counterparts for:
• All the atomic bytecodes supported in the Java Card Virtual Machine 3.0.1 Specification;







and is capable of providing conservative worst-case resource-usage estimates for Java Card platform 3.0.1 appli-
cations whose bytecode meet these restrictions.
It is further assumed that all Java Card applications to be analysed:
• Have successfully passed bytecode-verification by a correct bytecode verifier to satisfy fundamental Java
structural and type constraints;
• Have flow-reducible control-flow graphs (or been preprocessed to be flow-reducible via node-splitting tech-
niques5). Flow-reducibility is a requirement in the algorithm we use for finding natural loops [LT79];
• Supply full bytecode of any third-party libraries used by the application, and that bytecode has successfully
passed bytecode-verification by a correct bytecode-verifier;
• Are binary-compatible i.e. the JCRE would allow these versions of the applications to be co-loaded on the
card based on their export files.
Finally it is assumed users are only interested in semantics-based worst-case resource-usage estimates i.e. re-
source estimates on a Java Card smartcard which correctly implements the Java Card platform specification
[Ora11a, Ora11b, Ora11c] and whose hardware has not been tampered with. It has been shown in [LBL+15,
LBR+13, BG14, LBL+13, BLLL15, BTL13a, SFL13, BTL13b, BICL11] that it is possible to induce illegal control-
flow and non-deterministic behaviour on particular Java Card smartcards through poor implementation of API
methods or the transaction mechanism or via hardware attacks – we do not model and cannot provide resource-
usage guarantees for such cards.
5It is always possible to generate a flow-reducible graph/program from a flow-irreducible graph/program e.g.[JC97]. The approach in the cited
paper has the additional advantage of trying to minimise the code size increase implicit in the node splitting/copying techniques, a particular




Independently verified the correctness of the operational semantics of the atomic bytecode instructions for Carmel
at the end of SecSafe (consistent with Java Card Classic edition 2.1) and updated them to Java Card Classic
edition 3 (including logical channel related changes to firewall predicates for proper handling of MultiSelectable
and non-MultiSelectable applets). In doing so I:
• Corrected a handful of minor mistakes e.g. bytecode instructions:
– dup n d the pattern-matching on the size of n = nbWords(S1) and d = nbWords(S2 : S1) ensures
d ≥ n but the most common use of the instruction is dup 1 0 which copies/duplicates a freshly created
object reference on the top of the operand stack as a prelude to invoking an object initialiser on one of
the two identical object references.
– putstatic f requires a firewall access check as per Section 6.2.8.1 of [Ora11b]. This firewall check was
missing in SecSafe;
– push t c requires a byte value to be sign-extended to a short before being pushed on top of the
operand stack.
• Integrated transaction semantics (including semantic components JH for transaction heap and I for inval-
idated references) into the operational semantics for bytecode instructions that either persist values to the
heap or consult values from the transaction heap/commit buffer e.g.
– new τ
– new τ[ ]
– putfield f
– arraystore t
Indeed, anywhere getJHorH() occurs in an operational semantic rule. the global heap or the transaction heap
may be referenced.
• The invalidated components I allows a record to be kept of the locations created on the heap typically for
new objects or API object creation methods inside a transaction that was subsequently aborted. References
in I are to be treated as null pointers. Also incorporated initial method transaction depth and current
method transaction depth into each stack frame from [HS05]. Knowing the current method transaction depth
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is necessary as nested transactions are not possible in Classic editions and we need to know the current
transaction depth (i.e. whether a transaction is currently in progress) for when a Carmel program attempts to
start, commit or abort a transaction to behave in compliance with the JCRE and JCVM specifications.
• Integrated explicit semantic component R for applet registry into the operational semantics and added explicit
reference ion into each stack frame to keep track of the current Input-Output (IO) state of the smartcard. We
do so because, in the former case, only registered applets may have lifecycle method invoked on them and
because e.g. an applet identifier (AID) may be registered only once, as the AID is the unique key used to
tell the JCRE to select an applet and make it ready to receive commands. In the latter case, the changes
in the IO state of the card follow a strict ordering: in particular, that the communications state should be
set to read prior to any attempt to read the incoming buffer, then communications should be set to write
to send information back to the Card Acceptance Device or terminal (CAD). Once the smartcard is set to
send information back to the CAD, attempting to read the incoming data from the smartcard is forbidden and
throws an exception. So we need to include this information as part of the machine configuration so that we
can comply with the JCRE and JCVM specifications.
• Introduced an additional component to each runtime value: a runtime address at which the value was created
or last modified. This runtime address serves no function in the operational semantics, but its inclusion in the
operational semantics is required so our standard proof techniques of representation functions and structural
induction preserve the runtime label in the abstract runtime value, facilitating in the extended control-flow
analysis the use of novel analogues of classical loop-induction analyses and reaching definitions analyses.
• Clearly defined initial configurations including initial states of the persistent global object heap and static
heap.
• Extended exception handler to communicate current IO state and current method transaction depth to the
handler stack frame and address.
• Independently developed operational semantics for the Java Card API methods in Carmel consistent with
Java Card Classic Edition 3 and with the operational semantics for the atomic bytecode instructions. While
some effort had been made to develop operational semantics for some API methods in SecSafe, it was
simpler to start from scratch using the same framework as for the atomic bytecodes due to its integration with
the transaction and IO semantics.
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1.4.2 Overall strategy for determining worst-case resource-usage
Determined overall strategy for calculating worst-case resource-usage. Having analysed the Java Card platform
specification [Ora11c, Ora11b, Ora11a] and the Sun official Java Card book [Che00], and surveyed sample ap-
plets from various Java Card development kits, I came to the conclusion outlined in Section 1.1.2 for believing that
the Java Card Classic platform would be highly amenable to worst-case resource-usage analysis when used in
the way it is expected and instructed to be used, since Java Card Classic is essentially an array-based language,
where recursion is very strongly discouraged, with iteration likely to be tied to array lengths. Due to these prop-
erties, of the various approaches to determining maximum resource-usage bounds researched, the Implicit Path
Enumeration Technique and integer-linear programming stood out as the perfect companion technique, since its
principal requirements are to ensure no recursion and the availability of maximum iteration/loop bounds for each
reachable loop in the control-flow graph of the program under consideration.
1.4.3 Program analyses
Having established that our program analysis/analyses must support the determination of maximum loop bounds
for each loop and the detection of recursion to utilise the IPET technique we have selected for use, I reviewed the
program analyses from SecSafe and related works [HSN+03, Pro02, HS05, NN02, Han05]. None of the existing
program analyses were able to bound loops even for simple loops or detect recursion. Further, the existing program
analyses:
• only captured aspects of the operational semantics, the control-flow analyses were very approximate and in
particular were weak around the handling of loops/numbers, whereas bounding loops requires as strong and
accurate modelling and handling of loops/numbers as possible
• the choice of contexts was minimal e.g. the transaction depth for the transaction flow analysis.
I resolved to produce as precise a program analysis as possible to maximise:
• the number and types of Carmel programs for which we would be able to provide worst case resource usage;
• the precision of the maximum resource bounds we calculate. To this end, abstract values (numbers, object
references and objects including arrays and class instance) are modelled in greater detail and generally much
more closely to the operational semantics than in SecSafe. Similarly, I chose the context to include sufficient
machine state information to accurately answer questions around:
– Firewall predicate access checks
– Transactional and IO states
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To improve precision of control-flow (including exceptional behaviour), and data-flow.
I produced the extended control-flow program analysis covering both atomic bytecode instructions and the API
methods and proved them correct wrt to the operational semantics. To improve the precision of loop bounds cal-
culations, I developed and employed novel analogues of classical loop-induction analyses and reaching definitions
analyses.
1.4.4 Implementation of a Worst-Case Resource-Usage Tool including a Worklist Solver
Implemented a worst-case resource-usage tool named Fulgurite comprising:
• a worklist solver for the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 4;
• automatic generation of an integer-linear programming problem for each applet lifecycle for each registered
applet in the program under consideration. Currently the integer-linear programming problems are written
out in the format required by the open source mixed-integer linear-programming solver LPSolve6;
• automatic generation of .DOT graphs for all analysed applets showing their control-flow.
Due to the the nature of the Java Card virtual machine, most of the code has been written from scratch. For
example, in a normal Java virtual machine, values are sign-extended to integer before being pushed on the stack,
whereas in a Java Card virtual machine, values are sign-extended to short. The security framework particular to
Java Card – the applet firewall – has to be integrated with the bytecode instructions. Hence it was not possible to
use existing Java bytecode program analysis tools like Soot7 or the program analysis part of TJ Watson libraries8
for static analysis, or at least, not as-is. We still utilise the latter tool for its graphing abilities and ability to calculate






Background Material on Smartcards and
Java Card Classic Edition 3
2.1 Overview
The technologies under consideration in this thesis are non-standard and specialised (namely, smartcards and the
Java Card Classic Edition 3) and so a general introduction to these technologies is included for completeness.
For simplicity and brevity, the choice of the method of presentation for this general introduction may be said
to be question-and-answer or frequently-asked-questions. The material in this chapter is based principally on
[Ora11b, Ora11a, Ora11c, Che00].
2.2 Smartcards
2.2.1 What is a smartcard? In what areas are they used?
Usually the size of a credit card, and typically exhibiting a metal contact strip similar to that shown in Figure 2.1, a
smartcard has either or both on-card processing power and memory, and is capable of participating in input/output
(I/O) behaviour.
In particular, simple magnetic stripe cards – which do not feature a metal contact strip – are not smartcards, since
these require access to a remote information system at the time a transaction is attempted.
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Smartcards are predominantly used in the following areas:
• banking;
• wireless telecommunications (including mobile ’phone SIM cards);
• access control (both building access control and software access control via smartcard authentication);
• public transport tokens
and any other applications where data security/privacy is of paramount importance.
Figure 2.1: Typical appearance of the contact-strip on a smartcard
2.2.2 What are the governing standards regarding smartcards?
From the point of view of this thesis, the most important smartcard standards is the family of international standards
ISO-7816 “Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards with contacts”, which details the standards for smartcards
with metal contact strips. ISO-7816 has 7 parts:
1. Physical characteristics;
2. Dimensions and locations of the contacts;
3. Electronic signals and transmission protocols;
4. Inter-industry commands for exchange;
5. Application identifiers;
6. Inter-industry data elements;
7. Inter-industry command for Structured Card Query Language (SCQL);
Other important smartcard standards can be found in Section 2.7.1 of [Che00].
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2.2.3 What is the protocol for communicating with smartcards?
The normal mode of communication with smartcards is as follows. A smartcard is inserted into a card-acceptance
device (CAD), usually connected to a computer, that is capable of exchanging data packets with the smartcard.
The terminal, connected to the card-acceptance device, issues a command to the smartcard and the smartcard
processes the command and then responds with a reply.
The format of the terminal request and smartcard reply is known as APDU (application protocol data unit) and is
a protocol standard, like TCP/IP. We omit the technical details here due to space considerations. As a standard,
information on the format of the APDU command and reply messages is well-published, and may be found e.g. in
Section 2.4.1 of [Che00]. Other than the existence of the standard format for message exchange, communication
between a smartcard and a terminal has two noteworthy features: firstly, communication is half-duplexed i.e. only
one side at a time can send a message; secondly, every terminal request is responded to and a reply returned by
the smartcard.
The APDU standard for message exchange between smartcard and terminal is the same regardless of whether
the smartcard is a contact card or a contactless card (see Section 2.2.5 for further details).
2.2.4 What are the benefits of smartcards?
Summarising Section 1.1.2 of [Che00], smartcards provide four major benefits:
1. Processing power. Depending on the particular kind of smartcard under consideration, a smartcard may be
capable of only very simple behaviours (such as reducing the stored value on a pre-paid ‘phonecard) or have
a more general-purpose processor capable of executing more sophisticated applications;
2. Security. Physical possession of the smartcard, a knowledge of specialised technologies, and access to spe-
cialised hardware is necessary to mount an attack on a smartcard. Additionally, that a smartcard’s processor,
memory and I/O facilities are tightly packaged into a single integrated circuit makes it even less vulnerable to
attack;
3. Portability. Smartcards can be carried on the person of the card holder, and access to the services of, and
data on, the smartcard can be accessed when needed. This is of particular importance for identity cards,
smartcards with medical data, and cards holding cryptographic keys (typically used to verify an individual’s
digital identity);
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4. Ease of use. When access to a card’s data or services is required, the smartcard is inserted into a card-
acceptance device, and is removed from the card-acceptance device when transactions with the smartcard
have been completed.
2.2.5 What different kinds of smartcards are there? What are their typical applications?
Following Section 2.2 of [Che00], smartcards can be distinguished on two bases.
Firstly, whether they are memory cards or microprocessor cards:
• Memory cards. Memory cards do not have a processor. They have either memory or memory and non-
programmable logic. Typical applications are prepayment cards e.g. for use of the public payphone network.
Memory cards can only execute preprogrammed operations, such as debiting the stored value on the card.
More sophisticated memory cards can additionally detect and reject attempts to compromise the card e.g.
by preventing the stored value in a card from being increased;
• Microprocessor cards. As indicated by the name, microprocessor smartcards have at least one processor
on-card. By virtue of the microprocessor, the card is capable of providing general functionality (including
security functions) and serving multiple applications; indeed, the computational capabilities of the smartcard
are limited only by the processor and available memory resources. Plus the microprocessor separates
applications from data and memory and so are well-suited for applications that require data security.
Secondly, whether the card is a contact card or a contactless card:
• Contact cards. Contact cards must be placed– or inserted– into a card-acceptance device. Contact cards
exhibit a metal contact strip and communicate with card-acceptance devices using its serial connection.
Typical applications include banking, telecommunications and viewer subscription cards for satellite television
channels. Note that the SIM card inside (GSM) mobile ’phones is usually a microprocessor contact card,
whereas payphone cards are memory contact cards;
• Contactless cards. Contactless cards use electromagnetic fields to communicate with card-acceptance de-
vices. Typical applications include public transport systems and access control to buildings.
To help avoid unnecessary and potentially tedious and repetitious distinctions in this document, we assume smart-
cards are contact cards and talk of inserting them into card-acceptance devices. Wherever such a statement
occurs, it may equally well be said that if the smartcard is a contactless card, that it is brought within range of an
appropriate proximity-coupling device.
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2.2.6 What is the typical memory model of smartcards?
Per Section 2.3.4 of [Che00]. smartcards usually have three different types of memory on-card:
• Persistent immutable memory – typically implemented in Read-Only Memory (ROM) – housing the smartcard
operating system, utilities and other programs or data that are permanent and not capable of being upgraded.
This type of memory does not need electricity to retain data across card sessions;
• Persistent mutable memory – typically implemented in electrical erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM) – housing the applications data that is meant to persist across card sessions and which appli-
cations are capable of, and expect to, change over time. This type of memory does not need electricity to
retain data across card sessions. Reading from EEPROM is as fast as reading from ROM, but writing to it
is approximately a thousand times slower, and there is an upper limit to the number of times EEPROM may
reliably be written to;
• Non-persistent working memory – typically implemented in Random Access Memory (RAM) – used as
scratch space for computation and temporary working space for storing and modifying data. RAM is non-
persistent memory: information is not retained across card sessions and is lost when the power to the
smartcard ends. There are no limits to the number of times RAM may be written to;
2.3 Java Card Platform
2.3.1 What is a Java Card smartcard? What different kinds of smartcards are there?
What are their typical applications?
A Java Card smartcard is a microprocessor smartcard including an implementation of the Java Card platform
(see Section 2.3.3). In the remainder of this chapter, general references to smartcards are always references to
Java Card smartcards.
Java Card smartcards may be contacted (in which case a card session may be initiated when the card is inserted
into a card-acceptance device (CAD)) or contactless (in which case a card session may be initiated when the card
comes within range of a proximity coupling device (PCD)). In the interest of brevity, whether the particular card is
contacted or contactless, we shall refer to card acceptance devices (CADs), and we shall refer to “card tear” to
describe when a contacted card is removed abruptly during a card session or when a contactless card moves out
of range of the proximity coupling device during a card session (or the wireless connection is otherwise dropped
27
during a contactless card session).
As explained in Section 2.2.5, as a microprocessor smartcard, typical applications (called applets) that might be
registered with Java Card smartcards include:
• banking;
• wireless telecommunications (including mobile ’phone SIM cards);
• access control (both building access control and software access control via smartcard authentication);
• public transport tokens
and any other applications where data security/privacy is of paramount importance.
One of the most attractive qualities of the Java Card platform is the potential for dynamic download, deletion and
upgrade of registered applets on Java Card smartcards. Although not common, it is possible for a Java Card
smartcard not to allow update to the smartcard, and so its functions and value can be fixed.
Applets follow a lifecycle as explained in Section 2.3.3.7 and each applet is uniquely identified on a smartcard by
its application identifier. An Application IDentifier (AID) is defined in ISO 7816-5 to be a sequence of bytes between
5 and 16 bytes in length, of which the first five bytes are known as the Resource IDentifier (RID) and is used to
identify the applet vendor; the remaining bytes are known as the Proprietary Identifier eXtension (PIX).
Applets registered on a smartcard remain in a suspended state until selected by the CAD. At most one applet at a
time on a smartcard can be currently selected and capable of exchanging messages with the CAD. Section 2.3.3.6
explains more.
As well as being used to uniquely identify an applet on a smartcard, AIDs play a central role in Java Card security
as explained in Section 2.3.3.11.
2.3.2 What is the protocol for communicating with Java Card smartcards? What is
Java Card Remote Method Invocation?
The canonical protocol for communicating with Java Card smartcards is the canonical smartcard communication
protocol Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) outlined in Section 2.2.3. Support for this protocol is enshrined in
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the standard Java Card developer libraries (the Java Card API1) e.g. in the APDU class which provides access to
the components of the APDU commands and replies, as defined in ISO-7816. Note that regardless of whether
the smartcard is a contacted card or contactless card, APDU is the canonical protocol for communicating with a
Java Card smartcard.
Since Java Card platform 2.2 an alternative, object-centric, protocol for communicating between Java Card smart-
cards and card-acceptance-device-side Java applications based on Java remote method invocation, known as
Java Card Remote Method Invocation, is available. This is discussed in Chapter 8 of [Ora11b] and not any fur-
ther here, because whether it is APDUs or Java Card RMI, the same applet lifecycle methods are invoked on the
smartcard.
2.3.3 What is the Java Card platform? What are the governing standards regarding
Java Card smartcards?
Roughly speaking, the Java Card platform is a scaled-down version of the Java Standard Edition for smartcards
and other highly resource-constrained devices, whose feature set has been carefully chosen to be useful for writing
typical applications for such devices.
Properly speaking, the current Java Card Platform 3 Classic Edition is formally defined by three natural language
specifications: the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) specification [Ora11b]; the Java Card API (JCAPI)
specification [Ora11a]; and the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) specification [Ora11c].
As an indication of the success or rate of adoption of Java Card by the smartcard community, Oracle announced
in 2015 that over 12 billion Java Card smartcards have been deployed in the last fifteen years. Hence there is
potentially great commercial advantage in developing software to analyse interesting properties and behaviours of
Java Card applets. Security properties and resource-consumption demands are likely to be of particular interest.
The most appropriate basis for validating/verifying such software is formal methods. Prominent on the list of the
reasons we prefer and advocate program analysis for the choice of formal method is the high degree of automation
typical of software tools implementing static analyses.
The intention of this section is two-fold: firstly, to present a broad overview of the Java Card platform; and secondly,
to include sufficient detail in this broad overview to make it unnecessary to look elsewhere for a basic understanding
1See Section 2.3.3.2
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of the Java Card platform. Resources [Ora11b, Ora11a, Ora11c, Che00] are prime starting points for further
information.
2.3.3.1 The Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE)
Defined by the Java Card Runtime Environment specification [Ora11b], the JCRE is in essence the operating
system of the Java Card smartcard. Key responsibilities of the JCRE include: resource-management; provision of
entry-point methods2 to allow unprivileged (user) applets to invoke (privileged) system calls; receiving and reacting
to all commands received by the Java Card smartcard (typically by invoking the JCVM).
2.3.3.2 The Java Card API (JCAPI)
Defined by the Java Card API (JCAPI) specification [Ora11a], the JCAPI specification details the standard user
libraries available to Java Card applet developers, providing the usual Java abstraction away from the particular
underlying hardware (here smartcard technologies).
2.3.3.3 The Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
Defined by the Java Card Virtual Machine specification [Ora11c], the JCVM defines the instruction set (bytecode
instructions) of the Java Card virtual machine. Further details on the features supported by the current JCVM
specification are given below.A fundamental and striking difference between JCVMs and standard Java virtual
machines is that the JCVM appears to run forever. When power is restored to a Java Card smartcard, the JCVM
recovers from its persistent memory the persistent object heap – the JCVM is (essentially) suspended between
card sessions (i.e. sessions where APDUs are exchanged between the smartcard and the terminal). (See Section
2.3.3.8 for further details on this point).
2.3.3.4 Java Features supported in Java Card
Section 2.2 of [Ora11c] defines the subset of Java supported by the Java Card platform. Key details are given
below.
Based on Section 2.2 of [Ora11c], we consolidate in Table 2.1 the Java features that are and are not supported by
Java Card platform 3 Classic Edition.
2See Sections 2.3.3.11 to 2.3.3.13 for further details.
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Package access control in Java Card is essentially the same as in Java. There are seven specific package access
patterns that are valid in Java that are not supported in Java Card . These are given in Section 2.2.1.1 of [Ora11c].
To compensate for the lack of security managers, Java Card has its own security architecture known as the applet
firewall. Details of the applet firewall are given below in Section 2.3.3.11.
Supported Java Features Unsupported Java Features
Small primitive data types: Other primitive data types:
boolean, byte, short char, long, double, float
One-dimensional arrays Multi-dimensional arrays
Java packages, classes, interfaces and exceptions Garbage collection and finalization
Java object-oriented features: inheritance, Characters and strings
virtual methods, overloading and dynamic
object creation, access scope and binding rules.
The int keyword and 32-bit integer Security managers
data type support are optional









Table 2.1: Java Features supported in Java Card 3 Classic Edition
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Java Card Keywords
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 reproduce from Section 2.2.2.2 of [Ora11c] the Java keywords that are, and are not, respectively,
supported by the Java Card platform. For those Java keywords that are supported in Java Card keywords: “Their
use is the same as in the Java programming language”.
abstract default if private this
boolean do implements protected throw
break else import public throws
byte extends instanceof return try
case final int short void
catch finally interface static while
class for new super
continue goto package switch
Table 2.2: Java Keywords supported in Java Card 3 Classic Edition
native synchronized transient assert
volatile strictfp enum
Table 2.3: Java Keywords NOT supported in Java Card 3 Classic Edition
Java Card JCVM instruction set (bytecode instructions)
Table 2.4 lists the Java bytecode instructions supported by the Java Card virtual machine.
2.3.3.5 Split Architecture
The computing power and resources on the current generation of smartcards falls far short of that required to
perform the functions typical of standard Java development and deployment activities. For example, standard
bytecode verification is too resource-intensive for a typical smartcard.
The solution to this problem is a split-architecture where more computationally intensive activities take place off-
card and demands on the smartcard are kept to a minimum. Of course, the on-card JCVM includes a Java Card
bytecode interpreter that can interpret the bytecode instructions of Table 2.4. One of the key responsibilities of the
JCVM bytecode interpreter is to enforce the applet firewall (see below). As per Section 6.1 of [Ora11b]: “Applet
firewalls are always enforced in the Java Card VM. They allow the VM to automatically perform additional security
checks at runtime”.
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nop aconst null iconst <i> bipush
sipush ldc ldc w iload
aload iload <n> aload <n> iaload
aaload baload saload istore
astore istore <n> astore <n> iastore
aastore bastore sastore pop
pop2 dup dup x1 dup x2
dup2 dup2 x1 dup2 x2 swap
iadd isub imul idiv
irem ineg ior ishl
ishr iushr iand ixor
iinc i2b i2s if<cond>
ificmp <cond> ifacmp <cond> goto jsr
ret tableswitch lookupswitch ireturn
areturn return getstatic putstatic
getfield putfield invokevirtual invokespecial
invokestatic invokeinterface new newarray
anewarray arraylength athrow checkcast
instanceof wide ifnull ifnonnull
Table 2.4: Java bytecode instructions supported in Java Card 3 Classic Edition
2.3.3.6 Logical Channels
Java Card platform 3 provides support for logical channels as defined in ISO 7816-4:2013 Specification. This
allows up to twenty sessions to be opened up into the smart card per (contacted and contactless) I/O interface and
have an applet selected and ready to receive commands on each channel.
Java Card classic applets written to take advantage of logical channels3 can be selected concurrently on different
logical channels, or selected alongside other applets on different logical channels. The JCRE will ensure applets
written prior to logical channels support will be handled correctly i.e. there must be at most one applet from a
package active on at most one logical channel.
Note that only at most one applet at a time is designated as the currently active applet and only the currently active
applet may receive–, process- and reply to– non-SELECT FILE and non-MANAGE CHANNEL APDU commands
from the card terminal.
To be absolutely clear, under all Classic editions of Java Card platforms, Java Card Classic is a single-threaded
environment.
3This is signalled by implementing the methods of the javacard.framework.MultiSelectable interface.
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2.3.3.7 Applet Lifecycle
In a similar way to, for example, Java web applets and Enterprise Java Beans, card applets extend a base abstract
class Applet, which defines a set of lifecycle methods which the JCRE invokes appropriately in response to com-
mand APDUs received from the terminal connected to a card-acceptance device. These include select methods
to inform an applet that a request has been made to make it the currently selected applet on a particular logical
channel, a process method which is used to process each command APDU received and returns to the JCRE the
result of the operation (i.e. the reason code – like HTTP servers, smartcards return numeric status words to indi-
cate the success of an operation, along with any data to return to the terminal), and deselect methods to inform
the currently selected applet on a particular logical channel that a card-acceptance device session is complete, or
that another applet is to be selected to run on that logical channel.
2.3.3.8 What is the typical memory model of Java Card smartcards?
Specialising Section 2.2.6 in the light of Section 4.1 of [Che00]: Java Card smartcards usually have three different
types of memory on-card:
• Persistent immutable memory – typically implemented in Read-Only Memory (ROM) – housing the smartcard
operating system and the Java Card platform including JCRE, JCVM and JCAPI, including any fixed
applets, utilities and other programs or data that are permanent and not capable of being upgraded. This
type of memory does not need electricity to retain data across card sessions;
• Persistent mutable memory – typically implemented in electrical erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM) – housing the applications data and Java Card applets’ data and any downloaded Java Card
applets, and any objects allocated when an object is created using the new command that is meant to
persist across card sessions and which applications are capable of, and expect to, change over time. This
type of memory does not need electricity to retain data across card sessions. Reading from EEPROM is as
fast as reading from ROM, but writing to it is approximately a thousand times slower, and there is an upper
limit to the number of times EEPROM may reliably be written to;
• Non-persistent working memory – typically implemented in Random Access Memory (RAM) – used as
scratch space for computation and temporary working space for storing and modifying data, including run-
time Java Card operand stack, local variables and results from card specific native cryptographic
functions. RAM is non-persistent memory: information is not retained across card sessions and is lost
when the power to the smartcard ends. There are no limits to the number of time RAM may be written to;
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In Java Card , all class instances are persistent and arrays may be persistent or transient. The former type of mem-
ory, persistent memory, typically using EEPROM, is allocated when an object is created using the new command.
This enables persistent objects to hold state across card-acceptance-device sessions. The latter type, transient
memory has nothing to do with the keyword transient in standard Java (and which is not a valid keyword in
Java Card). Here transient memory means that the value of each array element is cleared to its default values (of
null for object types and zero for primitive numeric types) depending on what card event occurs:
• the card is reset (known as CLEAR ON RESET);
• the currently selected applet is deselected or an applet from another group context than the currently selected
applet has been selected to be the currently selected applet (known as CLEAR ON DESELECT)
Additionally, if a card suffers card tear, this causes elements of transient arrays to be cleared to their default value.
The APDU buffer and the byte array input parameter to the Applet install method are both transient objects. A user
applet may call the JCSystem.makeTransientXXXArray methods to create a dynamic transient array.
2.3.3.9 Transaction Model
The Java Card platform provides a transactional model to enable groups of operations to persistent4 object fields
to be treated as an atomic operation. If an error occurs during a transaction (whether internal or external by e.g. a
card tear), the next time the smartcard is inserted into a card-acceptance device, the state of persistent objects is
restored to its previous state prior to the smartcard being ready to receive APDUs.
The JCRE maintains a commit buffer in which is recorded provisional state changes to persistent objects since
the current transaction was successfully started. Reads from fields in the commit buffer return the provision-
ally updated values. When the current transaction is successfully committed, state changes in the commit buffer
are persisted. The JCAPI JCSystem provides the following static methods which behave in the obvious way:
abortTransaction(), beginTransaction(), commitTransaction(), getMaxCommitCapacity(),
getTransactionDepth(), getUnusedCommitCapacity().
Due to resource limitations, nested transactions are not possible and an attempt to start a fresh transaction when
one is already underway causes an exception to be thrown. Similarly, attempts to commit a transaction when none
is underway causes an exception to be thrown. Also once an applet’s lifecycle method has terminated (whether
normally or by generating an exception), and control is returned to the JCRE, if a transaction is currently underway,
4See Section 2.3.3.8 for an explanation of persistent and transient objects.
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the JCRE aborts it automatically.
The transaction mechanism in Java Card is deceptively simple. While it is true to say the transaction mechanism
of the Classic editions allows only a single level of transaction (no nested transactions), it is not the case that within
an active transaction all changes to all object fields are made to a commit buffer and then persisted only when the
transaction is committed as might be expected. Similarly, if an active transaction is aborted, it is not the case that
changes made to the persistent memory (not the commit buffer) during the span of the transaction will be rolled
back, as might be expected. As per Sections 7.6.3 and 7.7 of [Ora11b]:
“Object instances created during the transaction that is being aborted can be deleted only if ref-
erences to these deleted objects can no longer be used to access these objects. The Java Card RE
shall ensure that a reference to an object created during the aborted transaction is equivalent to a
null reference. Alternatively, programmatic abortion after creating objects within the transaction can
be deemed to be a programming error. When this occurs, the Java Card RE may, to ensure the secu-
rity of the card and to avoid heap space loss, lock up the card session to force tear or reset processing”.
“Only updates to persistent objects participate in the transaction. Updates to transient objects and
global arrays are never undone, regardless of whether or not they were ”inside a transaction.””
We adopt the former approach of invalidating/treating as null object references created within a transaction that
is then aborted. The semantic transitions (and thus the program analyses based on them) will then be a superset
of the semantics transitions possible by locking up the card and forcing tear or reset processing.
The rationale for transient5 objects not participating in transaction appears to be for security: consider a banking
applet which uses a Personal Identification Number (PIN) which gives the user a maximum number of tries to enter
the correct PIN before locking the applet or card. Keeping track of the number of failed PIN entries must not be
subject to transaction semantics, or an attacker could brute-force attack the application until access is gained by
first initiating a transaction, then trying an all-zeroes PIN, aborting the transaction if the PIN authentication failed,
then retrying with the next number in sequence, and repeating this process until access is gained. It is reported
the reference implementation of the Sun Java Card Development Kit 2.0 contained such a defect for OwnerPIN,
which was corrected in the reference implementation of the Sun Java Card Development Kit 2.1.1 [HMP06].
5See Section 2.3.3.8 for differences between permanent and transient memory.
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2.3.3.10 Applet Development Cycle and the CAP File Format
The Java Card application (i.e. applet) development cycle is different from the normal Java development cycle in
two regards: firstly, the keywords of the Java source files must come from Table 2.2; secondly, the unit of installa-
tion on Java smartcards is the package (in the normal Java sense) in a particular format, the compressed applet
(CAP) format. The exact format of the CAP file can be found in Chapter 6 of [Ora11c]. We omit the details here.
In particular, the normal applet development cycle is to develop Java applications using the keywords of Table 2.2
in a traditional computing environment (e.g. a desktop PC) where all the source (non-JCAPI, non-library packages
known to be present on the target smartcard(s)) Java files are defined in the same package. At that point, the
normal development cycle is followed e.g. design, implementation and testing. From the source Java files, normal
Java classes are output. Once the developer is satisfied with the behaviour of the applet(s) and supporting classes,
a piece of off-card software called the converter transforms the classes into a CAP file in the prescribed format.
Another special piece of off-card software called the installer is responsible for transmitting and registering the
CAP file with the JCRE on the smartcard. [The installation process is card– and card-vendor– specific and this
process is not specified by the Java Card platform].
2.3.3.11 Applet Firewall and Applet Selection
In the absence of security managers and class loaders, and to preclude the possibility that malicious applets may
be able to exploit unintentionally lax access modifier attributes in other applets, the Java Card platform defines its
own security architecture.
As noted above, the unit of installation on the Java Card smartcard is the package. For compatibility with ISO-7816,
the familiar Java package naming convention is mapped to (numeric) application identifiers (AIDs). An Application
IDentifier (AID) is defined in ISO 7816-5 to be a sequence of bytes between 5 and 16 bytes in length, of which
the first five bytes are known as the Resource IDentifier (RID) and is used to identify the applet vendor; the re-
maining bytes are known as the Proprietary Identifier eXtension (PIX). [AIDs and contexts are used synonymously].
When CAP files (i.e. JCVM bytecode in a particular format) are installed on the Java Card smartcard, each applet
in the CAP file is assigned a unique AID and a shared (group) AID, both of which must not be currently registered
on the particular smartcard prior to installation. When the client application wants to select a particular applet
on the Java Card as the currently active applet, it sends a SELECT FILE APDU or MANAGE CHANNEL OPEN
command to the smartcard with the AID of the desired applet and assuming the smartcard accepts the selection
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request, the applet identified by that AID is then set to receive subsequent applet-specific (non-SELECT FILE,
non-MANAGE CHANNEL APDU) commands, until some other applet is selected or the card is removed from the
card-acceptance device.
Broadly speaking, the applet firewall operates on the basis of group AIDs/contexts. When a request is made to
invoke a method on, or otherwise access, an object, a runtime check is made to ensure that the currently active
applet has the same group context as the object being accessed or invoked, or that the object being accessed is
JCRE-owned and the currently active applet is invoking or accessing a permitted object or method. If the group
contexts do not match, or if an improper attempt is made to access a JCRE method or object, then the JCVM
throws an exception. Section 3.8 codifies the applet firewall rules via a set of security predicates which apply
depending on the bytecode instruction being executed.
Every object o in the Java Card object system has an owning context comprised of two AIDs – for user applets,
the AID of the applet app that was active at the point of o’s creation, and the AID of the group context that was
active at the point of o’s creation i.e. app’s group context. For resource conservation reasons, and to control user
applet access to system resources, some objects are owned by the JCRE and different firewall rules apply in these
scenarios – these are discussed in Sections 2.3.3.12 to 2.3.3.15.
2.3.3.12 Object access across contexts – JCRE Entry Points Objects (temporary)
The APDU object and all JCRE owned exception objects are examples of temporary JCRE Entry Point objects,
and its methods may be invoked from any context.
The JCRE (more specifically the JCVM) throws a SecurityException if a user applet attempts to store a reference
to a temporary JCRE Entry Point object in instance variables, or array elements, or class variables.
2.3.3.13 Object access across contexts – JCRE Entry Points (permanent)
When an applet is installed on a Java Card , and more particularly when it is registered on a Java Card, it does so
with a particular AID. If the registration is successful, the JCRE creates a JCRE-owned instance of the correspond-
ing AID class, and adds them to the applet registry. These JCRE owned AID instances are examples of permanent
JCRE Entry Point objects and its methods may be invoked from any context, typically to identify a particular applet
on the card from which to request a Shareable service as explained in Section 2.3.3.15 below.
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A user applet is allowed to store and reuse references to permanent JCRE Entry Point objects in instance variables,
or array elements, or class variables.
2.3.3.14 Object access across contexts – Global Arrays
The APDU buffer and the byte array input parameter to the Applet install method are both examples of global
arrays and are accessible from any context. A user applet may call the JCSystem.makeGlobalArray()methods to
create a dynamic global array.
Section 6.2.2 of [Ora11b] states that global arrays are temporary JCRE entry points. The JCRE (more specifically
the JCVM) throws a SecurityException if a user applet attempts to store a reference to a temporary JCRE Entry
Point object in instance variables, or array elements, or class variables.
2.3.3.15 Object access across contexts – Shareable Objects
The applet firewall allows no communication between applets in different packages (i.e. applets with different group
contexts). This may be considered too restrictive for classes of useful applets e.g. loyalty-card style applets. The
Java Card platform defines a tagging interface Shareable to allow controlled access to an applet’s methods (but
never directly its fields). In a similar way to standard Java remote method invocation, an applet that wishes to make
services available to other clients defines a public interface extending Shareable, say S1, and then declares that
it implements the particular interface S1. It then publishes the Shareable reference to other applets by over-riding
the empty method getShareableInterfaceObject(AID, byte) defined in the Applet class, the base class which
all applets must extend. The parameters to this method allows an applet to determine what – if any – Shareable
references it wishes to return to the applet requesting the Shareable reference. [The JCRE automatically maps
the request for a Shareable reference, which must specify the AID of the applet providing the desired services
in the invoking applet, to the AID of the requesting applet AIDs in the invoked applet. This allows an applet pro-
viding shareable services to control to which applets it is willing to offer shareable object references, and allows
different shareable services to be offered to different requesting applets. This automatic mapping is part of the
applet (individual– and group– AID) context switch that occurs when the JCRE manages the request for shareable
objects, since only the JCRE can bypass the applet firewall and access any field or object it wishes].
Note that this mechanism for returning Shareable references is not sufficiently strong in itself to prevent unau-
thorised access to Shareable services. Suppose an applet A returns to applet B a shareable reference it would
not return to applet C. Nothing stops applet B from publishing to applet C the shareable object that A returned to
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it. Hence the JCRE specification advises, (in Chapter 6 of [Ora11b]), that at each attempt to access a shareable
method it authenticates the invoking client to guard against improper service access. At the very least, the applet
providing shareable services can use a JCAPI method to determine the AID of the invoking applet. Of course,
much more sophisticated authentication strategies are possible and appropriate for applets managing more sensi-
tive data, such as applets implementing an electronic purse or wallet.
2.3.4 What are the benefits of Java Card smartcards?
The Java Card platform brings to the smartcard arena many of the benefits enjoyed in more traditional computing
environments by Java. Reproducing from Section 1.3.1 of [Che00], the benefits of Java Card technology include:
1. Ease of application development – The Java language brings smart card programming into the mainstream of
software development, relieving developers from going through the swamps of microprocessor programming,
such as programming in 6805 and 8051 assembly languages. . . . The (Java Card) platform encapsulates
the underlying complexity and details of the smartcard system. Applet developers work with the high-level
programming interfaces. They can concentrate most of their effort on the details of the application and
leverage extensions and libraries that others have written;
2. Security – Security is always of paramount concern when working with smartcards. Java’s built-in security
features fit in well with the smartcard environment. For example, the level of access to all methods and
variables is strictly controlled and there is no way to forge pointers to enable malicious programs to snoop
around inside memory. In addition, applets on the Java Card platform are separated by the applet firewall.
This way the system can safeguard against an application’s attempts to damage other parts of the system;
3. Hardware independence – Java Card technology is independent of the type of hardware used. It can run
on any smart card platform. Applets are written on top of the Java Card platform and hence are smartcard
hardware independent. Ready-to-use applets can be loaded into any Java Card smartcard without recompi-
lation;
4. Ability to store and manage multiple applications – A Java smartcard can host multiple applets, such as an
electronic purse, authentication, loyalty and health care program, from different service providers. Because
of the the Java Card applet firewall, applets are not allowed to access each other unless explicitly permitted
to do so. . . More applets can be downloaded to the card. A Java smartcard’s functionality can be continually
upgraded with new or updated applets, without the need for issuing a new or different card;
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5. Compatibility with existing smartcard standards – Java Card technology is based on the smartcard interna-
tional standard ISO-7816, so it can easily support smartcard systems and applications that are generally
compatible with ISO 7816.
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Chapter 3
The Carmel programming language
3.1 Introduction
This thesis is firmly rooted in the SecSafe project1[HSN+03, Pro02], a successfully completed EC-funded inves-
tigation whose main focus was on the development of static techniques to analyse security properties of realistic
languages. Such analyses may be used as the formal basis for obtaining security certification at the higher levels
of the (US, Canadian and European) Common Criteria (for evaluation of computer security) [The06]. A substantial
proportion of the workload of, and effort expended during, the SecSafe project, relates to the Java Card platform.
In particular, this thesis is firmly rooted in the Java Card aspects of the SecSafe project. For the reader unfamiliar
with smartcards and/or the Java Card Classic Edition 3, Chapter 2 presents an introduction to these technologies.
In the context of this thesis, our principal interest in revisiting the SecSafe material is to evaluate its fitness for facil-
itating loop-bounds calculations and detecting recursion2. We also take the opportunity to update the operational
semantics and program analyses to Java Card Classic Edition 3; the version considered by SecSafe is Java Card
2.1. We have identified the following ways in which we will extend the SecSafe material for our purposes:
• Enable the identification of local variables being used as loop variables in if bytecode instructions to allow
simple loops to be bounded by our program analyses. The technical means by which we achieve this is to
extend the runtime value of Carmel values to include the address at which a value was generated or most
recently saved in a manner consistent with a reaching definitions for local variables analysis3 developed from
1Project IST-1999-29075, Secure and Safe Systems based on Static Analysis, funded by the European Community under the “Information
Society Technologies” Programme (1998-2002)
2As outlined in Section 1.1, and as explained more fully in Chapter 6, the hardest part of determining worst-case resource-usage is deter-
mining loop-bounds, and we must ensure there are no recursive calls reachable from any of the applet lifecycle methods.
3See Appendix C for details of the reaching definitions for local variables analysis and classical reaching definitions analysis.
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the classical reaching definitions analysis. The correctness of this approach is shown in two phases:
– firstly, we prove using structural induction and representation functions that the base control-flow anal-
ysis of Chapter 4 correctly captures (i.e. over-approximates the set of) the runtime values of the oper-
ational semantics (including the address at which each value was generated or most recently saved)
given in this Chapter;
– secondly, we prove using the reaching definitions for local variables analysis and operational semantics
that the base control-flow analysis clauses for the if bytecode instructions may be split into cases in the
extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5 and so we propagate only (a possible over-approximation
of the set of) semantically possible values of loop variables to the appropriate branches of the if state-
ments;
• In any program analysis, record at each program point the set of all method names in the call-stack and
propagate these to all successors of the program point – this will make detecting recursive calls straight-
forward at method invocation bytecode instructions;
• Integrate the full semantics of the transaction mechanism in the atomic bytecode instructions;
• Parameterise the applet firewall security predicates for use in the operational semantics and the abstract
program analyses;
• Restructure the operational semantics to be much closer in form to the program analyses and so
– simplify the proofs;
– amplify the correspondence of the operational semantics and the program analyses;
• all runtime values have explicit types and we support the optional 32-bit integer in our program analyses as
well as our operational semantics;
• specify the operational semantics for the Java Card API and corresponding program analysis clauses.
In this chapter, we present an operational semantics for the programming language Carmel, which models the
Java Card Virtual Machine language, based principally on [Ora11a, Ora11b, Ora11c, HS05, Siv04, SH01, Che00]
and explicitly represent the state of the transaction mechanism and the state of the I/O APDU buffer4 as part of the
JCVM machine state. More specifically, in this chapter we present an operational semantics for the Carmel form
4In Java Card Classic Edition 3, an applet must order its input/output behaviour with the card-acceptance device (CAD) via the APDU buffer
by first (optionally) signalling it wants to read from the APDU buffer and then reading and then (optionally) signalling it wants to return data to
the CAD and then writing to the APDU buffer. If the APDU buffer is set for writing, any attempt to read from it will cause an exception to be
raised, as will signalling the intention to read from the APDU buffer. The states of the APDU buffer, and their valid transitions, are well-specified
in [Ora11b].
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of the bytecode instructions in the Java Card Virtual Machine specification [Ora11c] and define in Appendix A the
operational semantics for the Java Card API methods specified in [Ora11a]. We use the instruction set and extend
the program structures from [SH01] and define a small-step relation between program configurations, including
rules for exception handling and subroutines. We also include the structures needed to model object ownership,
the Java Card firewall and transactional state.
3.1.1 Notation
Format of the operational semantics The format of the operational semantics presented in this thesis is non-
standard. Firstly, we use whitespace and indentation to indicate scope and to avoid excessive bracketing and









which may be read as meaning in a Carmel Program P , given a machine state of Q1, then when P1. . . . Pn are
true, the machine state transitions to Q2. Notationally, this is equivalent to:
P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn
Q1 ⇒ Q2
which is the more familiar form for describing how and when state transitions occur in operational semantics. Note






which is equivalent to the more familiar
(
Pi ⇒ (Pf ∧ . . . ∧ Pw)
)
. This is merely a notational convenience.
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Records. Some new domains are defined as records. Records are defined using the following notation:
Dom = (f1 : Dom1)× ...× (fn : Domn)
Access to field fi in e ∈ Dom is written as e.fi. Field update is written as e.[fi 7→ f ], where f ∈ Domi.
Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions and disjunctions are grouped using parentheses and curly braces









(x = v1) ∧ cond1 ∨
. . . ∨
(x = v i) ∧ ¬cond1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬condi−1 ∧ condi ∨
. . . ∨
(x = vn) ∧ ¬cond1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬condn−1 ∧ condn


3.2 The Carmel Syntax
3.2.1 The Carmel Instruction Set
As per [SH01], the Java Card Virtual Machine Bytecode Language Instruction set is partitioned into six groups:
I ∈ Instruction ::= CoreInstruction | ObjectInstruction | MethodInstruction | ArrayInstruction
| ExceptionInstruction | SubroutineInstruction
CoreInstruction ::= nop | push OpType Constant | pop integer |
dup NbWords NbWords | swap NbWords NbWords |
numop OpType NumericOperator OpTypeopt |
load OpType Index | store OpType Index |
inc OpType Index integer | goto Address |
if ComparisonOperator nullopt goto Address |
lookupswitch OpType (integer => Address)∗ , default => Address |
tableswitch OpType integer => Address∗ , default => Address
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ObjectInstruction ::= new ReferenceType |
checkcast ReferenceType | instanceof ReferenceType |
getstatic Field | putstatic Field |
getfield thisopt Field | putfield thisopt Field
MethodInstruction ::= invokedefinite Method | invokevirtual Method |
invokeinterface Method | return OpTypeopt
ArrayInstruction ::= arraylength | arrayload OpType | arraystore OpType
ExceptionInstruction ::= throw
SubroutineInstruction ::= jsr Address | ret Index
where
Constant ::= integer | null
NbWords ::= integer
op ∈ NumericOperator ::= UnaryNumericOperator | BinaryNumericOperator
UnaryNumericOperator ::= neg | to
BinaryNumericOperator ::= add | sub | mul | div | rem | cmp
| and | or | xor | shl | shr | ushr
ComparisonOperator ::= eq | ne | ge | gt | le | lt
Index ::= integer
An operand type,
t ∈ OpType ::= b | s | i | r,
indicates if the instruction is going to work with elements of type byte, short, integer or reference respectively. We
reuse this notation in section 3.4 when we use run-time types. Similarly we reuse ReferenceType, defined in 3.2.2.
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3.2.2 Types
A Carmel program deals with the following types:
τ ∈ Type ::= ReferenceType | PrimitiveType
PrimitiveType ::= BooleanType | NumericType | ReturnAddressType
NumericType ::= IntegralType
IntegralType ::= byte | short | int
BooleanType ::= boolean
ReturnAddressType ::= ret
τr ∈ ReferenceType ::= ArrayType | ClassType | InterfaceType
ClassType ::= ClassName
InterfaceType ::= InterfaceName
ComponentType ::= BooleanType | NumericType | ClassType | InterfaceType
ArrayType ::= ComponentType[ ]
A special type MethodType is defined:
τm ∈ MethodType = (parameterTypes : [Type]) × (resultType : ResultType)
τres ∈ ResultType = Type ∪ VoidType
but will usually write5:
MethodType ::= (τi)n1 → τres
ResultType ::= Type | VoidType
VoidType ::= void
The subtype relation τ  τ ′ is defined following the “can be assigned to” criteria as indicated by the description of
checkcast and instanceof in [Ora11b]. The following functions will be useful:
superClasses(⊥) = { }




{superInterfaces∗(ifacei) | ifacei ∈ superInterfaces(iface)} ∪
superInterfaces(iface)
(3.2)




cl ′ ∈ superClasses(cl)






τ[ ]  Object
τ  τ ′
τ[ ]  τ ′[ ]
iface ∈ implements(Array)
τ[ ]  iface
Figure 3.1: Subtype Relation Rules
implements(⊥) = { }
implements(cl) =
⋃
{superInterfaces∗(ifacei) | ifacei ∈ implementedInterfaces(cl)} ∪
implementedInterfaces(cl) ∪ implements(superClass(cl))
(3.3)
We write cl ∈ superClasses(cl ′) instead of “cl′ is a subclass of cl”. Similarly, we write
iface ∈ superInterfaces∗(interface′) and cl ∈ implements(iface) if iface′ is a subinterface of iface and if cl imple-
ments interface iface, respectively.
The subtype relation τ  τ ′ is defined by the rules in Figure 3.1.
3.3 Program Structures
3.3.1 Programs and Packages
The information contained in the JCVM CAP files is abstracted by the framework into a program structure. A
program P contains a set of packages and each package a set of classes. Classes and packages can be extracted
from a program using the interface defined in [Mar01]. We define the following domains:
P ∈ Program p ∈ Package cl ∈ Class iface ∈ Interface
A package is uniquely identified by an AID (application identifier):
aid ∈ PackageAID
Notation: Names are dropped from CAP files. In order to make the presentation more readable, names - concrete
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syntax - are introduced when necessary, as in the case of types and exception names.
3.3.2 Classes, Interfaces, methods and fields
The class, interface, method and field structures can be accessed using the interfaces defined in [Mar01].
3.3.2.1 Method Lookup
All methods sharing the same signature are assigned the same method id. Given a method id and a class cl, the
function methodLookup(id, cl) returns the first method structure with the same method id found in the superclass
hierarchy of class cl:
methodLookup : MethodID× Class⊥ → Method⊥
where
methodLookup(id, cl) = m ⇔ m ∈ cl.methods ∧m.id = id
methodLookup(id, cl) = methodLookup(id, cl.superClass) ⇔ ∀m ∈ cl.methods, m.id 6= id
methodLookup(id,⊥) = ⊥
3.4 Values and Runtime Data Types
Carmel supports two kind of values: primitive values and reference values. Primitive values consist of numeric
values (byte, short and int6) and return addresses. Reference values consist of references to class instances
and arrays (locations, section 3.5.2) and the special constant null. Java Card virtual machine values can be:
v ∈ Value = OpType× (PrimitiveValue ∪ ReferenceValue)× Address
PrimitiveValue = NumericValue ∪ ReturnAddressValue
NumericValue = ByteValue ∪ ShortValue ∪ IntegerValue
where
ReferenceValue = Location ∪ {null}
and ReturnAddressValue values are runtime representations of Address elements. The Java Card virtual machine
runtime types associated to the values defined above are:
JCVMType ::= b | s | i | r | ra
6Not all JCVM implementations support integers.
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for byte, short, integer, reference and return address values respectively. Note that we are re-using the OpType
set: JCVMType = OpType ∪ {ra}.
We use the notation (t, v , (mn, pcn)) to express the runtime value that represents the value v with type t and which
we’ve associated with address (mn, pcn). Note that the address component is never used in the operational se-
mantics to transition between configurations.
Storage is managed by the JCVM in terms of an abstract storage unit called word. A word is large enough to hold
a value of type b, s, r and ra. Two words are large enough to hold a value of type i. The function nbWords returns
the number of words of a value or a sequence of values.
nbWords : Value∗ → N0
nbWords : ǫ = 0
nbWords : (t, Y, (mn, pcn)) =


2, t = i
1, otherwise




(ti, Yi, (mi, pci))
)
3.4.1 Numeric Values
The Java types byte and short are supported by the JCVM. These types correspond to the b and s JCVM types.
Some JCVM implementations may also support the int type. The numeric values supported by the JCVM consist
of:
• Type b (byte), represented as 8-bit signed two’s complement integers.
• Type s (short), represented as 16-bit signed two’s complement integers.
• Type i (int), represented as 32-bit signed two’s complement integers.
Values of the Java type boolean are implemented as byte values, where 1 represents true and 0 false.
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Operations between numeric values are performed using the functions applyUnary and applyBinary:
applyUnary : UnaryNumericOperator × Value × Address
applyUnary : UnaryNumericOperator × JCVMType× Value × Address
applyBinary : BinaryNumericOperator × Value × Value × Address
As mentioned in section 3.5.3.1, boolean and byte values have to be sign-extended to a short before they are
pushed to the operand stack. Similarly, short values placed on the stack have to be truncated before they are
stored in to a field or array element of type boolean or byte. The toShort and fromShort functions are defined such
that:
toShort((t, c, (mn, pcn))) = applyUnary(to, s, (t , c, (mn, pcn)), (mn.pcn))




Carmel allows two object types, array objects (arrays) and non-array objects (class instances). For simplicity and
uniformity, we specify both object types in terms of 11 common attributes:
o ∈ Object = (type : Type)
× (refType : ReferenceType)
× (isArray : boolean)
× (owner : Owner)
× (entryPoint : EntryPoint)
× (isGlobal : boolean)
× (transient : Transient)
× (creationPoint : Address)
× (values : (FieldID ∪ integer) → Value)
× (length : integer)
× (heapID : integer)
and distinguish between object types based on the value of the isArray attribute i.e. an array would have the isArray
attribute set to true and a class instance has the isArray attribute set to false i.e.
o ∈ ClassInstance ⇐⇒ o.isArray = false
o ∈ ArrayObject ⇐⇒ o.isArray = true
Considering each attribute in turn:
• An object’s type is its class name if it’s a class instance, or the array element type if it’s an array object;
• An object’s refType is its reference type, if it’s a class instance, then refType = type, if it’s an array object, the
refType = type[ ] i.e. the reference type is an array whose elements are of type type;
• An object’s isArray attribute specifies whether the object is an array instance (in which case this attribute is
true) or a class instance (in which case the attribute is false);
• An object’s owner attribute specifies the object’s owner AID/context and object’s group/package AID/context
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– see Section 2.3.3.11 for more information. This information is kept by a special structure:
Owner = (context : Context) × (aid : AID)
where contexts are defined by:
ctxt ∈ Context = PackageAID ∪ {JCRE};
• An object’s entryPoint attribute indicates whether the object is a permanent or temporary JCRE entry point
object or not a temporary entry point object – see Sections 2.3.3.12 and 2.3.3.13 for further information. We
define:
EntryPoint = {permanent, temporary, no};
• An object’s isGlobal attribute is a boolean attribute specifying whether the object is a global array instance –
see Section 2.3.3.14 for further details;
• An object’s transient attribute specifies whether the object is a transient object – see Section 2.3.3.8 for further
details. In all the Java Card Classic Editions so far, only arrays can be designated as transient objects. We
define:
Transient = {CLEAR ON RESET, CLEAR ON DESELECT, NOT TRANSIENT};
• An object’s creationPoint is the address at which the object was instantiated;
• An object’s values is a map from field ids to runtime values for class instances and a map from non-negative
array indexes to runtime values for array objects;
• An object’s length is the length of the array if the object is an array object, otherwise it is zero;
• An object’s heapID is a unique integer across all objects to allow testing for object reference/pointer equality.
We use the instanceFields function to determine the set of non-static fields of a class, including the fields defined
in its superclasses. instanceFields is defined inductively:
instanceFields(⊥) = { }
instanceFields(cl) = {f | f ∈ cl.fields ∧ ¬f .isStatic} ∪ instanceFields(cl.superClass)
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0 if τ ∈ NumericType
null if τ ∈ ReferenceType
3.5.2 Objects and the Heap
Objects in Carmel are stored in one or both of two heaps depending on the transactional state of the JCVM:
• The persistent non-transactional object heap H . When:
– no transaction is in progress and an update to an object’s field is requested, or
– regardless of whether a transaction is in progress and an update to a transient object is requested (i.e.
the object’s transient status is one of {CLEAR ON RESET, CLEAR ON DESELECT}), or
– regardless of whether a transaction is in progress and an update to a global object is requested (i.e. the
object’s attribute isGlobal = true)
changes are made to the persistent heap H and subsequent reads of the object field returns the updated
value. Should the card suffer card-tear, these updated values will be restored at next card session.
• The temporary transactional object heap JH. When:
– a transaction is in progress and an update to an object’s field is requested, and both of the following are
true:
∗ the object’s field transient status is NOT TRANSIENT
∗ the object’s attribute isGlobal = false
changes are made to the temporary transactional heap JH and subsequent reads of the object field
return the updated value in the JH. If the transaction is committed, all the changes in the temporary
heap JH are copied to the permanent heap H and the JH is then cleared. Should the card suffer card-
tear before an open transaction is committed, the updated values held in the temporary transactional
object heap JH are lost and at the next card session the temporary heap is initialised to empty.











JH(loc).values(f .id) loc ∈ dom(JH) ∧ f ∈ dom(JH(loc.values))
H(loc).values(f .id) otherwise
The heap is defined as a mapping from locations to objects, which can be class instances or arrays.
H, JH ∈ Heap = Location → Object
3.5.3 Frames
A frame contains information about the state of execution of a method. It is defined as follows:
F ∈ Frame = Location× TransactionDepth× TransactionDepth× IOState× Address× LocalVar ×OperandStack
F ::= 〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
A frame contains the following components:
• The location locn of the object on which the method in the Address component is currently invoked;
• The initial transaction depth itdn in which this frame was called at the firstAddress address of the Address
component;
• The current transaction depth ctdn on which the method in the Address component is currently invoked;
• The current state of the APDU input/output buffer ion;
• The current program point (combination of mn ∈ Method and pcn ∈ Address);
• The array of local variables Ln;
• The operand stack Sn.
3.5.3.1 Operand Stack
Carmel instructions take their dynamic operands from a special structure, the operand stack7. The operand stack
is defined as a sequence of values:
S = v1:: . . . ::vn ∈ OperandStack = StackValue∗
7Some instructions also take dynamic operands from the local variables.
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where values on top of the stack appear on the right-hand side of the sequence i.e. vn is on top of the stack above.
The empty stack is represented with the symbol ǫ. An element can be added to a stack with the :: operator (S::v )
and two stacks can be concatenated with the : operator (S:S′). For clarity we will write v1::v2 instead of ǫ::v1::v2.
The operand stack stores values of all types except those of runtime type b(byte or boolean types). Instead,
the Java Card virtual machine converts - sign-extends - byte and boolean values to short values when they are
pushed to the operand stack. The domain of stack values is defined as:
StackValue = Value − ByteValue StackType = JCVMType− {b}
3.5.3.2 Local Variables
A local variable is not referenced by name but by the position it occupies in the array of local variables, defined by:
L ∈ LocalVar = [StackValue⊥]
The array of local variables can store values of any of the stack types. Local variable slots are not statically typed
so values of different types can be stored in the same slot at different times during the execution of a method.
Special care must be taken when using multiword values. An integer value stored in L[i] takes two slots and
access to L[i+ 1] is prohibited. We can model this by making L[i+ 1] = ⊥ while position i holds the integer value.
Notation: We write:
L = v0:: . . . ::vn
when local variable array L is initialized with the sequence of values (usually from the operand stack) v0:: . . . ::vn.
Note that L[0] = v0 but v i does not necessarily correspond to L[i]. Instead we have:
L[0] = v0 ∧ L[nbWords(v0:: . . . ::v i−1)] = v i i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
3.5.4 Configurations
A runtime configuration describes the state of execution of the JCVM. We define three kinds of configurations:
C ∈ Config = RConfig ∪ EConfig ∪ HConfig
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A running configuration - RConfig - keeps track of the chain of invoked methods by using a stack of call frames.
An exception configuration - EConfig- represents the state of uncaught exceptions or machine errors.
The halt configuration is the result of returning from the method that started the execution of the current applet.
A running configuration C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 contains the following components:
• Applet registry R, a map from AIDs to Location of registered applets;
• The persistent static fields memory K , a mapping FieldID → Value;
• The persistent object heap H , a mapping from locations to runtime objects (class and array instances);
• A set of invalidated object locations I, of objects created inside a transaction that was subsequently aborted
which are to be treated as null;
• A monotonically increasing sequence number (integer) HID, used whenever a new object is created,
whether by atomic bytecode instructions or Java Card API calls that allocate memory dynamically. This
sequence number is used to check for object reference/pointer equality;
• The journalling/transactional object heap JH, a mapping from locations to runtime objects (class and array
instances) of conditionally updated object fields made inside a transaction;
• Logical channels component CHN , a map from a channel number between 0 and 39 to Location of a
registered applet (or null);
• The call-stack SF of frames. See Section 3.5.3 for a description of the structure of frames.
An exception configuration represents a terminal configuration where an uncaught exception reaches the JCRE:
C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈 locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 10),[ ], (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉〉
where (r, locexc, (m, apc)) is the location of the exception object that was thrown and not caught, and cmtd was
the current transaction depth of the current frame at the point the JCVM threw the uncaught exception, and io was
the state of the APDU buffer at the point the JCVM threw the uncaught exception.
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An halting configuration represents a terminal configuration where an applet is returning normally (i.e. not via
exception) to the JCRE:
C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈 locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 20),[ ], S〉〉
where S = ǫ or S = (s, c, (m, apc)), c ∈ {0, 1} depending on the return type of the applet lifecycle method invoked,
and cmtd was the current transaction depth of the current frame at the point the applet returned control to the JCRE,
and io was the state of the APDU buffer at the point the applet returned control to the JCRE.
A running configuration in a Carmel program P is either an initial configuration as per Section 3.7.1 or is reachable
from an initial configuration via repeated application of the configuration transitions of Section 3.9 P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config
wherever the call-stack of the resulting configuration is not one of the following forms:
• 〈locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 10),[ ], (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉
• 〈locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 20),[ ], S〉
An exception configuration in a Carmel program P is the result of repeated application of the configuration tran-
sitions of Section 3.9 P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config
from an initial configuration as per Section 3.7.1 and the call-stack of the
resulting configuration is of the following form:
〈locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 10),[ ], (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉
A halting configuration in a Carmel program P is the result of repeated application of the configuration transitions
of Section 3.9 P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config
from an initial configuration as per Section 3.7.1 and the call-stack of the resulting
configuration is of the following form:
〈locJCRE, 0, 0, INITIAL, (loop(), 0),[ ], ǫ〉::〈locJCRE, 0, cmtd, io, (dispatch(), 20),[ ], S〉
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3.6 Exceptions
An exception is thrown whenever a program violates the semantic constraints of Java Card Classic Edition 3 or
any other constraint specified by the programmer. Exceptions can be thrown explicitly using the throw instruction.
An exception is said to be caught if an appropriate exception handler is found in the current stack of call frames. If
an exception is caught, control is transferred to the start address indicated by the exception handler and execution
is resumed at that point. Note that we require there always to be at least one stack frame on the JCVM: the bottom
stack frame is always the JCRE, a looping process which has the responsibility to listen for– and reply to– com-
mands from the CAD client, and this bottom frame is owned by the JCRE itself. In our operational semantics, an
uncaught exception reaching the JCRE level i.e. an exception configuration from the previous section, will return
the location of the exception or JCVM error object to the JCRE and it will communicate the error back to the CAD.
The process of throwing and catching an exception is defined by the catchException function, defined in Table 3.6,
which searches the stack of call frames according to the following criteria:
• It first inspects the top call frame to see if the exception of class τ and referenced by loc can be handled. If no
appropriate exception handler is found in the top frame, the frame is popped and the search continues from
the invoker’s frame (“. . . frame is popped, the frame of its invoker is reinstated, and loc is rethrown”[Ora11c,
Chapter 7, page 133]).
• If the top frame contains an appropriate handler, the pc is reset to the value indicated by the handler, the
operand stack of the frame is cleared and loc is pushed back onto the operand stack and the new stack of
frames is returned.
• If no user frame is found that can handle the exception - if the stack of frames is the empty stack - the function
returns the reference to the uncaught exception.
The findHandler(m, pc, τ) function searches for the first exception handler in method m that can handle an excep-
tion of class τ at address pc. It returns the address of the code intended to handle the exception.The semantics of
findHandler is described below.
59
Let E = m.exceptionHandlers:
findHandler(m, pc, τ) =


E [i].handlerAddress ∃i ∈ {0, . . . ,E .length − 1}.
isCorrectHandler(E , i, pc, τ)∧
∀j, 0 ≤ j < i : ¬isCorrectHandler(E , j, pc, τ)
⊥ otherwise
The predicate isCorrectHandler(E , i, pc, τ) determines if exception handler E [i] can handle an exception τ at ad-
dress pc:
isCorrectHandler(E , i, pc, τ) =


true (E [i].startAddress ≤ pc ≤ E [i].endAddress)∧
(τ  E [i].catchType ∨ E [i].catchType = ⊥)
false otherwise
It is the job of the compiler to order the table in such a way that, given a set of nested exceptions, the innermost
exceptions appear first.
3.6.1 Runtime Exceptions
There are eight runtime exceptions which may be raised by the JCVM during the execution of a program. These
are JCRE owned, pre-allocated exceptions objects designated as temporary JCRE Entry Point Objects. In our oper-
ational semantics, we refer to them using the symbolic constant of column two in the following table, column one
of the same row gives their class name:










3.7 The Applet Firewall
As explained in Sections 2.3.3.11 – 2.3.3.15, arrays and class instances are owned by the applet that created
them. The context (or package) where the applet is defined determines the owning context. The applet firewall
provides a security mechanism that prevents an object from being accessed by code running in a different context
(different from the owning context).
The JCRE provides several mechanisms to allow object access across contexts. JCRE entry point objects - tem-
porary and permanent - and global arrays are objects owned by the JCRE context that can be accessed from any
context. Another mechanism that allows object access among contexts is the use of Shareable interfaces. Meth-
ods of shareable interfaces can be invoked from one context even if the object implementing them is owned by
an applet in another context. A context switch occurs when a method of an object owned by a different context is
invoked i.e. two consecutive frames have different contexts.
Prior to performing an operation on an object, the JCVM performs an access check. The access checks depend on
the type and owner of the referenced object, the instruction, and the currently active context. Chapter 6 of [Ora11b]
details the applet firewall and the access checks comprehensively. Section 3.8 codifies the access checks of the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































checkPutObjectStatic : Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint → boolean
checkGetField : Owner×Owner → boolean
checkPutField : Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × boolean → boolean
checkThrow : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient → boolean
checkInvokeDefinite : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient → boolean
checkInvokeVirtual : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient → boolean
checkInvokeInterface : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient× Class× Interface → boolean
checkCast : Owner× Owner × Owner × boolean × boolean × EntryPoint× Transient × ReferenceType × ReferenceType → boolean
checkArrayLoad : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× Transient → boolean
checkArrayStore : Owner×Owner×Owner× boolean× Transient× boolean → boolean
checkPutObjectStatic : Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint → boolean










¬isArrayobject ∧ entryPointobject 6= temporary
)







owncurrent = (L,M) ∧ ownobject = (L,N)
)
checkPutField : Owner× Owner× Value× boolean → boolean

























checkThrow, checkInvokeDefinite, checkInvokeVirtual : Owner × Owner × Owner × boolean × boolean × EntryPoint × Transient → boolean
checkThrow(owncurrent, ownapplet, ownobject, isArrayobject, isGlobalobject, entryPointobject, transientobject) =
checkInvokeDefinite(owncurrent, ownapplet, ownobject, isArrayobject, isGlobalobject, entryPointobject, transientobject) =






































checkInvokeInterface : Owner× Owner×Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient× Class× Interface × boolean× Class → boolean














































iface  javacard.framework.MultiSelectable ∧
objapplet 6 javacard.framework.MultiSelectable ∧
owncurrent = (L,M) ∧ ownobject = (N,O) ∧






checkCast : Owner× Owner× Owner× boolean× boolean× EntryPoint × Transient× ReferenceType× ReferenceType → boolean























τ ∈ InterfaceType ∧





















checkArrayLoad : Owner×Owner×Owner× ReferenceValue → boolean


























checkArrayStore : Owner×Owner×Owner× ReferenceValue× Value× boolean → boolean





































checkMakeTransient : Owner× Owner× Transient → boolean
















3.9 Carmel Operational Semantics
The small step semantics is the smallest relation P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this Chapter we present our base control-flow analysis for Carmel and prove it correct with respect to the opera-
tional semantics of Chapter 3. The base control-flow analysis is specified using the constraint-based, specification-
oriented and implementation-agnostic flow-logic framework of Nielson and Nielson [NN02]. Further, we show how
to systematically construct from the flow-logic specification a worklist algorithm capable of generating the least
solution to the constraints of the base control-flow analysis. In proving the correctness of the base control-flow
analysis, we have been greatly aided by Chapter 3 of [Han05] with the approach and structure of this chapter very
much based on that one.
4.2 Abstract Domains including Analysis Domains
Following the original SecSafe material and [Han05], in this thesis we use the notation of “overlined” domains, e.g.
RetAddr for abstract return addresses, to indicate abstract counterparts of concrete domains, and domains with a
96
hat, e.g. V̂al, to indicate complete lattices over abstract domains.
It is customary to present the abstract domains first and then later the choice of representation functions. However,
we shall be presenting each abstract domain and its representation function together as we believe it is helpful to
understand immediately the nature of the correspondence between concrete and abstract entities.
4.2.1 Abstract Domains for Values
We define abstract domains and their corresponding representation functions for the values that can occur in a
Carmel program: numbers, object references (for class instances and array objects), and return addresses (for
subroutines).
Val = Num+ Ref + RetAddr
The high-level representation function for values in given before; the representation functions on the right-hand-
side are defined in the next few pages.
β
R,H,JH





Ref (t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t = r
βReturnAddress(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t = ra
βNum(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t ∈ {b, s, i}
4.2.1.1 Return Addresses
We simply enclose the return address value in a set for its abstract representation. There is no need for approx-
imation since the value can be determined statically from the jsr addr instruction, the only instruction that can
produce such values.
RetAddr : OpType× N0 × Address
RetAddr =
{
(ra, apc, (m, pc)) | (m, apc), (m, pc) ∈ Address
}
βReturnAddress(ra, addr , (mn, pcn)) = {(ra, addr , (mn, pcn))}
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4.2.1.2 Numbers
The abstract domain for numbers is motivated by the desire to be able to represent and track a runtime value
number (t, n, (m, pc)) as an interval (inclusive each end) from lowest number l to highest number h, such that
l ≤ n ≤ h, associated with (m, pc), and augmented by a modification count. The intention is that we will track
changes to numbers represented as intervals up to a maximum number of changes, MAX MOD COUNT, parametric to
the analysis, and then map the number to the well-defined minimum and maximum values the number may hold
according to its type i.e. (t, (⊥t,⊤t, MAX MOD COUNT), (m, pc)).




(t , (l, h,modcount), (m, pc))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊥t ≤ l ≤ h ≤ ⊤t
0 ≤ modcount ≤ MAX MOD COUNT
⊥t , l, h,⊤t ∈ Z
modcount ∈ N0
(m, pc) ∈ Address
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4.2.2 Abstract Domains for Analysis
4.2.2.1 Fundamental Complete Lattice Underpinning Analysis Domains
Having defined the abstract domains for values:
Val = Num+ Ref + RetAddr
corresponding closely to the concrete domains, we define the fundamental complete lattice underpinning our





where partial order ⊑V al is defined for v1.v2 ∈ V̂al:
v1 ⊑V al v2 ⇐⇒
∀ (t , Y, (m, pc)) ∈ v1 :
(t ∈ {r, ra}) ⇒
{(t , Y, (m, pc))} ⊆ v2
(t ∈ {b, s, i}) ⇒
∃ {(t , Y2, (m, pc))} ⊆ v2 .
Y = (l, h,modcount1)
Y2 = (l2, h2,modcount2)
⊥t ≤ l2 ≤ l ≤ h ≤ h2 ≤ ⊤t
0 ≤ modcount1 ≤ modcount2 ≤ MAX MOD COUNT
⊥t , l, l2, h, h2,⊤t ∈ Z
modcount1,modcount2 ∈ N0
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By Lemma A.2 of Appendix A of [NNH10], 〈V̂al,⊑V al〉 is a complete lattice with bottom ⊥Val = ∅ and ⊤Val = Val
and binary least-upper bounds ⊔V al{v1, v2}, written infix as v1 ⊔V al v2, defined in Table 4.1. In words, the least
upper bound of two values in V̂al depends on whether both values are numbers or not:
• if both values are not numbers sharing the same type and associated address, the least upper bound is simply
the union of the two values;
• if both values are numbers sharing the same type and associated address, the least upper bound is then:
– if the modification count of one or both of the values is ≥ MAX MOD COUNT, then the numeric interval
component of the resulting abstract number is widened to the minimum and maximum values supported
by that type i.e. (⊥t ,⊤t , MAX MOD COUNT);
– otherwise, the numeric interval component of the resulting abstract number is widened to:


minimum(first value left interval number, second value left interval number),
maximum(first value right interval number, second value right interval number),











































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.2.2 Object State - Class instances and Array objects
The fields of a class instance may be determined statically and in a finite program is a finite (and typically small)
number of fields. Therefore a map from fields to elements of V̂al is an appropriate representation of a class in-
stance’s object state.
In contrast, according to the semantics of arrays in Carmel, an array’s length is allowed to be up to ⊤s = 215 − 1.
While such a length is unlikely in a Carmel program, due to resource limitations, it does highlight the question of
how best to represent the object state of an array object. In line with the representation of abstract numbers in
Carmel, and desiring a compact representation of array object state, a map from intervals of array index numbers
to elements of V̂al is an appropriate representation of array object state. In particular, the default value of zero
or null for an abstract array would have the abstract representation of zero or null mapped from the interval
(0,⊤s). To ensure finiteness in the analysis results, and to allow a trade-off between memory costs and precision,
parametric to the analysis is MAX DOM DYN ARRAY – the maximum size of the domain of a dynamic array created
via the new τ[ ]. When a value is loaded from an array object, the array index is passed as an abstract number
and the interval (l, h) extracted, and each value i in (l, h) is checked against each of the array’s domain of inter-
vals (dl1, dh1), (dl2, dh2), . . . , (dln, dhn), and where dlj ≤ i ≤ dhj the mapped value is added to the set of values
whose LUB is pushed onto the stack as the result of the array load instruction. When a value is to be stored to
an array object, the array index is passed as an abstract number and the interval (l, h) extracted. If (l, h) matches
exactly one of the array’s domain of intervals (dl1, dh1), (dl2, dh2), . . . , (dln, dhn), then the LUB of the value to be
stored and the existing value mapped against (l, h) is stored against (l, h). Otherwise, if n < MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,
(l, h) is added to the array’s domain of intervals and the value to be stored is mapped against (l, h). When n ≥
MAX DOM DYN ARRAY, the LUB of the value to be stored and the current value mapped against the interval (0,⊤s) is
stored against the interval (0,⊤s).
We define across class instances and array objects:
Ôbject = (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al
and extend point-wise the ⊑V al ordering to objects o1, o2 ∈ Ôbject:
o1 ⊑ ̂Object o2 ⇐⇒ dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) : o1.values(f.id) ⊑V al o2.values(f.id)
Note that when o1and o2 are array objects, f.id = [f, f ]. Also note that in a Carmel program P , where an object or
static field specifies an array’s elements e.g.
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private static byte[] bootstrapSENCKeyData = { 77, 118, 55, 118, -86, -94, -80, 91, -87, 91, 88, -82, 11, 76, 40, -93 };
since we can determine statically the length and elements of the array, regardless of the value of the
MAX DOM DYN ARRAY parameter, the length is set correctly and the array’s values accordingly. For the example above
values would be set to:
[(0, 0) 7→ (b, (77, 77, 0), (m, pc)), . . . , (15, 15) 7→ (b, (−93,−93, 0), (m, pc))]
For the avoidance of doubt, the parameter MAX DOM DYN ARRAY is only ever consulted during an arraystore t
instruction and both statically declared arrays such as bootstrapSENCKeyData above and any dynamically created
instruction created by the new τ[ ] instruction will have new intervals added to the array’s domain of intervals
only if the current size of the array’s domain of interval is less than MAX DOM DYN ARRAY, otherwise the LUB of the
value to be stored and the current value mapped against the interval (0,⊤s) is stored against the interval (0,⊤s),
as described above.
NB it is worth reiterating the heightened importance of arrays in Java Card (and so in Carmel) as a result
of the lack of the Collections framework of discrete mathematical structures available in standard Java.
Consequently, we have taken particular care in our choice of representation of abstract array objects
including state.
4.2.2.3 Context-Sensitive Domains
To facilitate loop-bounds calculations and to reduce false positives in the detection of potentially recursive method
calls, we require our analysis to be precise as possible at each Carmel address wrt the possible:
• JCVM machine states including transaction mechanism state and IO/APDU state (for precision of control-flow
and data-flow);
• callstacks (for checking possibly recursive calls);
• class instance and array object values in the transaction buffer (for precision of control-flow and data-flow);
• operand stack (for analysing loops);
• local variable array (for analysing loops);
To this end, our choice of abstract context, defined in Table 4.2, includes the machine state and sufficient informa-
tion from the abstract callstack to be able to check the firewall security predicates. Since infinite callstacks are a
possibility, due to recursion, to ensure finiteness in the analysis results, and to allow a trade-off between memory
costs and precision, parametric to the analysis is k – the maximum number of stack frames from the concrete call-
stack to include in the abstract context. For the firewall security predicates, and for a minimal level of acceptable
105
precision, we require always k ≥ 5 and our worklist algorithm checks this parameter. In program analysis parlance,
our base control-flow analysis is a k-CFA analysis, as is the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5.
Context information is recorded for each address in a context-cache: ̂ContextCache = Address → P(Context) and
we calculate, for each address (m, pc), and for each context associated with that address:
• a possible over-approximation of the set of all method names that have invoked the method m (for checking
possibly recursive calls);
• a possible over-approximation of the set of all class instance and array object values in the transaction buffer
(for precision of control-flow and data-flow);
• abstract operand stack (for analysing loops);
• abstract local variable array (for analysing loops);
Each of the context-sensitive domains is defined in the following way:
̂AbstractDomain = Address → Context→ X
that is the abstract domain is defined as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed,
to (the abstract version of the concrete domain). For example, the abstract local variable array is defined as a
map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed, and from each context to a map from local
variable array indices to abstract values:
̂LocalVar = Address → Context→ N0 → V̂al
where N0 → V̂al is the abstract version of the local variable array i.e. as a map from natural numbers to abstract
values. The representation function for each of the context-sensitive domains then shows how to produce the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.2.3.1 Abstract Context Cache
The abstract context cache is modelled as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed:
̂ContextCache = Address → Ĉontext
and define the ordering ⊑C to abstract context caches c1, c2 ∈ ̂ContextCache:
c1 ⊑C c2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(c1) : c1(addr) ⊆ c2(addr)
4.2.2.3.2 Local Variable Array
Modelling of the abstract local variable array is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be
executed, and from each context to local variable array indices to abstract values.




LocalV ar(L) = M .
∀ i ∈ dom(L) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (L(i)) ⊑V al M(i)
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract local variable arrays l1, l2 ∈ ̂LocalVar:
l1 ⊑L l2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(l1),
∀ ctxt ∈ l1(addr),
∀ idx ∈ dom(l1(addr)(ctxt)) :
l1(addr)(ctxt)(idx) ⊑V al l2(addr)(ctxt)(idx)
4.2.2.3.3 Operand Stack
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Modelling of the abstract operand stack is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be exe-
cuted, and from each context to a sequence of abstract values. Since each Carmel program under consideration
has been bytecode verified, abstract operand stacks must be of finite length.






(t1, v1, (m1, pc1)):: . . . ::(to, vo, (mo, pco))
)
= βR,H,JHV al (t1, v1, (m1, pc1)):: . . . ::β
R,H,JH
V al (to, vo, (mo, pco))
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract operand stacks s1, s2 ∈ Ŝtack:
s1 ⊑S s2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(s1),
∀ ctxt ∈ s1(addr) :
s1(addr)(ctxt) = A1::A2:: . . . ::Aq ∧
s2(addr)(ctxt) = B1::B2:: . . . ::Br ∧
r ≥ q ∧
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q} :
Ai ⊑V al Bi
4.2.2.3.4 Transactional Heap
Modelling of the abstract transactional heap is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be
executed, from each context to a map from object references to object (both class instance and array object) values
map from fields or numeric intervals to abstract values.
̂TransactionDynamicHeap = Address → Context→ Ref → (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al
= Address → Context→ Ref → Ôbject
with representation function1:
1Here HEAP is JH; we use the same representation function for both the object heap and the transactional object heap, and supply JH or





⇐⇒ ∀ loc ∈ dom(HEAP ) :
o = βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, HEAP (loc).creationPoint)
∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(HEAP (loc).values) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (HEAP (loc).values(f.id)) ⊑V al M(o).values(f.id)
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract transactional heaps t1, t2 ∈ ̂TransactionDynamicHeap:
t1 ⊑JH t2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(t1),
∀ ctxt ∈ t1(addr) :
∀ ref ∈ t1(addr)(ctxt) :
o1 = t1(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
o2 = t2(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) :
o1.values(f) ⊑V al o2.values(f)
consistent with the ordering on ⊑ ̂Object.
4.2.2.3.5 Method Names Cache
A purely semantic component, to overcome potential loss of callstack information due to our choice of context (see
Table 4.2), and so to ensure at each address (m, pc) we have a conservative (i.e. a possible over-approximation)
of the set of methods that may have invoked m, we developed relation ̂MethodNamesCache. Modelling of the
method name cache ̂MethodNamesCache is as a map from address (m, pc) to contexts in which the address may
be executed, and from each context to the set of Carmel methods that may have invoked m.
̂MethodNamesCache = Address → Context→ P(Method)
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̂MethodNamesCache admits the following ordering ⊑ ̂MNAMES to method name caches
mnames1,mnames2 ∈ ̂MethodNamesCache:
mnames1 ⊑ ̂MNAMES mnames2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(mnames1),










Registry(R) = M .
∀ aid ∈ dom(R) :
R(aid) = (locJCREOwnedAID, locapplet) ∧
β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, locapplet, getJHorH(locapplet).creationPoint) ⊑V al M
and define the ordering on elements r1, r2 ∈ ̂Registry:
r1 ⊑R r2 ⇐⇒ r1 ⊑V al r2
4.2.2.4.2 Static Heap
The abstract static heap simply maps static fields to abstract values:
111
̂StaticHeap = Field → V̂al
with representation function:
βHStaticHeap(STATIC HEAP ) = M.
∀ f ∈ dom(STATIC HEAP ) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (STATIC HEAP (f.id)) ⊑V al M(f.id)
and define the ordering on elements k1, k2 ∈ ̂StaticHeap:
k1 ⊑K k2 ⇐⇒ dom(k1) ⊆ dom(k2) ∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(k1) : k1(f.id) ⊑V al k2(f.id)
4.2.2.4.3 Object Heap
Modelling of the abstract object heap is as a map from object references to object (both class instance and array
object) values map from fields or numeric intervals to abstract values.
̂ObjectHeap = Ref → (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al





⇐⇒ ∀ loc ∈ dom(HEAP ) :
o = βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, HEAP (loc).creationPoint)
∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(HEAP (loc).values) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (HEAP (loc).values(f.id)) ⊑V al M(o).values(f.id)
2Here HEAP is H; we use the same representation function for both the object heap and the transactional object heap, and supply JH or
H as a parameter as appropriate.
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and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract object heaps h1, h2 ∈ ̂ObjectHeap:
h1 ⊑H h2 ⇐⇒ ∀ ref ∈ dom(h1) :
o1 = h1(ref) ∧
o2 = h2(ref) ∧
dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) :
o1.values(f.id) ⊑V al o2.values(f.id)
consistent with the ordering on ⊑ ̂Object.
4.2.2.4.4 Invalidated Objects Cache
The abstract invalidated objects cache records the set of abstract object references whose related object may have
been created inside a transaction that was subsequently aborted and so members of this set should be treated






Invalidated(I) = M .
∀ loc ∈ dom(I) :
β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, loc, getJHorH(loc).creationPoint) ⊑V al M
and define the ordering on elements i1, i2 ∈ ̂InvalidatedReferences:
i1 ⊑I i2 ⇐⇒ i1 ⊑V al i2
3See Section 2.3.3.9 for fuller information.
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4.2.2.4.5 Exceptions Cache
The exceptions cache records the abstract reference of the exception object, the abstract context in which the
exception was thrown, and the abstract context in which the exception was caught.
̂ExceptionsCache = P(Ref × Context× Context)
Lemma B.5.1 (on page 407) proves that whenever the concrete semantics throws an exception, the program
analysis ensures, among other actions, ̂ExceptionsCache is updated appropriately. In particular, when:
SF ′ = catchException(SF, (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), getJHorH((r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType), ctdn, ion)
Then the program analysis ensures via the HANDLE predicate:












and define the ordering on elements e1, e2 ∈ ̂ExceptionsCache:
e1 ⊑E e2 ⇐⇒ e1 ⊆ e2
4.2.2.4.6 Recursive Method Calls Cache
When an attempt to invoke a potentially recursive method m is detected at an address addr, we store the address
addr, method to invoke m and the abstract context in which addr was attempted to invoke m.
̂RecursiveMethodsCache = P(Address×Method× Context)
̂RecursiveMethodsCache admits the following ordering ⊑REC to recursive method name caches
rmc1, rmc2 ∈ ̂RecursiveMethodsCache:
rmc1 ⊑R̂EC rmc2 ⇐⇒ rmc1 ⊆ rmc2
4.2.2.4.7 Context Graph
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Whenever a possible transition from one abstract context current to another abstract context next occurs in the
program analysis clause, then (current, next) is recorded in the context graph:
̂ContextGraph = P(Context× Context)
̂ContextGraph admits the following ordering ⊑CG to abstract context graphs cg1, cg2 ∈ ̂ContextGraph:
cg1 ⊑CG cg2 ⇐⇒ cg1 ⊆ cg2
4.2.3 Abstract Analysis Domains Define Complete Lattices
Proposition 4.2.1 (Analysis domains define complete lattices). The following domains are each complete lattices:
• ̂Registry = 〈 ̂Registry,⊑R〉
• ̂StaticHeap = 〈 ̂StaticHeap,⊑S〉
• ̂ObjectHeap = 〈 ̂ObjectHeap,⊑H〉
• ̂InvalidatedReferences = 〈 ̂InvalidatedReferences,⊑I〉
• ̂TransactionDynamicHeap = 〈 ̂TransactionDynamicHeap,⊑JH〉
• Ĉontext = 〈Ĉontext,⊑C〉
• ̂LocalVar = 〈 ̂LocalVar,⊑L〉
• Ŝtack = 〈Ŝtack,⊑S〉
• ̂ExceptionsCache = 〈 ̂ExceptionsCache,⊑E〉
• ̂MethodNamesCache = 〈 ̂MethodNamesCache,⊑MNAMES〉
• ̂RecursiveMethodsCache = 〈 ̂RecursiveMethodsCache,⊑REC〉
• ̂ContextGraph = 〈 ̂ContextGraph,⊑CG〉
Proof : V̂al is a complete lattice under ordering ⊑V al as shown in Section 4.2.2.1. The orderings on domains
̂Registry, ̂StaticHeap, ̂ObjectHeap, ̂InvalidatedReferences, ̂TransactionDynamicHeap, ̂LocalVar, Ŝtack are pointwise
extensions of the ordering on V̂al i.e. ⊑V al and the result follows from Paragraph 2.15 of [DP02]. The remaining
domains are powersets of finite sets, ordered by ⊆, which are complete lattices by Examples 2.6 (2) on [DP02]
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4.2.4 Abstract Domain for High-Level Base CFA Analysis
Having defined the abstract value- and analysis- domains, we may now define the high-level domain for the base
control-flow analysis analysis as the cross-product of the analysis domains:
̂Analysis = ̂Registry × ̂StaticHeap× ̂ObjectHeap×
̂InvalidatedReferences × ̂TransactionDynamicHeap×
Ĉontext× ̂LocalVar × Ŝtack × ̂ExceptionsCache×
̂MethodNamesCache× ̂RecursiveMethodsCache× ̂ContextGraph
̂Analysis admits the following ordering ⊑Analysis to abstract analysis results:
Let (R̂1, K̂1, Ĥ1, Î1, ĴH1, Ĉ1, L̂1, Ŝ1, Ê1, ̂MNAMES1, R̂EC1, ĈG1), (R̂2, K̂2, Ĥ2, Î2, ĴH2, Ĉ2, L̂2, Ŝ2, Ê2, ̂MNAMES2, R̂EC2, ĈG2)∈ ̂Analysis. Then:
(R̂1, K̂1, Ĥ1, Î1, ĴH1, Ĉ1, L̂1, Ŝ1, Ê1,
̂MNAMES1, R̂EC1, ĈG1) ⊑Analysis (R̂2, K̂2, Ĥ2, Î2, ĴH2, Ĉ2, L̂2, Ŝ2, Ê2,
̂MNAMES2, R̂EC2, ĈG2)
⇐⇒ R̂1 ⊑R R̂2 ∧
K̂1 ⊑K Ĥ2 ∧
Ĥ1 ⊑H Ĥ2 ∧
Î1 ⊑I Î2 ∧
ĴH1 ⊑H ĴH2 ∧
Ĉ1 ⊑C Ĉ2 ∧
L̂1 ⊑L L̂2 ∧
Ŝ1 ⊑S Ŝ2 ∧
Ê1 ⊑E Ê2 ∧
̂MNAMES1 ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES2 ∧
R̂EC1 ⊑REC R̂EC2 ∧
ĈG1 ⊑CG ĈG2
and by Proposition 4.2.1 and Paragraph 2.15 of [DP02], this is simply the product/pointwise extension of the
ordering on the underlying analysis domains. ⊑Analysis allows analysis results to be compared for the same
program, and in particular to determine whether one analysis result is “less” or “smaller” than another wrt the
ordering on 〈 ̂Analysis,⊑Analysis〉.
4.3 Analysis Specification.
The base control-flow analysis is specified using the constraint-based, specification-oriented and implementation-
agnostic flow-logic framework of Nielson and Nielson [NN02]. Being a specification-oriented approach, the flow-
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logic framework is used to specify what it means for an analysis result (or rather a proposed analysis result) to be
acceptable (correct) with respect to a program.
The judgements of the flow-logic specification for the analysis of Carmel are of the form:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAYBase-CFA (mn, pcn) : instr
where it is implicit:
• (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH , Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ∈ ̂Analysis;
• Base-CFA is the analysis name;
• mn.instructionAt(pcn) = instr;
• User input parameters:
– k is the maximum abstract context length i.e. the maximum number of stack frames from the concrete
callstack to include in the abstract context, as explained in Section 4.2.2.3;
– MAX MOD COUNT is the maximum number of times an abstract number may change the numeric interval
it contains before it is mapped to the well-defined minimum and maximum values the number may hold
according to its type t i.e. (⊥t,⊤t, MAX MOD COUNT), as explained in Section 4.2.1.2;
– MAX DOM DYN ARRAY is the maximum size of the domain of a dynamic array created via the new τ[ ], as
explained in Section 4.2.2.2.
Intuitively the above states that the left-hand side is an acceptable analysis for the instruction instr at ad-
dress mn.instructionAt(pcn) when analysed in any context π ∈ Ĉ(mn, pcn) and wrt the user supplied parameters
k, MAX MOD COUNT, MAX DOM DYN ARRAY.
To give the reader a basic grounding in the flow-logic framework and how to read the rules, we shall discuss in
detail the flow-logic rules for the following Carmel bytecode instructions:
• nop
• new τ
• if t cmpop goto addr
• invokevirtual w
One of the strengths of the framework is that it is quite intuitive for those familiar with pattern-matching.
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4.3.1 The nop instruction




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pc), Ln, Sn〉〉
From the semantic rule we see:
• the callstack remains the same length – only the program counter for the top stack frame changes from
(mn, pcn) to (mn.nextAddress(pcn));
• the JCVM transitions from (mn, pcn) to (mn.nextAddress(pcn)) with no changes to R,K,H, I,HID, JH
• the JCVM transitions from (mn, pcn) is (mn.nextAddress(pcn)) with no changes to the operand stack Sn or
local variable array Ln
In Table 4.3, we detail a line-by-line explanation of the flow-logic clause for the nop bytecode instruction.
4.3.2 The new τ instruction
In Tables 4.4–4.5 we detail an explanation of the flow-logic for the new τ bytecode instruction, and where appro-
priate a cross-comparison between the flow-logic rule and the corresponding operational semantic rule.
4.3.3 The if t cmpop goto addr instruction
To demonstrate the pattern-matching nature of many of the flow-logic rules, consider the if t cmpop goto addr
bytecode instruction shown on page 139:
• the possible successor addresses and contexts of (mn, pcn) are bound to π2 and π3 in the way familiar from
the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. π2 corresponds to the false
branch and π3 corresponds to the true branch;
• the abstract operand stack is bound and constrained, via:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) =M ::X1::X2
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to be a sequence of at least 2 elements, with the top-most element of the abstract operand stack bound to
variable X2, the second-from-top element bound to variable X1 and the remainder (which may be the empty
sequence) to M ;
• search for all possible type-matching operands to the if t cmpop goto addr is pattern-matched, and vari-
ables bound, in the lines:
∀ {(t , Y1, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t , Y2, (mq, pcq))} ⊑S X2 :
and then passed as parameters to the abstract version of the applyBinary operator:
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
)
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {false}
)
Due to the approximation introduced by our representation, the abstract version of applyBinary has to
be able to produce both true and false for the same question, as, e.g. in abstract numbers, there may
be particular pairs of values i1 and i2, l1 ≤ i1 ≤ h1, l2 ≤ i2 ≤ h2 in the intervals (l1, h1) and (l2, h2) for
which i1 cmpop i2 is true and other pairs of values such that i1 cmpop i2 is false. For abstract object
references, we have maybe-equal-and-definitely-not-equal semantics: when the fields of the abstract
object references are identical, they may refer to the same object, and so the abstract version of the
applyBinary operator produces both true and false; where at least one field differs between abstract
object references, they definitely do not refer to the same object and so the abstract version of the
applyBinary operator produces false. See Lemma B.5.10 on page 434 for more information;
• when absApplyBinary determines false is a possible value, then the context of the false branch is repre-
sented in the analysis: {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
We ensure the remaining stack M is represented in the analysis: M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and in the same way familiar from the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and
4.4, we ensure the local variable array. set of methods that may have invoked mn, and object state changes
recorded in the transaction buffer, and the transition from π1 to π2 are represented in the analysis results:
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
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{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
• similarly, when absApplyBinary determines true is a possible value, then the context of the true branch is
represented in the analysis: {π3} ⊑C Ĉ((mn, addr))
We ensure the remaining stack M is represented in the analysis: M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
and in the same way familiar from the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and
4.4, we ensure the local variable array. set of methods that may have invoked mn, and object state changes
recorded in the transaction buffer, and the transition from π1 to π3 are represented in the analysis results:
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π3)
{(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
4.3.4 The invokevirtual w bytecode instruction
In Tables 4.6–4.7 we detail an explanation of the flow-logic for the invokevirtual w bytecode instruction, and
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In this section two fundamental properties of the base control-flow analysis and its results are formally stated and
proved:
• semantic soundness
• a Moore family property
Semantic soundness is used to establish the correctness of the program analysis i.e. that the analysis results
do indeed correctly reflect all semantically possible runtime behaviours for the properties of interest being cap-
tured, here control-flow. The Moore family property is used to prove all programs may be analysed, and that a
least/smallest analysis exists for each program.
4.4.1 Semantic Soundness
As per [Han05, NNH10], the semantic soundness of a flow-logic analysis with a small-steps semantics is proved
by establishing a subject reduction property. Before doing so, we must formally relate the concrete- and abstract-
domains. Again, following [Han05, NNH10], we do so using representation functions and correctness relations.
We have already defined the representation functions relating the concrete and abstract and analysis domains in
the opening sections of this Chapter.
We express two correctness relations.
The first correctness relation relates the callstack to the analysis results and includes the context-sensitive do-
mains. SF RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) requires each stack frame, including the operand stack, local
variable array, and set of calling methods in the callstack to be represented in the analysis, and the transaction
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buffer to be represented in in the current address (mn, pcn), to be considered correct:
SF RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
⇐⇒ SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(JH) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
The second correctness relation relates the global entities (i.e. the non-context-sensitive entities) to the analysis
results, and requires the applet registry, global heap, static heap and invalidated object references be represented
in the analysis results to be considered correct. It also invokes the first correctness relation and so requires the
callstack to be represented in the analysis results to be considered correct.
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
⇐⇒ SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
∧ βR,H,JHRegistry(R) ⊑R R̂
∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
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A final preliminary before expressing and proving the subject reduction property: a concrete semantic configuration
is said to be well-formed if it is either an initial configuration as per Section 3.7.1 or is reachable from an initial
configuration by repeated application of the configuration transitions P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config
of Section 3.9. This ensures
the callstack is well-formed i.e. all the stack frames below the stack frame at the top of the callstack are suspended
method invocations.
4.4.2 Subject reduction theorem
Theorem 4.4.1 (Subject Reduction Theorem). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• C’ = 〈R′,K ′, H ′, I ′, HID′, JH ′, CHN ′, SF ′〉
Then:
C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ⇒
C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)





By case inspection. Please see Appendix B.4.1 (page 320) for full details of the proof.
Corollary 4.4.2 (Base CFA calculates graph of all semantically possible transitions).
Let (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P . Then the control-flow graph ĈG captures all se-
mantically possible transitions, including exceptions, between configurations as directed pairs of abstract contexts.
Proof:
Follows immediately from Theorem 4.4.1.
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4.4.3 Set of Acceptable analysis results under |=Base-CFA form a Moore family
The Moore family property is used to prove all programs may be analysed, and that a least/smallest analysis exists
for each program.
As per Appendix A.1 of [NNH10]: “a Moore family is a subset Y of a complete lattice L = 〈L,⊑L〉 that is closed
under greatest lower bounds: ∀Y ′ ⊆ Y : ⊓Y ′ ∈ Y . It follows a Moore family always contains a least element ⊓Y
and a greatest element ⊓∅, which equals the greatest element ⊤L from L; in particular a Moore family is never
empty”.
Recast in terms of our Base-CFA analysis, the Moore family result for a Carmel program P is that the set of
acceptable analysis results/solutions of a Carmel program P under |=Base-CFA form a Moore family:
∀ Y ′ ⊆ {Y | Y |=Base-CFA P} :
d
Y ′ ∈ {Y | Y |=Base-CFA P}
Since a Moore family is by definition never empty, this ensures every Carmel program P has at least one solution
(⊓∅) and a best/smallest solution ( d{Y | Y |=Base-CFA P}) .
Due to time constraints, we have been unable to spend the time necessary to produce the proof-by-cases for all
instructions, and instead state it without proof, and point the interested reader in particular to Theorem 3.16 of
[Han05] where a Moore family result for the set of acceptable flow-logic CFA analysis results/solutions presented
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)           
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4.6 Whole Program Analysis
In this Section we specify the conditions for being able to analyse a whole Carmel program P . In words, this
amounts to:
• ensuring the abstract versions of the valid initial configurations of Section 3.7.1 are represented in the anal-
ysis. In particular, we must ensure the correctness relations of Section 4.4.1 hold for each of the initial
configurations;
• any static field initialisers in P should be represented in the analysis;
• each bytecode instruction must be analysed;
The next two tables present the above in symbols. Any unfamiliar constant is defined in Appendix D.7. The first
table contains the initial configurations corresponding to the static
javacard.framework.Applet.install(byte[],short,byte)methods of Tables 1 and 2 of the valid initial config-
urations of Section 3.7.1, and the second table contains the remaining three tables, which represents the invocation
of Applet lifecycle methods on registered applets with the appropriate machine configuration and parameters for
local variable array and operand stack. From inspection, it is clear the whole program analysis conditions correctly
relate the initial configurations to the analysis domains of ̂Analysis i.e. the whole program analysis conditions
satisfy the correctness relations of Section 4.4.1 wrt the valid initial configurations of Section 3.7.1. In the second
table, we also include the requirement that the analysis results must represent the analysis results of the individual
instructions i.e.
∀ (mn, pcn) ∈ P.addresses :
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : mn.instructionAt(pcn)
167
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY


















owner : (σ̂JCRE, σ̂Null),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,















owner : (σ̂JCRE, σ̂Null),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,





, 0, 0, INITIAL, (dispatch(), 0)

∧
∀ p ∈ P.packages :
∀ c ∈ p.classes :
∀f ∈ fields(c) . f.isStatic : βR,H,JH
V al
(f.initValue) ⊑K K̂(f.id)
c ≺ javacard.framework.Applet ⇒
minst = methodLookup(javacard.framework.Applet.install(byte[], short, byte).id, c)









owner : (p.packageAID, cl),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,





, 0, 0, INITIAL, (minst, minst.firstAddress)






{(s, (0, 127, 0), (minst,minst.firstAddress))} ⊑L L̂(minst,minst.firstAddress)(π)(1)
{(b, (0, 127, 0), (minst,minst.firstAddress))} ⊑L L̂(minst,minst.firstAddress)(π)(2)
{ǫ} ⊑S Ŝ(minst,minst.firstAddress)(π)
{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
168
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA P (Part 2 of 2)
∧ ∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂ :
mprocess = methodLookup(javacard.framework.Applet.process(APDU).id, O3.type)
(mprocess 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 =
(
O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (mprocess, mprocess.firstAddress)
)







{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)






msingleSoD = methodLookup(m.id, O3.type))
(msingleSoD 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 =
(
O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (msingleSoD , msingleSoD.firstAddress)
)






{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
∧ ∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂ :






mmultiSoD = methodLookup(m.id, O3.type))
(mmultiSoD 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 = (O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (mmultiSoD, mmultiSoD.firstAddress))





{(s, (0, 1, 0), (mmultiSoD,mmultiSoD.firstAddress))} ⊑L L̂(mmultiSoD,mmultiSoD.firstAddress)(π)(1)
{ǫ} ⊑S Ŝ(mmultiSoD,mmultiSoD.firstAddress)(π)
{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
∧ ∀ (mn, pcn) ∈ P.addresses :
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : mn.instructionAt(pcn)
4.7 Constructing a worklist solver
Having specified the program analysis flow-logic clauses for the base control-flow analysis and the program anal-
ysis conditions for the whole program analysis, we are able to construct an iterative worklist-solver capable of
169
computing the least solution to the constraints generated by the base control-flow analysis. Our approach relies
on each program analysis flow-logic clause defining a monotone function over a complete lattice (here ̂Analysis),
which can easily be verified by inspection, and Tarski’s theorem, which guarantees the existence of a least-fixed
point to the set of monotone functions in ̂Analysis. Our worklist algorithm then iterates from bottom to the least-
fixed point in ̂Analysis and Tarski’s theorem guarantees this least-fixed point will be reached in a finite number of
steps.
In this Section, the reader is expected to translate familiar first-order-logic and quantifiers into standard imperative
programming parlance, or rather to appreciate that is what is intended e.g. ∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂, the reader is expected
to read this as:
for each element O3 ⊑R R̂
statements like (minst 6= ⊥) ⇒ S are to be interpreted as conditionals i.e. if <cond> then do S, and statements
like π = C1::C2::C3 are assumed to be translated into some suitable stack operations in the language of implemen-
tation. I think this is clearer and better than artificially translating the whole program analysis criteria into simple
while program constructs.
The iterative solver has the following outline form:
1. Initialise analysis domains solution (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH , Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ∈ ̂Analysis to bottom;
2. Ensure the constraints of Table 1 of Section 4.6 are satisfied – this needs to be done just once as these
constraints depend only on the static structure of P ;
3. Initialise the global boolean flag shouldIterateOverWorklist to true then enter the main body of the it-
erative solver, whose guard is while (shouldIterateOverWorklist= true) do, and whose first instruction
is to assign false to shouldIterateOverWorklist. This is a typical high-level control-structure for work-
list solvers, where, in the main loop of the loop, if some LUB calculation climbs the lattice, we shall set
shouldIterateOverWorklist to true and force at least one more iteration to check whether a fixed point has
been reached;
4. Ensure the constraints beginning with ∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂ of Table 2 of Section 4.6 are satisfied – this needs to be
done each loop to ensure the valid initial configurations for registered applets are represented in the analysis;
5. In the main body of the loop, load all the addresses of the bytecode instructions in P onto a worklist W ;
170
6. Pop the first address (mn, pcn) off the worklist W and check whether the current solution satisfies the flow-
logic clauses for the instruction at that address. If while checking the solution we increase the cardinality of
any analysis relation or otherwise climb the lattice by, for example, widening an abstract number as part of a
LUB calculation, one of the constraint-satisfaction-with-equality predicates satisfy
()
defined in Tables 4.8
and 4.9 will set shouldIterateOverWorklist to true and guarantee the main loop will be executed at least
once more;
7. Repeat the previous step until W is empty;
8. Once the body of the loop terminates, which it must do based on the finite height of the complete lattices of
the analysis domains under consideration, we must have reached a fixed point. Since all constraints have
been satisfied with a LUB operator, either ⊔V al or ∪, this fixed point must be least.
Fuller details on the implementation of our worklist algorithm can be found in Appendix E.
4.7.1 Step 1: Initialisation of Analysis Domains/Components
Let (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ∈ ̂Analysis.




































4.7.2 Step 2: Initialisation of the Java Card framework analysis objects and static ini-
tialisers of Carmel program P
Using the constraint-satisfaction-with-equality predicates satisfy
()
defined in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, load the ab-























owner : (σ̂JCRE, σ̂Null),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,





















owner : (σ̂JCRE, σ̂Null),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,











∀ p ∈ P.packages :
∀ c ∈ p.classes :







c ≺ javacard.framework.Applet ⇒
minst = methodLookup(javacard.framework.Applet.install(byte[], short, byte).id, c)









owner : (p.packageAID, cl),
entryPoint : no,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,





, 0, 0, INITIAL, (minst, minst.firstAddress)





























{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
)
4.7.3 Step 3: Define a global boolean flag shouldIterateOverWorklist which controls
the repetition of the main loop
We define the variable shouldIterateOverWorklist to be true immediately prior to entering the main body of the
iterative worklist:
shouldIterateOverWorklist := true
while (shouldIterateOverWorklist = true) do
shouldIterateOverWorklist := false
4.7.4 Step 4: Ensure the constraints associated with the initial configurations of regis-
tered applets are satisfied
Ensure the initial configurations of registered applets are represented in the analysis.
174
∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂ :
mprocess = methodLookup(javacard.framework.Applet.process(APDU).id, O3.type)
(mprocess 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 =
(
O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (mprocess, mprocess.firstAddress)
)
























{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
)






msingleSoD = methodLookup(m.id, O3.type))
(msingleSoD 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 =
(
O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (msingleSoD, msingleSoD.firstAddress)
)




















{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
)
∀ {O3} ⊑R R̂ :






mmultiSoD = methodLookup(m.id, O3.type))
(mmultiSoD 6= ⊥) ⇒
C3 = (O3, 0, 0, INITIAL, (mmultiSoD, mmultiSoD.firstAddress))

























{∅} ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(π)
)
4.7.5 Step 5: Load all the addresses of the bytecode instructions in P
W:= {addr | addr ∈ P.addresses}
while (W.peek() 6= nil) do
175
4.7.6 Step 6: Pop the top address addr from the worklist W and check constraints for
Carmel instruction at addr
(mn, pcn):=W.pop()
switch (instruction at (mn, pcn) ):
Case instruction labels nop instruction at address (mn, pcn), check:
∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :























{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
)
Case instruction labels push t c instruction at address (mn, pcn), check:
∀ π1 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :





(t = r) ⇒ satisfy
(
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{σ̂Null} ⊑S Ŝ(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
)
(t ∈ {b, s}) ⇒ satisfy
(
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (c, c, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
)
(t = i) ⇒ satisfy
(

















{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
)
. . . [All Carmel bytecode instructions and API methods flow-logic clauses] . . .
4.7.7 Step 7: Repeat until worklist W is empty
The exhaustion of the worklist W is technically part of Step 5. When we reach this point, W will be empty and we
will then return to Step 3 to check the condition shouldIterateOverWorklist.
176
shouldIterateOverWorklistwill be true if any of the LUB calculations in the previous iteration over W increased
the cardinality of any of the abstract domains or otherwise climbed the lattice e.g. widening an abstract number.
If shouldIterateOverWorklist is false, we must have reached a fixed point and for reasons argued above, this
must be the least-fixed point by our choice of LUB operators.
satisfy
(
X ⊑V al Y
)
⇐⇒ (X 6⊑V al Y ) ⇒






⇐⇒ (X 6⊆ Y ) ⇒
Y := Y ∪X
shouldIterateOverWorklist := true














⇐⇒ ∀ f ∈ dom(k1) : satisfy
(






⇐⇒ ∀ ref ∈ dom(h1) :
o1 = h1(ref) ∧
o2 = h2(ref) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) :
satisfy
(














⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(t1),
∀ ctxt ∈ t1(addr) :
∀ ref ∈ t1(addr)(ctxt) :
o1 = t1(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
o2 = t2(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
satisfy
(














⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(l1),
∀ ctxt ∈ l1(addr),
∀ idx ∈ dom(l1(addr)(ctxt)) :
satisfy
(






⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(s1),
∀ ctxt ∈ s1(addr) :
s1(addr)(ctxt) = A1::A2:: . . . ::Aq∧
s2(addr)(ctxt) = B1::B2:: . . . ::Br∧
r ≥ q ∧
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q} :
satisfy
(












m1 ⊑ ̂MNAMES m2
)
⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(m1),


























In this Chapter we detail a key deficiency in the base control-flow analysis of Chapter 4 which makes the calcula-
tion of loop-bounds so conservative as to be useless, and remedy this deficiency with replacement clauses for the
if bytecode instructions in an extended control-flow analysis which allows simple loops to be bounded. Moreover,
we integrate into the extended control-flow analysis the results of a variant of the classical reaching definitions
analysis1 to further improve the precision of loop-bounds calculation in Carmel.
5.2 Deficiency in base control-flow analysis handling of loops
Having analysed a slew of different types and complexities of loops in Carmel using the base control-flow analysis
worklist algorithm of Chapter 4, one distinct issue impacting precision kept presenting itself. We have distilled
this issue into its simplest form to aid discussion: a simple bounded loop. The semantics-based solution to this
problem, presented in Section 5.3, has proved sufficiently robust to remedy this issue and allowed the calculation
of conservative loop bounds for each of the loops we tested, including the Carmel sample given in this Chapter.
5.2.1 Even simple numeric loops cannot be bounded finitely
Consider the Java and corresponding Carmel code of Table 5.1, which shows a simple bounded loop that loops
17 times, where the Java variable i is mapped to the Carmel local variable 11. The desired outcome of applying




for (i=0; i < 17; i++){
//body of loop - assume empty statement for simplicity
}
//the value of i is 17 at the point the loop terminates
Carmel translation:
0: push s 0
1: store s 11
2: load s 11
3: push s 17
5: if s ge goto 14
8: inc s 11 1
11: goto 2
14: return
Table 5.1: Simple bounded loop, in Java and Carmel
our worklist algorithm is given in Table 5.3. The actual results of applying our worklist algorithm to this program
can be seen in Table 5.4 and does not make for happy reading. It is extremely disappointing that, for such a simple
program, the base control-flow analysis is unable to deduce:
• a useful approximation of the possible values of the local variable 11 at the if s goto statement of line 5
• the value of the local variable 11 must be 17 at the return statement
In each case, the values map to (−32768, 32767) = (⊥s,⊤s) i.e. all we know about the value is that it is in the
range of a short.
Looking more closely at the base control-flow analysis flow-logic clauses for the two if statement forms in Carmel,
the more general of which is reproduced for convenience in Table 5.2, it becomes clear why (⊥s,⊤s) is the least
solution for the local variable 11: the relationship between local variables on the operand stack and the local
variable array is ignored. In particular, the relationship between local variables loaded onto the operand stack
that serve as loop variables and the local variable array is ignored. Consequently, values for local variables are
propagated to branches of if statements that are not semantically possible – here for instance, it is not semantically
possible for the value of local variable 11 to be ≥ 17 at program counter 8, yet due to the following excerpt from
the flow-logic rule:
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t, Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
)
⇒
{π3} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
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(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAYBase-CFA (mn, pcn) : if t cmpop goto addr
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
π3 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, addr)))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ {(t, Y1, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t, Y2, (mq, pcq))} ⊑S X2 :(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t, Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
)
⇒
{π3} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π3)
{(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
(





L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Table 5.2: Base CFA specification of if t cmpop goto addr statement
(




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
if any one value in the interval of a loop-variable’s value meets the condition of the if statement, then the whole
interval of a loop-variable’s value is propagated to the corresponding branch of the if statement. Once a seman-
tically impossible value for a loop variable is propagated down the negative branch of the if statement, which
contains the loop increment (or loop decrement) in a terminating loop, the program analysis clauses for the inc
and if statements contend to ensure only the (⊥s,⊤s) value can satisfy the constraints for the loop variable.
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5.3 Extended control-flow analysis remedies deficiency in base control-
flow analysis handling of loops
From Section 5.2 we may summarise the key deficiency of the base control-flow analysis handling of loops as
being:
• Not recognising and/or treating loop-variables differently at if statements;
5.3.1 Selective propagation of numeric loop-variables
The first question is: how do we recognise loop variables? Firstly, loop variables are numeric local variables
whose values are passed on the operand stack as parameters to if statements via the load t i instructions.
According to the operational semantics of Carmel as defined in Chapter 3, numeric local variables exhibit the
following behaviour:
• whenever a number is saved from the operand stack to the local variable array via a store t i instruction,
the runtime value saved to the local variable array is stamped with the address of the store t i instruction
regardless of its previous runtime address label;
• whenever a number in the local variable array is incremented via a inc t j c instruction, the runtime value
saved to the local variable array is stamped with the address of the inc t j c instruction regardless of its
previous runtime address label;
• whenever a number is loaded onto the operand stack from the local variable array via a load t i, it is loaded
as-is i.e. with the address with which it was saved, which must additionally be either a store t i or inc t j c
instruction by virtue of the two previous items.
From inspection of the operational semantics of Carmel, no other bytecode instruction stamps a Carmel runtime
value with the address of a store t i or inc t j c instruction. As the program analysis has been proved
to be correct with respect to the operational semantics of Carmel, the above properties have been proved to be
preserved by the flow-logic clauses. It follows then that, if the following conditions hold at an if s statement:
• the top of the operand stack consists solely of store t i or inc t j c values and that only one distinct local
variable index is referenced in these values;
• the top of the operand stack is identical to the local variable array at the distinct local variable referenced in
the top of the operand stack
we may conclude that the values on top of the operand stack must have been loaded from the local variable array
and not subsequently changed. In such a case, the set of values on top of the operand stack are a proxy for the
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local variable at the specified index of the local variable array and we should apply the test of the if statement
against each possible value, from its minimum to maximum value, and propagate the appropriate value(s) of the
local variable to the appropriate branch of the if statement at the specified index. Equally, where the if statement
is the variant that takes two operands from the operand stack, and the two conditions above apply to the second
from top of the operand stack set of values, these should be similarly tested and propagated to the appropriate
branch. Where the two conditions apply to both operands, each pair of possible values from each set should be
tested and propagated to the appropriate branch. Utilisation of associated runtime address in the program analy-
ses to identify loop variables loaded from the local variable array is the sole reason we extended the operational
semantics of Carmel and constructed the representation functions in the proofs of the base control-flow analysis
to include the associated runtime address.
5.3.2 Detecting non-reaching definitions of local variables
An assignment (known as a definition in classical program analysis terms) to a local variable in Carmel (only pos-
sible via a store t i or inc t j c instruction) is said to be a reaching definition if a path exists from definition to
use (via a load t i instruction) along some path of execution.
We have developed an analogue of the classical reaching definitions analysis2 which we have named a reaching
definition for local variable analysis. This intra-method analysis formally guarantees for each program counter pcm
of a method m, a set of pairs of (local variable number lv, program counter pc) such that the local variable lv may
have received its definition at program counter pc of method m.
For illustration purposes, in the Carmel code of Table 5.1, the local variable assignments that are reaching defini-
tions at program counter 5 are:
(11, pc:1)
(11, pc:8)
which is to say, at program counter 5, the local variable 11 may have received its definition at program counter 1
or 8.
The formal guarantees of the correctness of the reaching definition for local variable analysis ensures we can
safely identify the reaching definitions:
2See Appendix C or [NNH10] for further information.
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- (s (0,0,0), pc: 1, STORE_T_I (StoreTIArguments (t=s), (i=11) ) )
- (s (1,17,17), pc: 8, INC_T_I_C (IncTICArguments (t=s), (i=11),(c=1) ) )
and exclude from consideration any other local variable definitions that have reached this point in the program
analysis – as they cannot correspond to semantically possible assignments i.e. they are not reaching definitions.
5.3.3 Bounding simple numeric loops and suppressing propagation of non-reaching
definitions
Bringing this Section together, the consolidating question is then: under what circumstances at an if statement,
for the individual values supplied as operands:
• should we attempt to filter and propagate to appropriate branches individual values?
• should we not attempt to filter and propagate to appropriate branches individual values?
• should we discard operand(s)?
Consider first the more general of the if statement forms, which is reproduced for convenience in Table 5.2, and
which takes two stack operands. Each of the two stack operands may have been loaded from the local variable
array, and may be a reaching definition. This implies 24 = 16 possible combinations, as documented in Table 5.3.3.
On consideration of each scenario described by the combinations, there are only 4 distinct combinations where
we want to act:
• Case 1: No filtering to be applied to either operand. Neither operands have been loaded from the local
variable array (and so neither can be reaching definitions);
• Case 2: Filtering is to be applied to both operands. Both operands have been loaded from the local variable
array, and both are reaching definitions;
• Case 3: Filtering is to be applied to only the first operand. The first operand has been loaded from the local
variable array and is a reaching definition. The second operand has not been loaded from the local variable
array (and so cannot be a reaching definition);
• Case 4: Filtering is to be applied to only the second operand. The second operand has been loaded from the
local variable array and is a reaching definition. The first operand has not been loaded from the local variable
array (and so cannot be a reaching definition);
The remaining 12 combinations are excluded for the reasons stated under the Notes column.
The extended control-flow analysis clause for the more general of the if statement forms is then essentially the
base control-flow analysis clause for the more general of the if statement forms duplicated 4 times, each duplicate
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guarded by the conditions for one of the above cases, with filtering of values from minimum to maximum values of
appropriate operand(s) for cases 2 - 4, and is documented in Section 5.3.4.
The extended control-flow analysis clause for the less general of the if statement forms is then essentially the
base control-flow analysis clause for the more general of the if statement forms duplicated twice, each duplicate
guarded by the conditions for one of the above cases, with filtering of values from minimum to maximum values
of appropriate operand(s) for cases 1 and 4, and is documented in Section 5.3.5. Cases 2 and 3 do not apply in
this scenario as only one operand is consumed from the operand stack, with an implicit argument of zero or null
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4 Modifying the base control-flow analysis worklist solver
Two changes are required to the worklist solver of the base control-flow analysis of Section 4.7 to compute the
least solution to the extended control-flow analysis constraints:
• insert a new Step between Step 1 and Step 2, where the global variable RDLV is assigned the results of the
Reaching Definitions for Local Variables analysis of Appendix C for Carmel program P ;
• at Step 6, replace the existing flow-logic clauses for the if statements of the base control-flow analysis with
those of the extended control-flow analysis of this Chapter. These replacement clauses are the only ones
that access the fresh global variable RDLV so, if memory is a factor, RDLV can have reaching definitions






In this Chapter, we detail the conditions under which we are able to analyse the worst-case resource-usage of a
Carmel program P , and present an algorithm for generating from the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5
for P a family of integer linear programming problems, one for each applet lifecycle method in P per registered
applet whose solution yields the worst-case resource-usage for that applet lifecycle method. While our algorithm
is firmly based on the outstanding and pioneering work of [PS97], its presentation is intentionally closer to that of
[Sch09].
The general conditions to make the worst-case execution-time decidable (and so make the worst-case resource-
usage analysis decidable) for Java applications are [Sch09]:
1. Dynamic class loading is forbidden;
2. Programs must not contain any recursion;
3. The upper bound of each loop has to be known;
Considering these conditions in the context of Java Card Classic Edition 3:
1. Dynamic class loading is forbidden in Java Card Classic Edition 31 so this condition is automatically satisfied
for all Carmel programs.
2. We can formally guarantee there are no recursive method calls in any code reachable from any applet
1Please see Table 2.1 for Java features supported and not supported in Java Card Classic Edition 3.
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lifecycle methods in P when
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
and R̂EC = ∅.
3. Determining the upper bound of each loop in P and more particularly specifying the conditions under which
we can determine the upper bound of each loop requires a few preliminary technical steps2:
• For each applet lifecycle method in P , identify the set of natural loops, including the set of basic blocks
which form the natural loop, reachable from that applet lifecycle method.
• For each applet lifecycle method in P and each natural loop reachable from that applet lifecycle method:
– capture the set of local variables of the operands at the condition of the loop header from the
operand stack, and their minimum and maximum values;
– capture the set of local variables which are written to via the inc t i c in the body of the loop, and
the values by which they are increased (or decreased where c is negative);
– capture the set of local variables which are written to via the store t i in the body of the loop;
• Determine from the captured information whether we have the required information to calculate the
upper bound for each loop, and that it is safe to do so e.g. that the local variables on which outer loops
are dependent are not modified in the body of inner loops.
6.2 Identifying natural loops in Carmel
Let P be a Carmel program such that
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
Then ĈG is a control-flow graph of P and more particularly a directed graph where each node in the graph is a
basic block in P and the directed edges between nodes represent the control-flow between basic blocks in P in-
cluding inter-method, intra-method, normal and exceptional control-flows3. There is a start node in ĈG associated
with each applet lifecycle method/initial configuration in P .
Intuitively a loop in ĈG has the following properties:
2We cover the required material in Section 6.2; those already familiar with natural loops and dominators may freely skip that section
3See Corollary 4.4.2 on page 128
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• a loop is a set of nodes nodes ⊆ ĈG;
• a loop has a loop-header node ∈ nodes such that control-flow to nodes in nodes from outside of nodes in ĈG
must go via the loop-header node;
• a loop has a back-edge from one of the nodes in nodes to the loop-header node
Consider Figure 6.1 which has three nested loops:
• Loop with basic block 5 as the loop-header and block 6 as having the back-edge. The whole loop body is
{5, 6};
• Loop with basic block 3 as the loop-header and block 7 as having the back-edge. The whole loop body is
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7};
• Loop with basic block 1 as the loop-header and block 8 as having the back-edge. The whole loop body is
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
It is clear from examining the basic blocks making up the three loops, that the first loop is the innermost loop of
the nested loops, and that the second is the middle loop, with the third being the outermost loop. Where there is
no intersection between basic blocks in loop-bodies, these loops must be independent. We use natural loops in a
similar way as e.g. JOP uses defscopes [Sch09] or SWEET [Gus] uses scope graphs to e.g. ensure the local vari-
ables on which outer loops depend should not be written to by child/nested loops. Nestedness and independence
of loops can be inferred from the set of basic blocks associated with each loop.
To formalise the specification and identification of natural loops, we introduce the notion of dominators. A node d
is said to dominate another node n in ĈG (which we write d dominates n) if every path from a start node to p must
go though d. A loop in Carmel then has the following properties:
• A single entry point, the loop header node lh, which dominates all nodes in the loop;
• A back-edge linking a node n to the loop-header node lh.
Considering Figure 6.1 once more:
• Basic block 5 dominates blocks {5, 6}– block 5 is the loop-header node and block 6 has the back-edge to the
loop-header node;
• Basic block 3 dominates blocks {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}– block 3 is the loop-header node and block 7 has the back-edge
to the loop-header node;
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• Basic block 1 dominates blocks {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}– block 1 is the loop-header node and block 8 has the

























f8_1 Control returned to the JCRE
Figure 6.1: Control-flow graph of a Carmel program, with three embedded loops. Loop-header nodes at basic-
block nodes 1, 3 and 5.
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A natural loop in Carmel consists of a back edge n→ lh, where lh dominates n, and the set of nodes x such that
lh dominates x and there exists a path from x to n not containing lh; the loop header is lh. Note that we have
assumed as part of the thesis’ assumptions in Section 1.3 that P is flow-reducible, or has been preprocessed to be
be flow-reducible via node-copying/node-splitting techniques, and so ĈG is flow-reducible. This ensures loops are
well-defined and back edges are unique (and consistent with how we have presented them here). An algorithm to
detect natural loops in Carmel is given in Table 6.2. We use the graph facilities of the WALA4 library to compute
the dominator relation (using the Tarjan-Lengauer algorithm of [LT79]) and to identify the back edges and compute
the natural loop using its depth-first search functions.
Algorithm to identify natural loops in a Control Flow Graph:
- Compute dominator relation
- Identify back edges
- Compute the loop for each back edge:
for each node h in dominator tree
for each node n for which there exists a back edge n->h
define the loop with
header h
back edge n -> h
body consisting of all nodes reachable from n by a
depth first search backwards from n that stops at h
Table 6.1: Algorithm to identify natural loops in a control-flow graph such as ĈG, reproduced from [Pin10]
6.3 Capture local/loop variable information from each natural loop
Let P be a Carmel program such that
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
4The T. J. Watson Libraries for Analysis (WALA) libraries http://wala.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/Main Page provides static code
analysis capabilities for Java bytecode.
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and {n1, . . . , nm} be the set of natural loops extracted from ĈG using the approach and algorithm outlined in
Section 6.2 and assuming the required data has been captured to define the following functions:
findBlocks : NaturalLoop −→ P(N0)
findAddresses : NaturalLoop −→ P(Address)
findLoopHeader : NaturalLoop −→ N0
findLoopHeaderIdom : NaturalLoop −→ N0
findLoopBackEdge : NaturalLoop −→ N0
Then we define and specify the following functions to capture local/loop variable information:
findStoreV ariables : NaturalLoop −→ P(N0)
findStoreV ariables(n) = {i| (m, pc) ∈ findAddresses(n),m.instructionAt(pc) = store t i}
findIncV ariables : NaturalLoop −→ P(N0)
findIncV ariables(n) = {i | (m, pc) ∈ findAddresses(n),m.instructionAt(pc) = inc t i c}
findIncV ariablesAndV alues : NaturalLoop −→ P(N0 × Z)
findIncV ariablesAndV alues(n) = {(i, c) | (m,pc) ∈ findAddresses(n),m.instructionAt(pc) = inc t i c}
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findLoopV ariablesAndV alues : NaturalLoop −→ (N0 −→ (Z× Z× Z))
findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(n) = B .
n is a loop-header node
n ends with an if instruction at (mn, pcn)
Start computation of B
B := [ ]
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = if t op goto addr ⇒
∀π1 ∈ Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ (s, (l1, h1,mod1), (mn, pc2)) ∈ X2 :
mn.instructionAt(pc2) ∈ {store t i , inc t i c} ⇒
(B(i) is nil) ⇒
B(i) := (l1, h1,mod1);
(B(i) is not nil) ⇒
B(i) = (l2, h2,mod2)
B(i) := (min{l1, l2}, max{h1, h2}, max{mod1,mod2});
∀ (s, (l1, h1,mod1), (mn, pc2)) ∈ X1 :
mn.instructionAt(pc2) ∈ {store t i , inc t i c} ⇒
(B(i) is nil) ⇒
B(i) := (l1, h1,mod1);
(B(i) is not nil) ⇒
B(i) = (l2, h2,mod2)
B(i) := (min{l1, l2}, max{h1, h2}, max{mod1,mod2});
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = if t op null goto addr ⇒
∀π1 ∈ Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1
∀ (s, (l1, h1,mod1), (mn, pc2)) ∈ X1 :
mn.instructionAt(pc2) ∈ {store t i , inc t i c} ⇒
(B(i) is nil) ⇒
B(i) := (l1, h1,mod1);
(B(i) is not nil) ⇒
B(i) = (l2, h2,mod2)
B(i) := (min{l1, l2}, max{h1, h2}, max{mod1,mod2});
End computation of B
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6.4 Validate conditions for being able to determine loop-bounds
Let P be a Carmel program such that
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
and {n1, . . . , nm} be the set of natural loops extracted from ĈG using the approach and algorithm outlined in Section 6.2 and
assuming the functions defined in Section 6.3.
Then we require the following conditions/validations to be satisfied to be able to provide upper loop-bounds for each reachable
loop in P :
• No recursion:
R̂EC = ∅
• All reachable instructions must be on a path that eventually returns control to the JCRE:




∀ (mn, pcn) ∈ P.addresses :
∀ π ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :(
{(π, JCRE normal), (π, JCRE uncaught exception)}⋂T 6= ∅)
This condition is designed to detect infinite intra-method loops e.g. the simplest/pathological form would be:
10 goto 10
There is no path to the JCRE from instructions for which this condition fails.
• Inner loops must not change the value of loop variables of outer loops:
∀i∈{1,...,m}∀j∈{1,...,m},j 6=i findBlocks(ni) ∩ findBlocks(nj) 6= ∅ ⇒
findIncV ariables(ni) ∩ findIncV ariables(nj) = ∅
∀i∈{1,...,m}∀j∈{1,...,m},j 6=i findBlocks(ni) ∩ findBlocks(nj) 6= ∅ ⇒
|findBlocks(ni)| > |findBlocks(nj)| ⇒
dom(findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(ni)) ∩
(findIncV ariables(nj) ∪ findStoreV ariables(nj)) = ∅
• Last instruction of a loop-header node must be an if s statement;
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• Loops must be simple numeric loops:
∀i∈{1,...,m} dom(findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(ni)) ∩ findIncV ariables(ni) 6= ∅
• Loop variables must be monotonically increasing or decreasing:
∀i∈{1,...,m}
∀(i1, c1) ∈ findIncV ariablesAndV alues(ni)
∀(i2, c2) ∈ findIncV ariablesAndV alues(ni)
(i1 = i2) ⇒ ((c1 > 0 ∧ c2 > 0) ∨ (c1 < 0 ∧ c2 < 0))
• Loop variables must have finite (non-top) interval values:
∀i∈{1,...,m}
∀j ∈ dom(findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(ni))
∀(min,max,mod) ∈ findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(ni)(j) :
¬(min = ⊥s ∧max = ⊤s ∧mod = MAX MOD COUNT )
6.5 Calculate loop-bounds
Let P be a Carmel program such that
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
and {n1, . . . , nm} be the set of natural loops extracted from ĈG using the approach and algorithm outlined in Section 6.2 and
assuming P successfully passes all the validation criteria of Section 6.3, then we are able to calculate an upper loop-bound per
loop.
findMaxLoopBound : NaturalLoop −→ P(N0)
findMaxLoopBound(n) =
{
max{bound1, . . . , boundw}
∣∣∣∣∣ findLoopBounds(n) = {(index1, bound1), . . . , (indexw, boundw)}
}
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(maxV al −minV al)
step
⌉) ∣∣∣∣∣
index ∈ dom(findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(n))
(minV al,maxV al,modV al) = findLoopV ariablesAndV alues(n)(index)
findIncV ariablesAndV alues(n) = {(i, c1), . . . , (i, cm)}, step = min{|c1|, . . . , |cm|}
}
6.6 Generating an integer linear programming problem per registered
applet lifecycle method
6.6.1 Introduction
Let P be a Carmel program such that
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,RDLVExtended-CFA P
and {n1, . . . , nm} be the set of natural loops extracted from ĈG using the approach and algorithm outlined in Section 6.2
and assuming P successfully passes all the validation criteria of Section 6.3, then we are able to generate an integer linear
programming problem per registered applet lifecycle method whose solution is the worst-case resource-usage (WCRU) for that
registered applet and applet lifecycle method. As mentioned in the outset of this chapter, while our approach is firmly based on
the outstanding and pioneering work of [PS97], its presentation is intentionally closer to that of [Sch09].
Remember that ĈG is a control-flow graph of P and more particularly a directed graph where each node in the graph is a
basic block in P and the directed edges between nodes represent the control-flow between basic blocks in P including inter-
method, intra-method, normal and exceptional control-flows. There is a start node in ĈG for each registered applet lifecycle
method/initial configuration in P .
In framing the integer linear programming problem for each registered applet lifecycle method (which we’ll abbreviate from this
point on as the ILP problem):
• We associate a resource usage cost ci ∈ N0 with each basic block/node Bi in ĈG. Each basic block/node in ĈG is
identified by its unique number Bi. For simplicity, our examples in this chapter will mainly focus on examples where the
resource cost is the execution time associated with each basic block; we may define any resource cost function that can
be expressed as a function of the individual instructions within a basic block and an aggregate function on the instructions
within a basic block – for worst-case execution-time and worst-case dynamic memory allocation analysis, the aggregate
function is the sum of the cost of the individual instructions. This resource usage cost expresses the cost of enacting the
block once;
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• We associate an execution frequency ei ∈ N0 for each edge in ĈG. Since each basic block/node in ĈG is assigned a
unique number, and there are no self-loops or duplicate edges in ĈG, edges are uniquely identified and labelled as
f < source basic block/node number > < destination basic block/node number > e.g. f0 1 is the directed edge from
basic block 0 to basic block 1 in ĈG.
Then the objective function of the ILP for the n basic blocks reachable from the particular registered applet lifecycle method





subject to two sets of constraints we generate algorithmically from ĈG:
• Structural constraints. The methodology requires:
– adding a unique entry node S to ĈG and add an edge fs from S to the basic block corresponding to the first basic
block of alm and adding an initial constraint fs = 1 to express we must enter the body of alm exactly once;
– adding a unique exit node T to ĈG and add an edge ft to T with an initial constraint ft = 1 to express we must
return to the JCRE exactly once;
– express that the frequency with which a block is executed must equal the sum of the frequencies of all incoming
edges:
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
{fX1 i, . . . , fXo i} ∈ edges(ĈG) :




– express that the frequency with which a block is executed must equal the sum of the frequencies of all outgoing
edges:
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
{fi X1, . . . , fi Xo} ∈ edges(ĈG) :




– for each basic block Bℓ corresponding to a terminal configuration – returning control to the JCRE either normally or
abnormally via an uncaught exception – add an optional edge ft from Bℓ to T :
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∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
Bi ∈ {JCRE normal, JCRE uncaught exception}
add constraint ei ≤ ft
– express the resource cost ti of each basic block Bi as the product of the frequency of execution and the resource
cost of executing the block once. We assume the precalculation of ci = 〈some resource function of Bi〉 for each
basic block prior to generation of the resource cost constraints of each basic block:
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
add constraint ti = ciei
NB if Bi ∈ {JCRE normal, JCRE uncaught exception} we require ci = 0 (otherwise we’d be including in the ILP
a cost to return to the JCRE from an applet lifecycle method).
– express the global logical constraint that, in any valid solution, control must be returned to the JCRE exactly once:
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
Bi ∈ {JCRE normal, JCRE uncaught exception}




fj i = ft
– constrain solution to be integral. Define each block cost, edge frequency and timing variable name to be an integer;
– constrain solution to be non-negative. Define each block cost, edge frequency and timing variable value to be ≥ 0;
• Loop constraints. Express the numerical relationship between the frequency of execution of the immediate dominator of
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the loop header and the back edge to the loop header:





backEdge = f〈loopHeaderTail〉 〈loopHeader〉
idomEdge = f〈loopHeaderIdom〉 〈loopHeader〉
add constraint backEdge = maxLoopBound ∗ idomEdge
6.6.2 Sample generation of an integer programming problem for an overridden method
in an entry point method
In this subsection we demonstrate how our approach to generating ILP handles polymorphism/overridden methods for an ap-
plet with rival implementations of a polymorphic method and how the solution of the ILP selects the rival implementation with
the highest resource cost.
Dynamic dispatch of method invocation is a fundamental feature of an object-oriented language like Java. Dynamic dispatch
occurs at method invocation in Java and Carmel when the runtime system has to select/resolve which version of a polymorphic
method call to invoke, and is based principally on the runtime class of the object and other runtime types, including interfaces,
it possesses. Dynamic dispatch occurs in Carmel when either of the following bytecode instructions are executed:
• invokevirtual w
• invokeinterface w
and the semantics of resolving dynamic dispatch are abstracted into the function methodLookup defined in Section 3.3.2.1.
Note that dynamic dispatch does not occur with invokedefinite w instructions. The semantics of method invocation in
Carmel are defined in Section 3.9.3.
In Tables 6.2–6.3, we present the simplified Carmel code for an applet AnimalApplet which has an attribute animal of abstract
type uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal and includes annotations of which basic block instructions belong to. The control-flow graph
for this program is shown in Figure 6.2 and includes the basic blocks and their resource cost. The entry point is block 0, the first
block of the AnimalApplet install method. In a fuller applet, the installation byte array would be used to select one particular
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animal and a variety of fields and methods would be provided. For simplicity, the abstract type uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal
defines only one method, the abstract method doSomething(). The extended control-flow analysis determines this field may
be populated by concrete classes: uk.ac.imperial.doc.Hawk and uk.ac.imperial.doc.Dog as a result of blocks 2, 5 and
8. Block 9 invokes the doSomething() on the animal instance and dynamic dispatch adds directed edges from block 9 to
blocks 11 (Hawk), 12 (Dog) and to the uncaught JCRE exception block 10 (since animal may have been null according to the
extended control-flow analysis). The is modelled in the ILP as:
e9 = f9 10 + f9 11 + f9 12;
with the alternative paths represented due to the rule on the sum of the outgoing edges. Since the objective function is to max-
imise a sum involving t9, and the definition of t9 = 1e9, the solver selects the edge which leads to the highest resource cost.
This is straightforward in our example since each rival implementation of doSomething() does not invoke any other methods
or have any loops or conditionals, but in a real-life example, rival implementations of a polymorphic method may very well do
so, and the beauty of the ILP formulation and ILP solvers is the ability to find a global maximum of the objective function i.e. to
select the worst-case resource-usage across all paths in a Carmel program P .
The ILP is documented in Tables 6.4 – 6.5 and the syntax of the ILP is tailored for the open-source linear integer programming
solver lpsolve5.55. The solution to the ILP is given in Table 6.6 and aspects included in the control-flow graph given in Figure
6.3. From the solution we learn a number of interesting things:
• the worst-case resource-usage is 30 (with the unit of measurement here being the number of Carmel instructions exe-
cuted);
• the edges not forming part of the worst-case resource-usage have a frequency of zero;
• the blocks Bi not forming part of the worst-case resource-usage have an execution frequency ei = 0. We see that
e11 = 0 and e10 = 0 and so the corresponding blocks 11 (the Hawk implementation of the doSomething() method) and
block 10 (an unhandled exception return to the JCRE) are not executed in the worst-case resource-usage path, and see
that the Dog implementation of the doSomething() method (block 12) and normal return to the JCRE (block 17) are part
of the worst-case resource-usage path, since e12 = 1 6= 0 and e17 = 1 6= 0. This is shown in Figure 6.3.
5and we like very much the lpsolve package and its easy-to-use lpsolve integrated development environment.
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Table 6.2: Carmel program demonstrating overriding, part 1
Block number Carmel code
package uk.ac.imperial.doc { 0xa0, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x2 };
public abstract class Animal {
public abstract void doSomething();
}
public class Hawk extends uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal {








public class Dog extends uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal {












Table 6.3: Carmel program demonstrating overriding, part 2
Block number Carmel code
public class AnimalApplet extends javacard.framework.Applet
{ 0xa0, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x2, 0x01 } {
private uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal animal;
public void <init>(byte[]){
0: load r 0
16: new uk.ac.imperial.doc.Hawk
2 19: dup 1 0
3 20: invokedefinite uk.ac.imperial.doc.Hawk.<init>()
23: putfield this uk.ac.imperial.doc.NewApplet.animal
30: new uk.ac.imperial.doc.Dog
5 33: dup 1 0
6 34: invokedefinite uk.ac.imperial.doc.Dog.<init>()
37: putfield this uk.ac.imperial.doc.NewApplet.animal
40: load r 0
8 41: getfield uk.ac.imperial.doc.NewApplet.animal
9 44: invokevirtual uk.ac.imperial.doc.Animal.doSomething()
13 47: return
}
public static void install(byte[], short, byte){
0: load r 0
3: store r 4
4: new uk.ac.imperial.doc.AnimalApplet
5: store r 5
7: load r 5
0 8: load r 4
1 9: invokevirtual uk.ac.imperial.doc.AnimalApplet.<init>(byte[])
14 12: load r 5





Figure 6.2: Control-flow graph with resource costs of a Carmel program showing overridden versions of a
doSomething method
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Table 6.4: ILP generated from Carmel program demonstrating overriding, Part 1
/*Objective function Carmel address: (0,uk.ac.imperial.doc.AnimalApplet.install(byte[],short,byte))*/
max: t0 + t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 + t7 + t8 + t9 + t10 + t11 + t12 + t13 + t14 + t15 + t16 + t17;
/*Flow constraints*/
S: fs = 1;
T: ft = 1;
e0 = fs;
e0 = f0 1;
e1 = f0 1;
e1 = f1 2;
e2 = f1 2;
e2 = f2 3;
e3 = f2 3;
e3 = f3 4;
e4 = f3 4;
e4 = f4 5;
e5 = f4 5;
e5 = f5 6;
e6 = f5 6;
e6 = f6 7;
e7 = f6 7;
e7 = f7 8;
e8 = f7 8;
e8 = f8 9;
e9 = f8 9;
e9 = f9 10 + f9 11 + f9 12;
e10 = f9 10 + f15 10;
e10 ≤ ft;
e11 = f9 11;
e11 = f11 13;
e12 = f9 12;
e12 = f12 13;
e13 = f11 13 + f12 13;
e13 = f13 14;
e14 = f13 14;
e14 = f14 15;
e15 = f14 15;
e15 = f15 10 + f15 16;
e16 = f15 16;
e16 = f16 17;
e17 = f16 17;
e17 ≤ ft;
/*one terminal exit*/
TERMINAL CONSTRAINT: f9 10 + f15 10 + f16 17 = ft;
/*resource usage cost*/
t0 = 6 e0;
t1 = 1 e1;
t2 = 3 e2;
t3 = 1 e3;
t4 = 1 e4;
t5 = 3 e5;
t6 = 1 e6;
t7 = 1 e7;
t8 = 3 e8;
t9 = 1 e9;
t10 = 0 e10;
t11 = 2 e11;
t12 = 5 e12;
t13 = 1 e13;
t14 = 1 e14;
t15 = 1 e15;
t16 = 1 e16;
t17 = 0 e17;
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f0 1 ≥ 0;
f11 13 ≥ 0;
f12 13 ≥ 0;
f13 14 ≥ 0;
f14 15 ≥ 0;
f15 10 ≥ 0;
f15 16 ≥ 0;
f16 17 ≥ 0;
f1 2 ≥ 0;
f2 3 ≥ 0;
f3 4 ≥ 0;
f4 5 ≥ 0;
f5 6 ≥ 0;
f6 7 ≥ 0;
f7 8 ≥ 0;
f8 9 ≥ 0;
f9 10 ≥ 0;
f9 11 ≥ 0;












































































Table 6.6: Solution to ILP generated from Carmel program demonstrating overriding
Variables MILP Feasible result
30 30
f0 1 1 1
f1 2 1 1
f2 3 1 1
f3 4 1 1
f4 5 1 1
f5 6 1 1
f6 7 1 1
f7 8 1 1
f8 9 1 1
f9 10 0 0
f9 11 0 0
f9 12 1 1
f11 13 0 0
f12 13 1 1
f13 14 1 1
f14 15 1 1
f15 10 0 0
f15 16 1 1
f16 17 1 1
fs 1 1
ft 1 1






































Figure 6.3: Control-flow graph with resource costs of a Carmel program showing overridden versions of a
doSomething method, dotted lines show edges NOT taken in worst-case resource-usage, all other edges are
executed exactly once
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6.6.3 Sample generation of an integer programming problem for a triangular triple-
nested loop
In this subsection we demonstrate how our approach to generating ILP handles triangular and more generally nested loops. A
triangular loop is a loop in which the the number of executions of an inner loop is dependent on a variable in an outer loop. For
example in the following Java code:
int i, j, k;
for (i=0; i < 100; i++){ // max iterations of loop 100
for (j=i; j < 75; j=j+2){ // max iterations of loop 38 when i =0





the middle loop (variable j) depends on the outer loop (variable i) and so this is a triangular loop.
In Table 6.7, we present the simplified Carmel code for an applet TripleLoopApplet, corresponding to the above Java code,
including annotations of which basic block instructions belong to. The control-flow graph for this program is shown in Figure
6.4 and includes the basic blocks and their resource cost. The entry point is block 0, the first block of the TripleLoopApplet
install method. This is admittedly not a good example of applet code: it is intended to demonstrate how we generate an ILP
for nested loops. In the Carmel code, index 11 corresponds to i in the Java code, index 12 corresponds to j in the Java code,
and index 13 corresponds to k in the Java code. Block 2 corresponds to j = i.
Table 6.8 shows how we calculate the loop bounds from the extended control-flow analysis. While we are able to calculate exact
loop bounds for simple loop variables i and k, our approach to calculating loop bounds conservatively (over-) approximates the
loop bounds for j – further investigation is needed to reduce the degree of over–approximation. On the other hand, other tools
such as JOP and SWEET state they are unable to handle triangular loops.
The ILP is documented in Table 6.9 and the syntax of the ILP is tailored for the open-source linear integer programming solver
lpsolve5.56. The solution to the ILP is given in Tables 6.10 and aspects included in the control-flow graph given in Figure 6.5.
From the solution we learn a number of interesting things:
• the worst-case resource-usage is 6051006 (with the unit of measurement here being the number of Carmel instructions
executed);
6and we like very much the lpsolve package and its easy-to-use lpsolve integrated development environment.
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• all edges and blocks are visited (all fx y and ei are positive integers).
Table 6.7: Carmel program demonstrating triangular triple-nested loop
Block number Carmel code
package uk.ac.imperial.doc { 0xa0, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x2 };
public class TripleLoopApplet extends javacard.framework.Applet
{ 0xa0, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x24, 0x2, 0x02 } {
public static void install(byte[], short, byte) {
0: push s 0
0 1: store s 11
2: load s 11
3: push s 100
1 5: if s ge goto 51
8: load s 11
2 10: store s 12
11: load s 12
12: push s 75
3 14: if s ge goto 45
17: push s 200
4 20: store s 13
21: load s 13
215: push s 0
5 22: if s le goto 39
25: nop
33: inc s 13 -1
6 36: goto 21
39: inc s 12 2
7 42: goto 11
45: inc s 11 1





Table 6.8: Calculation of loop bounds for Carmel program demonstrating triangular triple-nested loop
Loop header at basic block 1, pc=5, back edge at block 8, immediate dominator block 0, stack loop value operands:
- (s (0,0,0), pc: 1,(StoreTIArguments (t=s), (i=11) ) )
- (s (1,100,100), pc: 45,(IncTICArguments (t=s), (i=11),(c=1) ) )
⇒ max=100.0,min=0.0,step=1.0,bound=100.0
⇒ f8 1 = 100 f0 1
Loop header at basic block 3, pc=14, back edge at block 7, immediate dominator block 2, stack loop value operands:
- (s (0,99,99), pc: 10,(StoreTIArguments (t=s), (i=12) ) )
- (s (2,76,38), pc: 39,(IncTICArguments (t=s), (i=12),(c=2) ) )
⇒ max=99.0,min=0.0,step=2.0,bound=50.0
⇒ f7 3 = 50 f2 3
Loop header at basic block 5, pc=22, back edge at block 6, immediate dominator block 4, stack loop value operands:
- (s (200,200,0), pc: 20,(StoreTIArguments (t=s), (i=13) ) )
- (s (0,199,200), pc: 33,(IncTICArguments (t=s), (i=13),(c=-1) ) )
⇒ max=200.0,min=0.0,step=1.0,bound=200.0
























Figure 6.4: Control-flow graph of a Carmel program showing a triple-nested triangular loop.
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Table 6.9: ILP generated from Carmel program demonstrating a triangular triple-nested loop
/*Objective function Carmel address: (0,uk.ac.imperial.doc.TripleLoopApplet.install(byte[],short,byte))*/
max: t0 + t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 + t7 + t8 + t9 + t10;
/*Flow constraints*/
S: fs = 1;
T: ft = 1;
e0 = fs;
e0 = f0 1;
e1 = f0 1 + f8 1;
e1 = f1 2 + f1 9;
e2 = f1 2;
e2 = f2 3;
e3 = f2 3 + f7 3;
e3 = f3 4 + f3 8;
e4 = f3 4;
e4 = f4 5;
e5 = f4 5 + f6 5;
e5 = f5 6 + f5 7;
e6 = f5 6;
e6 = f6 5;
e7 = f5 7;
e7 = f7 3;
e8 = f3 8;
e8 = f8 1;
e9 = f1 9;
e9 = f9 10;
e10 = f9 10;
e10 ≤ ft;
/*one terminal exit*/
TERMINAL CONSTRAINT: f9 10 = ft;
/*loop bounds*/
f8 1 = 100 f0 1;
f7 3 = 50 f2 3;
f6 5 = 200 f4 5;
/*resource usage cost*/
t0 = 2 e0;
t1 = 3 e1;
t2 = 2 e2;
t3 = 3 e3;
t4 = 2 e4;
t5 = 3 e5;
t6 = 3 e6;
t7 = 2 e7;
t8 = 2 e8;
t9 = 1 e9;













f0 1 ≥ 0;
f1 2 ≥ 0;
f1 9 ≥ 0;
f2 3 ≥ 0;
f3 4 ≥ 0;
f3 8 ≥ 0;
f4 5 ≥ 0;
f5 6 ≥ 0;
f5 7 ≥ 0;
f6 5 ≥ 0;
f7 3 ≥ 0;
f8 1 ≥ 0;





































































f5_7 = 5000 f6_5 = 200 f4_5 = 1000000
f7_3 = 50 f2_3 = 5000
f8_1 = 100 f0_1 = 100 f9_10 = ft = 1
Figure 6.5: Control-flow graph of a Carmel program showing a triple-nested triangular loop, annotated with fre-
quencies derived from solution of the corresponding ILP.
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Table 6.10: Solution to ILP generated from Carmel program demonstrating triangular loops













f0 1 1 1
f1 2 100 100
f1 9 1 1
f2 3 100 100
f3 4 5000 5000
f3 8 100 100
f4 5 5000 5000
f5 6 1000000 1000000
f5 7 5000 5000
f6 5 1000000 1000000
f7 3 5000 5000
f8 1 100 100














6.7 Evaluation of the Precision of the Worst-Case Resource-Usage Anal-
ysis
Calculating the worst-case execution-time of a program is in general an undecidable problem, equivalent to the halting problem
[WEE+08], and so evaluation of the precision of the worst-case resource-usage of a Carmel program is best conducted in terms
of analysing a suite (or suites) of benchmark programs with known resource usage through our tool. Whilst implementing the
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worklist solver, I composed a suite of my own input Carmel programs with manually computed known resource usage, mostly
based on analysing a variety of different loops with different levels of nestedness and loop conditions, principally to test the
correctness of the implementation.
The formal evaluation of our worst-case resource-usage tool has been conducted in terms of cross-comparison with the mature
test suite of Ma¨lardalen worst-case execution-time benchmarks7 [GBEL10]. This suite is a collection of C programs for which
staff at the Ma¨lardalen Real-Time Research Centre have provided loop-bounds computed by their mature SWEET8 tool. In
particular, our evaluation of our worst-case resource-usage tool consists of two parts per test program, namely whether or not
our tool:
• is able to provide loop bounds;
• is able to match the precision of the loop bounds provided by the SWEET tool;
for all reachable loops in the Carmel translation of the C test program in the suite of Ma¨lardalen worst-case execution-time
benchmarks [GBEL10]. The Ma¨lardalen test suite consists, at the time of writing this, of 35 C programs. Our suite of equivalent
Carmel programs consists of 26 of the original 35, the remaining tests were dropped for one of a number of reasons:
• they test recursion;
• the pointer arithmetic was too complex or impossible to translate into Carmel;
• the test program relies on floating-point arithmetic, which is not supported by the Java Card virtual machine;
Note in terms of translating each C program into the equivalent Carmel, we first transform the C program syntactically into valid
Java code, and then translate from the generated Java bytecode the corresponding Carmel code.
Table 6.16 shows the results of cross-comparing the loop-bounds our tool generates against those generated by SWEET and
the results are very encouraging. We were able to match SWEET for 18 of the 26 programs in terms of the number of loops
detected and the loop bounds computed. There is a slight difference in how loop bounds are reported, in that SWEET reports
a loop as having a bound of zero when it determines the loop will not be executed i.e. when SWEET determines the loop
is executed zero times ≡ the loop is not executed according to SWEET ≡ the loop is not reachable in the control-flow graph
our tool computes, and so no loop bound is given for it in our corresponding generated integer-linear programming problem,
since the integer-linear programming problem is generated from the control-flow graph. Of the 8 programs for which we were
not able to provide loop-bounds, 5 of these 8 were due to array indexes not moving monotonically forwards or backwards9, a
fundamental requirement in our approach to the calculation of conservative loop-bounds, and one of the validation conditions
of Section 6.4. Of the other 3, one test case had a loop condition which depended on a non-constant global variable, and our
tool couldn’t bound its possible values. This code pattern is not a common pattern in Java Card applet code. The other two
7http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/projects/wcet/benchmarks.html
8http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/projects/wcet/sweet/index.html
9This is a natural/necessary part of the algorithm being used in some of the test programs e.g. the binary search and quicksort algorithms.
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test programs have loop conditions which are not currently able to be bounded by our tool.
Careful analysis and reflection on the test suite showed three things:
• the design, use and integration of our reaching definitions for local variables analysis10 to filter out non-reaching defini-
tions and so increase the precision of loop-bounds was the right decision. The Ma¨lardalen worst-case execution-time
benchmarks extensively reuse the same local variable for different purposes in the same function/method. Consider
Table 6.11, which shows a sequence of three loops using the same local variable, whose values in each loop range over
distinct subranges of the short datatype. Without reaching definitions11, the loop bounds of the second loop would be
substantially less accurate as the maximum value of the local variable would be coarsened to 100 from the flow from the
first loop and the loop bound computed as [−50, 100, |1|] = 150. Similarly the third loop bounds would be coarsened to
[−50, 200, |1|] = 250;
• whilst designed with bounding iteration over arrays in mind, our tool is also able to bound iteration of a class of simple
looping algorithms and so is able to provide accurate resource-usage of e.g. the iterative version of the calculation of
the Fibonacci sequence12 as shown in Table 6.13. The class of simple looping algorithms are those that iterate from a
constant monotonically up or down towards a parameter n e.g. the iterative version of the Fibonacci sequence iterates
monotonically from 2 to n and the loop-bound is computed correctly as (n− 1) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 30. [The upper-limit is due to
the first condition in the C for loop, and so replicated in the Carmel code];
• our tool shows great promise of being able to be extended to calculate loop bounds for more complex algorithms, by
analysing the product of arithmetic operations used as loop conditions. Consider Table 6.12, which presents the Java
and Carmel versions of the Ma¨lardalen C implementation13 of the classic algorithm for determining whether or not a
positive integer n ≥ 2 is a prime number. Its essence is that if n is even, then if n = 2, it is prime, otherwise it is not
prime. Otherwise, we iterate over the odd integers from 3 to ⌈√n ⌉and check whether it is a factor of n - if it a factor, then
n cannot be prime. If iteration to ⌈√n ⌉ completes with no factors have been found, then n is prime. This second part is
expressed in this implementation with the loop:
for (i = 3; i * i <= n; i += 2)
with the key part of the corresponding Carmel code being:
31: inc s 1 2
36: load s 1
37: load s 1






39: load s 0
40: if s le goto 21
The static analysis underlying our tool is not able to bound this loop since it cannot determine the relationship between
i, the result of the binary operator i ∗ i = i2 and n. In particular, the if statement at program counter (pc) 40 does not
recognise one of its operands as being a derived function (via pc 38) of local variable 1 at pc 31. Note that I consider
it to be a derived function because the operand to the if statement at pc 40 that is a function of local variable 1 (= i)
at pc 31 remains a reaching definition at pc 40, and so can be expressed as a function of the local variable 1 at pc 40.
This opens the door to filtering the values of local variable 1 at pc 40 to its successor addresses according to whether
the operator at pc 38 succeeds or fails. Such filtering prevents the local variable 1 at pc 31 being forced to top.
For exploratory reasons only, as a foray into the feasibility of the approach, we extended the implementation of each
abstract number to add the set of its operands, and for the multiplication operation to capture its operands and to add
filtering as described above. The Java code implementing this change is given in Tables 6.14 and 6.15 and the results
have been astonishingly accurate. Trying around 30 prime and non prime numbers with the new code, at the analysis
results for local variable 1 at pc 40, the values have ranged from 3 to (⌈√n ⌉ + 1) and the boolean value of the primes
method returned to pc 13 of the install method has been correct for the value passed in at pc 6 has been true (1, 1, X) or
false (0, 0, Y ) and never maybe-true-and-false (0, 1,W ). Much further analysis is required before adopting this approach,
but our change makes logical sense and produces the right set of values for each input parameter I tried. From this set
of values, we can produce the loop-bound as the loop increment is known (two).
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Table 6.11: Illustration on how the use of reaching definitions improve the prevision of loop bounds
C Code Carmel translation Loop bounds
short i = 0; 0: push s 0
1: store s 11
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { 2: push s 0 (s (0,0,0), (3,store (t=s), (i=11) ) )
No changes to i 3: store s 11 (s (1,100,100),(10,inc (t=s), (i=11),(c=1) ) )
} 4: goto 15 loop bound, max=100.0,min=0.0,step=1.0,bound=100.0
7: nop
10: inc s 11 1
15: load s 11
16: push s 100
18: if s lt goto 7
for (i = -50; i < -20; i ++) { 102: push s -50 (s (-50,-50,0),(103,store (t=s), (i=11) ))
No changes to i 103: store s 11 (s (-49,-20,30),(1010,inc (t=s), (i=11),(c=1) ))
} 104: goto 1015 loop bound, max=-20.0,min=-50.0,step=1.0,bound=30.0
107: nop
1010: inc s 11 1
1015: load s 11
1016: push s -20
1018: if s lt goto 107
for (i = 250; i > 200; i–) { 202: push s 250 (s (250,250,0),(203,store (t=s), (i=11) ))
No changes to i 203: store s 11 (s (200,249,50),(2020,inc (t=s), (i=11),(c=-1) ))
} 204: goto 2015 loop bound, max=250.0,min=200.0,step=1.0,bound=50.0
207: nop
2020: inc s 11 -1
2015: load s 11
2016: push s 200
2018: if s gt goto 207
21: return
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Table 6.12: An algorithm for determining whether a given positive integer is prime
Java form of C Code Carmel translation Values
public static boolean divides(short n, short m) { public static void install(byte[], short, byte){ (s (3,3,0), (17,store (t=s), (i=1) ))
return (m % n == 0); (s (5,80,78), (31,inc (t=s), (i=1),(c=2) ))
} 0: push s 6217 (s (3,78,77), (38,binop (t=s), (op=MUL) ))
6: invokedefinite uk.ac.imperial.PrimesApplet.prime(short)
public static boolean even(short n) { 13: return
return (divides((short) 2, n)); }
}
public static boolean prime(short){
public static boolean prime(short n) {
short i; 0: load s 0
1: invokedefinite uk.ac.imperial.PrimesApplet.even(short)
if (even(n)) 4: if s eq null goto 16
return (n == 2); 7: load s 0
for (i = 3; i * i ¡= n; i += 2) { 8: push s 2
if (divides(i, n)) 9: if s ne goto 14
return false; 12: push s 1
} 13: return s
return true; 14: push s 0
} 15: return s
16: push s 3
public static void main(String[] args) { 17: store s 1
short x = 6217; 18: goto 36
21: load s 1
boolean prime = prime(x); 22: load s 0
} 23: invokedefinite uk.ac.imperial.PrimesApplet.divides(short,short)
26: if s eq null goto 31
29: push s 0
30: return s
31: inc s 1 2
36: load s 1
37: load s 1
38: numop s mul
39: load s 0
40: if s le goto 21
43: push s 1
44: return s
}
public static boolean even(short){
0: push s 2




public static boolean divides(short, short){
0: load s 1
1: load s 0
2: numop s rem
3: if s ne null goto 8
6: push s 1
7: return s




Table 6.13: Illustration on how Fulgurite is able to calculate loop bounds for a class of simple looping algorithms
such as computing the Fibonacci sequence
C Code Carmel translation Loop bound for fib(30)
int fib(int n){ public static short fib(short){ (s (2,2,0), (5, store (t=s), (i=1) ))
(s (3,31,29), (20, inc (t=s), (i=1),(c=1) ))
int i, Fnew, Fold, temp,ans; 0: push s 1 loop bound, max=31.0,min=2.0,step=1.0,bound=29.0
1: store s 2
Fnew = 1; Fold = 0; 2: push s 0
for ( i = 2; 3: store s 3
i ¡= 30 && i ¡= n; 4: push s 2
i++ ) 5: store s 1
{ 6: goto 25
temp = Fnew; 9: load s 2
Fnew = Fnew + Fold; 10: store s 4
Fold = temp; 12: load s 2
} 13: load s 3
ans = Fnew; 14: numop s add
return ans; 16: store s 2
} 17: load s 4
19: store s 3
int main() 20: inc s 1 1
{ 25: load s 1
int a; 26: push s 30
28: if s gt goto 36
a = 30; 31: load s 1
fib(a); 32: load s 0
return a; 33: if s le goto 9
} 36: load s 2
37: store s 5




SortedSet<AbstractCarmelNumber> absX2Operands = absX2.getOperands();




&& absX2.getOperands().first().getOperands().size() == 0;
if (filter4) {
AbstractCarmelNumber abx2operand1 = absX2Operands.first();
ExtendedCarmelAddress addr = new ExtendedCarmelAddress(abx2operand1.getCarmelAddress(),
(((ReachingDefinitionInstuctionArguments) abx2operand1.getCarmelAddress()
.getInstructionArguments()).getI()));
boolean b = ((rdlv.contains(addr)));
BINOP_NO_OPT_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments2 = (BINOP_NO_OPT_T_NUMERIC_Arguments) absX2
.getCarmelAddress().getInstructionArguments();
BinaryNumericOperator binop = instructionArguments2.getBinop();
i2 = addr.getIndex();
CarmelLUBTreeSet i2Lub = localVarArray.get(new CarmelIntegerIndex(i2));
AbstractShortNumber[] abstractShortNumbers = i2Lub.getAbstractShortNumbers()
.toArray(new AbstractShortNumber[0]);
for (acn1low = absX1.getMin(); b && acn1low <= acn1high; acn1low++) {
for (AbstractShortNumber sNumber : abstractShortNumbers) {
for (acn2low = sNumber.getMin(); acn2low <= sNumber.getMax(); acn2low++) {
temp1 = new AbstractShortNumber((short) acn1low, (short) acn1low,
acn1CurrentModCount, absX1.getCarmelAddress());
temp2 = new AbstractShortNumber((short) acn2low, (short) acn2low,
acn2CurrentModCount, absX2.getCarmelAddress());
AbstractShortNumber temp3 = (AbstractShortNumber) temp2.apply(binop, temp2, temp2,
instructionArguments2, carmelAddress);






















new CarmelIntegerIndex(i2), trueJ, carmelAddress), carmelAddress);
}
if (trueLocal.keySet().size() > 0) {
addCarmelOpStackAndLocalVarArray(opStack, trueLocal, gotoAddrContext, gotoAddr, jHMap,
carmelAddress, context);
}
if (falseLocal.keySet().size() > 0) {
addCarmelOpStackAndLocalVarArray(opStack, falseLocal, nextAddressContextSequence,
nextAddress, jHMap, carmelAddress, context);
}

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We begin this Chapter by honouring the foundations of this thesis and a related PhD thesis which has proved
invaluable in the context of constructing proofs for flow-logic [NN02] program analyses of Carmel:
• This thesis is firmly rooted in the SecSafe project1[HSN+03, Pro02], a successfully completed EC-funded
investigation whose main focus was on the development of static techniques to analyse security properties
of realistic languages. Among the achievements of this project, the specification of the language Java Card
Virtual Machine Language equivalent language Carmel, and the provision of an operational semantics and
program analyses for Carmel, rate highly;
• In his PhD thesis, Hansen [Han05], a member of the original SecSafe project, extends the program analyses
of Carmel from SecSafe and includes novel program analyses for security and information flow. We have
referred to this thesis many times for the methodology of how to construct proofs in the flow-logic framework
[NN02].
By related work we mean (most relevant) projects and published papers on the topics of analysis or certification2
or estimation of resource-usage or resource cost or memory-usage or execution-time of computer languages, at
three different levels of similarity to our thesis:
• Java Card: Despite extensive literature searches, we have been able to locate only one research project –
the Castles3 project – and a handful of published papers [CJPS05, GS05, SCJ06, PTTC08, PTT08, JJ05,
1Project IST-1999-29075, Secure and Safe Systems based on Static Analysis, funded by the European Community under the “Information
Society Technologies” Programme (1998-2002)
2certified in the sense of formal certificates of program behaviour generated by proof-carrying code approaches inspired by [Nec97] or
certified meaning proved by theorem provers
3http://raweb.inria.fr/rapportsactivite/RA2006/lande/uid44.html
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LSWH09]. For the reader interested in where most research effort has been spent on Java Card , it has
focussed on security considerations:
– Formalising the Java Card platform and being able to prove security properties of Java Card applets
and extract certified bytecode verifiers e.g. (Verificard [BDdS+02] and SecSafe [HSN+03] projects);
– Co-evolution of attacks and defences against attacks on Java Card smartcards:
∗ Hardware attacks and particularly fault analysis on specific Java Card smartcards
∗ Software attacks against implementation deficiencies of Java Card API methods or on–card byte-
code verifiers on particular Java Card smartcards
∗ Platform weakness in relying on off-card bytecode validation allowing a window of opportunity to
introduce corruptions e.g. defects in CAP files
to introduce type-confusion, non-deterministic behaviour and the leakage of sensitive/secret information
held on the smartcard e.g. [LBL+15, LBR+13, BG14, LBL+13, BLLL15, BTL13a, SFL13, BTL13b,
BICL11].
• Embedded systems: If we widen our search to Java Micro Edition, a version of the Java platform designed for
embedded systems such as TV set-top boxes, gateways, printers and mobile ’phones, which have greater
computational resources than Java Card smartcards, there exists a number of projects devoted to proof-
carrying code (including proofs of resource-usage properties) including:
– the Mobile Resource Guarantee project4
– the Mobius project5
– the Lande project6
– the COSTA project7
• General programming languages:







7.2.1 The Castles project and other Java Card works
The Castles project focused on creating a unified automated environment for formally certifying the Java Card
platform and Java Card applets by integrating static analysis with automated proof checkers and software
testing methodologies. Such integration was intended to provide an architecture capable of formally connect-
ing and supporting specification, implementation and testing in one system. The Castles project partnered
with, among others, the Lande project; whereas Castles’ focus was on Java Card , the Lande project provided
more supporting research and tooling in formal methods and static analysis.
Two papers from the Castles project are of particular interest to us, and both use variants of the Carmel
programming language. The first [CJPS05, GS05] presents a certified8 algorithm capable of determining
whether any bytecode instruction in a Carmel program may dynamically allocate memory using the new
operator in a loop. If there are no calls to the new operator in a loop, the program is deemed to execute in
bounded memory; otherwise, it is deemed to execute in an unbounded amount of memory. The distinction
between applets operating in bounded memory (applet is fine) and unbounded memory (applet is rejected)
appears to be due to a judgement on the availability of an object deletion mechanism (which requires an
explicit API call to reclaim unreachable objects; garbage collection remains optional in all Classic editions):
“Indeed, for Java Card up to version 2.1 there is no garbage collector and starting with version 2.2
the machine includes a garbage collector which may be activated invoking an API function at the
end of the execution of the applet. This has lead to a rather restrictive programming discipline for
smart cards in which the programmer must avoid memory allocation in parts of the code that are
within loops”.
which is not in the spirit of the official intended use of the object deletion mechanism9:
“The object deletion mechanism is not like garbage collection in standard Java technology appli-
cations due to space and time constraints. The amount of available RAM on the card is limited. In
addition, because the object deletion mechanism is applied to objects stored in persistent memory,
it must be used sparingly. EEPROM writes are very time-consuming operations and only a limited
number of writes can be performed on a card.
8Here proved with the Coq theorem prover https://coq.inria.fr/
9https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/prognotes/object deletion mechanism.htm
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Due to these limitations, the object deletion mechanism in Java Card technology is not automatic:
it is performed only when an applet requests it. Use the object deletion mechanism sparingly and
only when other Java Card technology-based facilities are cumbersome or inadequate”.
nor does the presented analysis ensure the applet under consideration actually calls the referenced API
method to reclaim unreachable objects.
In contrast to our analysis, the algorithm presented in [CJPS05, GS05] does not provide any basis for quan-
tification of the dynamic memory allocation using the new operator and excludes from consideration the API
methods which create dynamic objects via API calls e.g. to any of the JCSystem.makeXXXArray methods.
The second paper [SCJ06] is interesting because it declares itself based on the probabilistic abstract inter-
pretation framework of [DHW03]. Certainly it takes the central notions of viewing programs and systems as
transitions systems with a quantity attached to each transition, and by taking a richer algebraic structure than
a lattice (here a semi-idempotent ring) and using linear operators in the abstract space – but deviates from
it by attaching numerical quantities between transitions representing the resource-usage to be measured10
which in the context of this paper is the cost of a cache lookup failure for a local variable. It is shown how to
compute correct (over-)approximations of the concrete resource cost.
[PTTC08, PTT08] presents an algorithm suitable for on–card calculation/validation of upper bounds on heap
usage. However, it assumes loop-bounds are known and passed into the applet or are constants. Addi-
tionally, it only considers dynamic memory allocation via a new operator and excludes from consideration the
API methods which create dynamic objects via API calls e.g. to any of the JCSystem.makeXXXArraymethods.
[JJ05, BG02] are similar papers in that they share a common aim to reduce the size of applets bytecode on–
card using elements familiar from compression techniques. The former observes that in Java Card , a range
of the opcodes from full Java bytecode is unused and could therefore be repurposed to combine multiple
bytecode instructions into new single bytecode instructions, saving space on-card whilst (speculatively) si-
multaneously improving performance. The paper reports a 10% saving in space saving using this approach.
[BG02] is one of a number of papers which propose full compression of bytecode in a variety of schemes
to save space with a corresponding change to the Java Card Virtual Machine to decompress the instruction
10rather than a probability between 0 and 1 as in the original work
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prior to executing it. This paper measures a 2% to 30% drop in execution speed, for a space saving of 15%.
Other papers e.g. [LSWH09] present approaches for improving aspects of the performance of Java Card,
here transaction performance; since our emphasis is on language-based resource-usage analysis and static
analysis, we do not discuss them further here.
7.3 Embedded systems
The Mobile Resource Guarantee project11 developed a proof-carrying framework for a resource-aware func-
tional language with object handling extensions (Camelot and O’Camelot for the version extended with object
support) which is capable of generating from a Camelot or O’Camelot program a provably equivalent Java
bytecode program and provably correct resource certificate(s). This separation of the source functional lan-
guage from the target Java bytecode was designed to allow for future extensions to target other languages
e.g. the Common Intermediate Language for .NET or Mono. None of the papers from this thesis have
been helpful in analysing Java Card bytecode. The EmBounded project12 is a successor to the Mobile Re-
source Guarantee project that aims to quantify and certify the resource-usage of another functional language
Hume13, a domain-specific language for real-time embedded systems; again, no papers in this thesis have
been useful in understanding how to analyse Java Card bytecode.
The COSTA14 project15 uses cost-relations (extended forms of recurrence relations) to analyse Java bytecode
and automatically generate and solve systems of cost equations to derive upper bounds on resource-usage
for a variety of resource metrics e.g. number of instructions executed, dynamic memory allocated. COSTA
can handle standard Java as well as micro Java versions and applies an admirable array of semantics-based
transformation and analysis techniques, including partial evaluation, determination of loop invariants and
ranking functions. Sometimes the system of cost equations COSTA generates is not solvable and no upper
bound can be found [AAGP08]. This happens when, as part of the solution process, the recursive relations
are being replaced with equivalent non-recursive closed form, non-determinacy in a relation is found. The
COSTA system is used as part of the Mobius project and in the case-studies evaluation of the Mobius deliv-
erable16 where they conclude it can analyse “a relatively large class of Java bytecode programs, and gives








As mentioned in Section 7.2.1, the Lande project17 provided supporting research and tooling in formal meth-
ods and static analysis, and especially in terms of integrating static analysis with automated proof checkers
and software testing methodologies. Most of the papers of the Lande project relate to certified proof–carrying
code frameworks including how program/certificate consumers can verify on–device the certificate claims in
a space efficient manner [BJP06b, BJP06a]. We have referenced in Section 7.2.1 the two resource-related
papers from the Lande and Castles projects.
The Mobius project18 is a successor to the Mobile Resource Guarantee project and its aims were to develop
a proof-carrying framework (including resource-usage, information-flow and security policies) targeting the
Java Micro Edition at the bytecode level. Combining an impressive battery of techniques and technologies,
including certified19 certificate-generating compilers (both interactive for ad-hoc policies and fully automatic
predefined policies) and certified20 certificate-checkers, theorem provers, type systems, Java Markup Lan-
guage, Bytecode Markup Language, Resource Aware Java, cost-relations, BoogiePL, static analysis – in-
cluding polyhedral analysis to recover intervals of possible values for variables and linear relations between
variables – and ways to represent proof certificates compactly. A full list of their deliverables (including their
published papers at the end of each deliverable) can be found here21. Based on Chapter 3 of Mobius deliver-
able22 the Source Specification in the Figure is currently limited to Java Markup Language, and the Bytecode
Specification is Bytecode Markup Language. The COSTA system is used to generate upper bounds for Java
bytecode to verify compliance with resource certificate policies, and a number of novel analyses were added
to COSTA as described in Chapter 5 of Mobius deliverable23. A number of case studies are presented,











7.4 General programming languages
7.4.0.1 Hard Real-Time C Programs
An excellent survey paper covering the worst-case execution-time problem in hard real-time systems, its
history and tooling is given in [WEE+08]. These tools all analyse C or some subset of C programs. The cited
paper includes a discussion of the SWEET tool, which analyses an intermediate language called ALF (Artist
Flow Analysis Language), and a number of translators, from other languages, including C and C++, to ALF
exist. However on closer examination of the ALF language, support for variable stack unwinding, necessary
for exception handling, is not currently part of the language – only support for popping a named/literal number
of stack frames is supported and so it unclear whether, and if so how, support for exceptions could be built
into this tool. Nor can SWEET handle triangular loops, as our analysis does.
7.4.0.2 CompCert Certified C compiler
INRIA has developed a certified C compiler25 for most of ANSI C which as well as formally guaranteeing gen-
eration of executables whose behaviour is semantically equivalent to the C program is capable of producing
formally correct/safe WCET estimates [MBPP14a].
7.4.0.3 The Java Optimized Processor (JOP) project
The Java Optimized Processor (JOP) project26 tackles a central problem in hard real–time worst-case execution-
time analysis – the growing complexity of processors which have been designed to make the average case
fast but which have architectural features difficult to analyse for the worst-case, and which suffer from timing
anomalies [RWT+06], causing unduly pessimistic WCET estimates – with a time-predictable27 Java Virtual
Machine built in hardware which has been designed from first principles to facilitate worst-case execution-
time analysis and to be free from timing anomalies. JOP targets Java bytecode. In terms of this primary aim,
the JOP project has been a massive success, is in use in a number of industrial applications, being used
as the root of a number of different processors, and being used as a foundation by several other research
projects. JOP has been extended to facilitate:
– WCET of chip-multiprocessors with shared memory [SAA+15, Sch10b];
– WCET of safety-critical Java [SDH+14a, HHL+09, SR12];
25http://compcert.inria.fr/ certification using the Coq proof assistant
26http://www.jopdesign.com/
27There are no time dependencies between bytecodes
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– WCET of real-time Java [Sch04a, Sch04b];
JOP employs the IPET integer linear programming approach and obtains loop bounds using a data-flow
analysis to automatically detect simple loop bounds. For loops for which it is not able to determine loop
bounds automatically, JOP expects loop bounds to be annotated in the source Java program (JOP recovers
these annotations using the bytecode engineering library). According to [SPPH10a], the data-flow analysis
for JOP cannot handle exceptions or triangular loops (both of which our work is able to conservatively handle).
Should we ever want to target a real-time architecture, we would choose JOP, for the reasons outlined above,
especially its timing predictability.
7.4.0.4 Operational Semantics and Bytecode Verification for the Java Virtual Machine Language
In composing our operational semantics for Carmel, our principal concerns were:
– correctness, including the modelling of novel aspects of the Java Card platform, e.g. the applet firewall;
– expression, including the use of auxiliary predicates, that most lends itself to being converted into a
compositional verbose flow-logic analysis [NN02] without stratified constraints to simplify:
∗ formulation of proofs;
∗ implementation of a worklist algorithm to solve with equality all the constraints of the compositional
verbose flow-logic analysis without stratified constraints;
These concerns have lead to clear, and well-structured, operational semantics which incorporate the many
low-level details of the Java Card platform [Ora11c, Ora11b, Ora11a].
These concerns have also lead to the simplifying assumption of all Carmel code under consideration having
been bytecode verified28. When we consider our operational semantics for Carmel wrt to the operational
semantics, and indeed the type systems, of foundational papers around modelling full Java bytecode and
resolving prevailing ambiguities and inconsistencies29 of bytecode verification, we realise how much is owed
to such pioneering research [SA99, Fre98, FM99, DEK99]. In particular, when one considers the elegance
and compactness of [FM99, SA99], our operational semantics seem bloated and ugly in comparison. Our
28As outlined in Section 1.3.
29or perhaps more clearly, specifying the correctness
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operational semantics has great fidelity to the Java Card platform, and makes it is easy to see the different
conditions that lead to different transitions, particularly around the novel applet firewall rules.
7.5 Evaluation of the loop-bound precision of our tool wrt SWEET,
JOP and COSTA
From our literature survey, we have identified three tools which are most like our timing tool in terms of their
primary focus being the determination of loop-bounds for input programs: SWEET, COSTA and JOP. We
would like to evaluate the relative precision of the loop-bounds of each of these tools with our own30.
COSTA provides much more sophisticated/comprehensive loop-bound analysis than our tool. In addition,
and unlike JOP and SWEET, COSTA – like our tool – is able to provide resource estimates for code that may
cause exceptions to be thrown [AAG+07]. Since COSTA operates on Java bytecode, some customisation
to be able to accurately analyse Java Card applet bytecode would be required. Whether the program struc-
ture of commercial Java Card applet code is complex enough to benefit from COSTA, and so to justify the
time / development effort of specialising COSTA to the Java Card platform, is unclear. It might make more
sense to strengthen our tool’s ability to handle more complex algorithms and loop-conditions, as explored
tentatively with encouraging results in Section 6.7. While objectionable in principle to the current writer, a
hybrid/augmenting approach of using COSTA to provide potential loop-bounds to our tool, would also be
possible, leveraging the loop-bounds analysis strengths of COSTA, to provide information to our tool, which
it can consult according to its better understanding of reachability/control-flow and data-flow of Java Card
applet bytecode.
Section 6.7 provides a detailed cross-comparison of our timing tool and SWEET wrt the Ma¨lardalen worst-
case execution-time benchmarks31 [GBEL10]. In terms of programs based on array processing, our tool and
SWEET were of equal standing. SWEET is able to handle recursion and is able to provide loop-bounds for
more complex programs than our tool. However, as is shown in Section 6.7, our tool shows great promise of
being able to be developed to provide tight loop-bounds for more complex programs. SWEET is based on
30NB all three tools are more mature tools than ours, and in particular have benefitted from more time and more developers being poured
into them than our tool.
31http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/projects/wcet/benchmarks.html
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analysing ALF programs, and significant effort would be required to customise it to the Java Card platform.
Since, as outlined in Section 7.4.0.1 above, it does not look possible for SWEET to handle variable stack
unwinding, it does not look possible for SWEET to be able to handle Java style exception handling, and so I
do not believe it worth the time or effort to extend SWEET to handle Java Card applets.
JOP has been a massive success in its intention to produce a timing-predictable / timing-anomaly-free
Java processor, as outlined in Section 7.4.0.3. However, the dataflow analysis underlying JOP’s worst-case
execution-time analysis is weak, and JOP typically relies on manual annotations of worst-case / maximum
loop-bounds in the Java code to be made available in the Java bytecode to complete analysis. Table 7.5
shows such annotations. Further, JOP cannot handle exceptions or triangular loops (both of which our
work is able to conservatively handle). The inability to handle exceptions is a particular weakness for a tool
targetting an object-oriented language, as it is very easy for buggy code to hide in rarely-executed catch
statements, with the real worst-case resource-usage path tied to exceptional flows. Direct comparison be-
tween the JOP dataflow and our tool is further complicated by the JOP benchmarks of Section 6.2 of [Sch09]
being full Java applications including IP/UDP libraries, and so our tool cannot analyse these. JOP also per-
forms its own cross-comparison with the Ma¨lardalen worst-case execution-time benchmarks, but only gives
its final measured cycle-time which includes the cost of memory-cache-misses and different weightings for
different instructions, making it next to impossible to compare like-for-like with our tool. For the simple running
example/method given in Listing 6.1 of [Sch09], reproduced for convenience in Table 7.5, our tool matches
the accuracy of the loop-bounds JOP determines. The only difference is that we have to call the method
twice with different boolean arguments to explore all the paths. This implies our tool is more accurate than
JOP, since we never “guess” the values of method arguments.
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Table 7.1: Reproduction of [Listing 6.1: The example used for WCET analysis] from [Sch09]
public static int loop(boolean b, int val ) {
int i , j ;
for ( i=0; i<10; ++i) { // @WCA loop=10
if (b) {













Conclusions and further work
8.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we review the main achievements of this thesis, provide the expected scope for future work,
and reach a conclusion on whether the thesis statement has been proved.
8.2 Main Achievements of this Thesis
The main achievement of this thesis has been the rigorous, systematic and dogged engagement with the
complexities of a real-world, commercially important/successful platform like the Java Card Classic Edition
3.0.1 and its bytecode language1 which we have rationalised into the Carmel language and its associated
programming structures. From this systematic engagement:
– Our first major achievements were the product of thorough immersion in the Java Card platform speci-
fication 3.0.1 [Ora11c, Ora11b, Ora11a] and the Sun official Java Card book [Che00], and the develop-
ment of:
∗ high-level arguments, detailed in Section 1.1.2, as to why we might expect Java Card Classic Edi-
tions to be amenable to worst-case resource-usage analysis, based on architecture, programming-
conventions and ultimately the limited resources of a typical smartcard;
∗ the existing SecSafe operational semantics and program analyses to better support loop-bounds
calculation and detect potentially recursive method calls, whilst integrating full transaction- and
1A utility developed as part of the SecSafe project is capable of generating equivalent Carmel from a compressed applet (CAP) file.
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APDU I/O- semantics. These translate into the operational semantics of Chapter 3 and the base
control-flow analysis of Chapter 4;
∗ a worklist algorithm capable of generating the least solution to the base control-flow analysis of
Chapter 4.
– Development of the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5 from the base control-flow analysis of
Chapter 4 to better handle loop-variables and discard non-reaching local variable definitions2 via the
refinement of the if statements from the base control-flow analysis integrated with the results of novel
analogues of classical loop-induction analyses and reaching definitions analyses, with a corresponding
change to the handling of the if statements in the worklist algorithm of Chapter 4. Our extended
control-flow analysis is the most precise static analysis of Java Card bytecode of which we are aware;
– Implementation in Java in a tool which we have named Fulgurite, for a Carmel program P :
∗ the worklist algorithm for computing the least solution to the constraints of the extended control-flow
analysis of P ;
∗ the generation of a family of integer linear programming problems per registered applet in P and
their solution via the open-source mixed-integer linear-programming solver lpsolve3;
∗ the production of DOT control-flow/resource graphs from P ;
– Use of Fulgurite to analyse:
∗ whole- and key fragments- of various applets from Oracle’s Java Card development kits;
∗ assorted loops and recursive methods to various depths, translated from Java classes to Carmel
via javap, sed and manual translation;
from which we have verified Fulgurite/the extended control-flow analysis does indeed bound simple
loops over arrays using their arraylength, or bounded loops from numeric literals, and triangular loops
of various depths, all successfully;
– Development of the formulation of the integer-linear programming problem from [PS97, Sch09] to Carmel
to include exceptional flows and inclusion of constraints ensuring exactly one return path to the Java Card
Runtime Environment, whether via a normal/exception-free path or abnormal/uncaught exception path.
Utilisation of exception behaviour, and the ability to handle triangular loops makes our worst-case
resource-usage tool superior to other more mature known worst-case execution-time tools e.g. JOP
and SWEET. We can still learn from other tools, such as COSTA, which analyses full Java bytecode, on




how to analyse more complex loops. Further analysis of commercial applet code would be needed to
determine whether applet code control-flow/data-flow/loop-conditions are complex enough to be able to
benefit from COSTA’s more advanced loop analysis techniques, and so to justify the effort to transplant
these to Carmel.
8.3 Future Work
There are a number of different directions in which the work in this thesis could be developed:
1. The material in this thesis could be updated in line with the latest version of Java Card (at time of writing,
this is 3.0.5). Having reviewed the Java Card platform specification 3.0.5, no changes to the Java Card
Runtime Environment or Java Card Virtual Machine have been made since v 2.2.24. The changes are
all in the Java Card Application Programmer Interface (API), the developer libraries.
The hard part is the modelling of each new API method as an operational semantic rule, its translation
into a flow-logic clause and completion of the subject reduction theorem proof of correctness. Adding the
Java implementation of the new abstract API methods to Fulgurite is straight-forward, the method name
is added to the set of API methods SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS and the implementation is added
to a case of a switch statement against the method name of the API name, next to the implementation
of the other intercepted API methods;
2. Our static analysis could be extended to handle more complex arithmetic expressions. In particular,
our static analysis could be extended to handle more complex arithmetic expressions forming part of
the loop conditions of Carmel programs. Initial efforts in this regard, as recorded in Section 6.7, have
proved very encouraging;
3. While we have a high degree of confidence in the correctness of our manual proofs and in the correct-
ness of Fulgurite, our implementation of the worklist algorithm capable of solving the constraints of the
extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5, we would prefer the greater assurance of machine-checked
proofs via e.g. a certified theorem prover or model-checking. To this end, given that:
– certified defensive and offensive Java Card virtual machines have been developed in Coq as part
of [BDdS+02, G. , BDJ+01];
– a certified proof of the correctness of the worst-case execution-time estimates for the CompCert C
compiler has also been developed in Coq as part of [BMP13, MBPP14a];
4Confirmed by http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/embedded/javacard/downloads/default-1970005.html
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it would seem both feasible and appropriate to implement in Coq a certified proof of the correctness of
the worst-case resource-usage analysis estimates for Carmel. Further supporting this, it is reported in
[CJPR04] that the expression of a flow-logic analysis lends itself to being encoded in Coq. From the
certified proof, Coq supports the “proof-as-program” extraction facility [Let08] into O’Caml, Scheme and
Haskell;
4. Fulgurite could be developed into a plugin for Eclipse for developers to use while developing Java Card
applications for immediate feedback on analysability and worst-case resource-usage, or developed
into a plugin for a continuous build system such as Jenkins or Hudson to allow per-build and series
analysability and worst-case resource-usage data to be collected.
8.4 Thesis statement evaluation
From Section 1.1, our formal thesis statement was:
“The Java Card Classic edition platform is worst-case resource-usage analysis-friendly. In particular, the
Java Card platform is highly amenable to worst-case execution-time analysis and worst-case dynamic mem-
ory allocation analysis through a combination of techniques from the fields of static analysis and integer
linear programming”.
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In this Chapter we present for each of the key Java Card API methods:
– the operational semantic rule;
– the corresponding flow-logic clause;
– proof of the subject reduction theorem1 for that API method.
Due to time-constraints we have not been able to type up the complete set of Java Card API methods for
which we have written proofs, though we can supply ‘photocopies on request. All of the supported API
methods have been implemented in our worklist solver.
1See Theorem B.4.1 on page 320 for the Subject Reduction Theorem for the base control-flow analysis.
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A.2 Transaction Methods
A.2.1 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth():
A.2.1.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, ctdn, (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
A.2.1.2 Flow-Logic clause
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAYBase-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (γn, γn, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
A.2.1.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
By assumption:
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, ctdn, (mn, pcn))
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(Sn::(s, ctdn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAYBase-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (γn, γn, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG







Stack(Sn::(s, ctdn, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn)::βNum(s, ctdn, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (γn, γn, 0), (mn, pcn))}
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
A.2.2 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.getUnusedCommitCapacity():
A.2.2.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getUnusedCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
P




(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getUnusedCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
A.2.2.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getUnusedCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we
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∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
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(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getUnusedCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Given:
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE ⇒






Stack(Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn)::βNum(s, CARD SPECIFIC UNUSED CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn}
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
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A.2.3 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.getMaxCommitCapacity():
A.2.3.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getMaxCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
A.2.3.2 Flow-Logic clause
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getMaxCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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A.2.3.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getMaxCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.getMaxCommitCapacity()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Given:
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY ≤ Short.MAX VALUE ⇒






Stack(Sn::(s, CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn)::βNum(s, CARD SPECIFIC MAX CAPACITY, (mn, pcn))
⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (0, Short.MAX VALUE, 0), (mn, pcn}
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
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and the result follows.
A.2.4 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction():
A.2.4.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS






SF, (r, locTransactionException, (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException, ctdn, ion
)






SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, 1, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pc)), Ln, Sn〉
H′ = H
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, HID, JH, CHN,SF ′〉
A.2.4.2 Flow-Logic clause
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 1) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 0) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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A.2.4.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H ′,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF= 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF’=catchException
(
SF, (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException , ctdn, ion
)
H ′ = H[locTransactionException .values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id) 7→ σ̂TransactionException .IN PROGRESS]
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.2 and so we have only to show:
•
βR,H,JHV al (σ̂TransactionException .IN PROGRESS) ⊑V al
Ĥ
(
βR,H,JHRef ((r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)))
)
.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason .id)
• HANDLE(βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JHRef (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), ∅)
to conclude.
From the flow logic rule we have:
271
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 1) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 1 we must have:
{(σ̂TransactionException .IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)







and from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )
and the result follows.
Possible transition 2 of 2
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By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH ′, CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, 1, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pc)), Ln, Sn〉
JH ’=[]
S = Sn









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for






From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 1) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 0) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 0 we must have:
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{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)









and the result follows.
A.2.5 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction():
A.2.5.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS






SF, (r, locTransactionException, (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException, ctdn, ion
)





SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, 1, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pc)), Ln, Sn〉
H′ = H
∀ loc ∈ dom(JH) . ∀ f ∈ dom(JH(loc).values) : H[loc.values(f.id) 7→ JH(loc).values(f.id)]
JH′ = []
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, HID, JH′, CHN, SF ′〉
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A.2.5.2 Flow-Logic clause
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 1) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
A.2.5.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H ′,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF= 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF’=catchException
(
SF, (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException , ctdn, ion
)
H ′ = H[locTransactionException .values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id) 7→ σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS]
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.2 and so we have only to show:
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•
βR,H,JHV al (σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS) ⊑V al
Ĥ
(
βR,H,JHRef ((r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)))
)
.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason .id)
• HANDLE(βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JHRef (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), ∅)
to conclude.
From the flow logic rule we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 0 we must have:
{(σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)







and from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )
and the result follows.
Possible transition 2 of 2
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By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS(
1 = ctdn
)
∀ loc ∈ dom(JH) . ∀ f ∈ dom(JH(loc).values) : H[loc.values(f.id) 7→ JH(loc).values(f.id)]
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH ′, CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, 0, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pc)), Ln, Sn〉
JH ’=[]
S = Sn









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ {[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 1) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 1 we must have:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑H Ĥ
{[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)










and the result follows.
A.2.6 Case API method javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction():
A.2.6.1 Operational Semantic rule
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS






SF, (r, locTransactionException, (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException, ctdn, ion
)









∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, HID, JH′, CHN, SF ′〉
A.2.6.2 Flow-Logic clause
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 1) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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A.2.6.3 Subject Reduction Theorem
Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H ′,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF= 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF’=catchException
(
SF, (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), java.framework.TransactionException , ctdn, ion
)
H ′ = H[locTransactionException .values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id) 7→ σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS]
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.2 and so we have only to show:
•
βR,H,JHV al (σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS) ⊑V al
Ĥ
(
βR,H,JHRef ((r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)))
)
.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason .id)
• HANDLE(βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ), βR,H,JHRef (r, locTransactionException , (1, 1)), ∅)
to conclude.
From the flow logic rule we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA
(mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
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combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 0 we must have:
{(σ̂TransactionException .NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)







and from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )
and the result follows.
Possible transition 2 of 2
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = invokedefinite p
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH ′, CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, 0, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pc)), Ln, Sn〉
JH ’=[]
S = Sn










∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=
k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
Base-CFA (mn, pcn) : invokedefinite p
⇐⇒ ∀ π1 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) :
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, 1, ξn, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))))
p = javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction()
p.isStatic
p ∈ SEPARATELY HANDLED API METHODS
(γn = 0) ⇒
{(σ̂TransactionException.NOT IN PROGRESS)} ⊑V al σ̂TransactionException.values(javacard.framework.TransactionException.reason.id)
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂TransactionException, ∅)
(γn = 1) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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combined with the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, ctdn = γn = 1 we must have:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{[]} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)















In this Appendix we present the full proofs for our base control-flow analysis for Carmel and prove it correct with
respect to the operational semantics of Chapter 3. The base control-flow analysis is specified using the constraint-
based, specification-oriented and implementation-agnostic flow-logic framework of Nielson and Nielson [NN02].
Further, we show how to systematically construct from the flow-logic specification a worklist algorithm capable of
generating the least solution to the constraints of the base control-flow analysis. In proving the correctness of the
base control-flow analysis, we have been greatly aided by Chapter 3 of [Han05] with the approach and structure
of this chapter very much based on that one.
B.2 Abstract Domains including Analysis Domains
Following the original SecSafe material and [Han05], in this thesis we use the notation of “overlined” domains, e.g.
RetAddr for abstract return addresses, to indicate abstract counterparts of concrete domains, and domains with a
hat, e.g. V̂al, to indicate complete lattices over abstract domains.
It is customary to present the abstract domains first and then later the choice of representation functions. However,
we shall be presenting each abstract domain and its representation function together as we believe it is helpful to
understand immediately the nature of the correspondence between concrete and abstract entities.
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B.2.1 Abstract Domains for Values
We define abstract domains and their corresponding representation functions for the values that can occur in a
Carmel program: numbers, object references (for class instances and array objects), and return addresses (for
subroutines).
Val = Num+ Ref + RetAddr
The high-level representation function for values in given before; the representation functions on the right-hand-
side are defined in the next few pages.
β
R,H,JH





Ref (t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t = r
βReturnAddress(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t = ra
βNum(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) t ∈ {b, s, i}
B.2.1.1 Return Addresses
We simply enclose the return address value in a set for its abstract representation. There is no need for approx-
imation since the value can be determined statically from the jsr addr instruction, the only instruction that can
produce such values.
RetAddr : OpType× N0 × Address
RetAddr =
{
(ra, apc, (m, pc)) | (m, apc), (m, pc) ∈ Address
}
βReturnAddress(ra, addr , (mn, pcn)) = {(ra, addr , (mn, pcn))}
B.2.1.2 Numbers
The abstract domain for numbers is motivated by the desire to be able to represent and track a runtime value
number (t, n, (m, pc)) as an interval (inclusive each end) from lowest number l to highest number h, such that
l ≤ n ≤ h, associated with (m, pc), and augmented by a modification count. The intention is that we will track
changes to numbers represented as intervals up to a maximum number of changes, MAX MOD COUNT, parametric to
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the analysis, and then map the number to the well-defined minimum and maximum values the number may hold
according to its type i.e. (t, (⊥t,⊤t, MAX MOD COUNT), (m, pc)).




(t , (l, h,modcount), (m, pc))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊥t ≤ l ≤ h ≤ ⊤t
0 ≤ modcount ≤ MAX MOD COUNT
⊥t , l, h,⊤t ∈ Z
modcount ∈ N0
(m, pc) ∈ Address
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B.2.2 Abstract Domains for Analysis
B.2.2.1 Fundamental Complete Lattice Underpinning Analysis Domains
Having defined the abstract domains for values:
Val = Num+ Ref + RetAddr
corresponding closely to the concrete domains, we define the fundamental complete lattice underpinning our





where partial order ⊑V al is defined for v1.v2 ∈ V̂al:
v1 ⊑V al v2 ⇐⇒
∀ (t , Y, (m, pc)) ∈ v1 :
(t ∈ {r, ra}) ⇒
{(t , Y, (m, pc))} ⊆ v2
(t ∈ {b, s, i}) ⇒
∃ {(t , Y2, (m, pc))} ⊆ v2 .
Y = (l, h,modcount1)
Y2 = (l2, h2,modcount2)
⊥t ≤ l2 ≤ l ≤ h ≤ h2 ≤ ⊤t
0 ≤ modcount1 ≤ modcount2 ≤ MAX MOD COUNT
⊥t , l, l2, h, h2,⊤t ∈ Z
modcount1,modcount2 ∈ N0
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By Lemma A.2 of Appendix A of [NNH10], 〈V̂al,⊑V al〉 is a complete lattice with bottom ⊥Val = ∅ and ⊤Val = Val
and binary least-upper bounds ⊔V al{v1, v2}, written infix as v1 ⊔V al v2, defined in Table 4.1. In words, the least
upper bound of two values in V̂al depends on whether both values are numbers or not:
• if both values are not numbers sharing the same type and associated address, the least upper bound is simply
the union of the two values;
• if both values are numbers sharing the same type and associated address, the least upper bound is then:
– if the modification count of one or both of the values is ≥ MAX MOD COUNT, then the numeric interval
component of the resulting abstract number is widened to the minimum and maximum values supported
by that type i.e. (⊥t ,⊤t , MAX MOD COUNT);
– otherwise, the numeric interval component of the resulting abstract number is widened to:


minimum(first value left interval number, second value left interval number),
maximum(first value right interval number, second value right interval number),











































































































































































































































































































































































B.2.2.2 Object State - Class instances and Array objects
The fields of a class instance may be determined statically and in a finite program is a finite (and typically small)
number of fields. Therefore a map from fields to elements of V̂al is an appropriate representation of a class in-
stance’s object state.
In contrast, according to the semantics of arrays in Carmel, an array’s length is allowed to be up to ⊤s = 215 − 1.
While such a length is unlikely in a Carmel program, due to resource limitations, it does highlight the question of
how best to represent the object state of an array object. In line with the representation of abstract numbers in
Carmel, and desiring a compact representation of array object state, a map from intervals of array index numbers
to elements of V̂al is an appropriate representation of array object state. In particular, the default value of zero
or null for an abstract array would have the abstract representation of zero or null mapped from the interval
(0,⊤s). To ensure finiteness in the analysis results, and to allow a trade-off between memory costs and precision,
parametric to the analysis is MAX DOM DYN ARRAY – the maximum size of the domain of a dynamic array created
via the new τ[ ]. When a value is loaded from an array object, the array index is passed as an abstract number
and the interval (l, h) extracted, and each value i in (l, h) is checked against each of the array’s domain of inter-
vals (dl1, dh1), (dl2, dh2), . . . , (dln, dhn), and where dlj ≤ i ≤ dhj the mapped value is added to the set of values
whose LUB is pushed onto the stack as the result of the array load instruction. When a value is to be stored to
an array object, the array index is passed as an abstract number and the interval (l, h) extracted. If (l, h) matches
exactly one of the array’s domain of intervals (dl1, dh1), (dl2, dh2), . . . , (dln, dhn), then the LUB of the value to be
stored and the existing value mapped against (l, h) is stored against (l, h). Otherwise, if n < MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,
(l, h) is added to the array’s domain of intervals and the value to be stored is mapped against (l, h). When n ≥
MAX DOM DYN ARRAY, the LUB of the value to be stored and the current value mapped against the interval (0,⊤s) is
stored against the interval (0,⊤s).
We define across class instances and array objects:
Ôbject = (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al
and extend point-wise the ⊑V al ordering to objects o1, o2 ∈ Ôbject:
o1 ⊑ ̂Object o2 ⇐⇒ dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧ ∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) : o1.values(f) ⊑V al o2.values(f)
Note that in a Carmel program P , where an object or static field specifies an array’s elements e.g.
private static byte[] bootstrapSENCKeyData = { 77, 118, 55, 118, -86, -94, -80, 91, -87, 91, 88, -82, 11, 76, 40, -93 };
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since we can determine statically the length and elements of the array, regardless of the value of the
MAX DOM DYN ARRAY parameter, the length is set correctly and the array’s values accordingly. For the example above
values would be set to:
[(0, 0) 7→ (b, (77, 77, 0), (m, pc)), . . . , (15, 15) 7→ (b, (−93,−93, 0), (m, pc))]
For the avoidance of doubt, the parameter MAX DOM DYN ARRAY is only ever consulted during an arraystore t
instruction and both statically declared arrays such as bootstrapSENCKeyData above and any dynamically created
instruction created by the new τ[ ] instruction will have new intervals added to the array’s domain of intervals
only if the current size of the array’s domain of interval is less than MAX DOM DYN ARRAY, otherwise the LUB of the
value to be stored and the current value mapped against the interval (0,⊤s) is stored against the interval (0,⊤s),
as described above.
NB it is worth reiterating the heightened importance of arrays in Java Card (and so in Carmel) as a result
of the lack of the Collections framework of discrete mathematical structures available in standard Java.




To facilitate loop-bounds calculations and to reduce false positives in the detection of potentially recursive method
calls, we require our analysis to be precise as possible at each Carmel address wrt the possible:
• JCVM machine states including transaction mechanism state and IO/APDU state (for precision of control-flow
and data-flow);
• callstacks (for checking possibly recursive calls);
• class instance and array object values in the transaction buffer (for precision of control-flow and data-flow);
• operand stack (for analysing loops);
• local variable array (for analysing loops);
To this end, our choice of abstract context, defined in Table 4.2, includes the machine state and sufficient informa-
tion from the abstract callstack to be able to check the firewall security predicates. Since infinite callstacks are a
possibility, due to recursion, to ensure finiteness in the analysis results, and to allow a trade-off between memory
costs and precision, parametric to the analysis is k – the maximum number of stack frames from the concrete call-
stack to include in the abstract context. For the firewall security predicates, and for a minimal level of acceptable
precision, we require always k ≥ 5 and our worklist algorithm checks this parameter. In program analysis parlance,
our base control-flow analysis is a k-CFA analysis, as is the extended control-flow analysis of Chapter 5.
Context information is recorded for each address in a context-cache: ̂ContextCache = Address → P(Context) and
we calculate, for each address (m, pc), and for each context associated with that address:
• a possible over-approximation of the set of all method names that have invoked the method m (for checking
possibly recursive calls);
• a possible over-approximation of the set of all class instance and array object values in the transaction buffer
(for precision of control-flow and data-flow);
• abstract operand stack (for analysing loops);
• abstract local variable array (for analysing loops);
Each of the context-sensitive domains is defined in the following way:
̂AbstractDomain = Address → Context→ X
that is the abstract domain is defined as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed,
to (the abstract version of the concrete domain). For example, the abstract local variable array is defined as a
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map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed, and from each context to a map from local
variable array indices to abstract values:
̂LocalVar = Address → Context→ N0 → V̂al
where N0 → V̂al is the abstract version of the local variable array i.e. as a map from natural numbers to abstract
values. The representation function for each of the context-sensitive domains then shows how to produce the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.2.2.3.1 Abstract Context Cache
The abstract context cache is modelled as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be executed:
̂ContextCache = Address → Ĉontext
and define the ordering ⊑C to abstract context caches c1, c2 ∈ ̂ContextCache:
c1 ⊑C c2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(c1) : c1(addr) ⊆ c2(addr)
B.2.2.3.2 Local Variable Array
Modelling of the abstract local variable array is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be
executed, and from each context to local variable array indices to abstract values.




LocalV ar(L) = M .
∀ i ∈ dom(L) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (L(i)) ⊑V al M(i)
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract local variable arrays l1, l2 ∈ ̂LocalVar:
l1 ⊑L l2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(l1),
∀ ctxt ∈ l1(addr),
∀ idx ∈ dom(l1(addr)(ctxt)) :
l1(addr)(ctxt)(idx) ⊑V al l2(addr)(ctxt)(idx)
B.2.2.3.3 Operand Stack
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Modelling of the abstract operand stack is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be exe-
cuted, and from each context to a sequence of abstract values. Since each Carmel program under consideration
has been bytecode verified, abstract operand stacks must be of finite length.






(t1, v1, (m1, pc1)):: . . . ::(to, vo, (mo, pco))
)
= βR,H,JHV al (t1, v1, (m1, pc1)):: . . . ::β
R,H,JH
V al (to, vo, (mo, pco))
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract operand stacks s1, s2 ∈ Ŝtack:
s1 ⊑S s2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(s1),
∀ ctxt ∈ s1(addr) :
s1(addr)(ctxt) = A1::A2:: . . . ::Aq ∧
s2(addr)(ctxt) = B1::B2:: . . . ::Br ∧
r ≥ q ∧
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q} :
Ai ⊑V al Bi
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B.2.2.3.4 Transactional Heap
Modelling of the abstract transactional heap is as a map from address to contexts in which the address may be
executed, from each context to a map from object references to object (both class instance and array object) values
map from fields or numeric intervals to abstract values.
̂TransactionDynamicHeap = Address → Context→ Ref → (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al





⇐⇒ ∀ loc ∈ dom(HEAP ) :
o = βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, HEAP (loc).creationPoint)
∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(HEAP (loc).values) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (HEAP (loc).values(f.id)) ⊑V al M(o).values(f.id)
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract transactional heaps t1, t2 ∈ ̂TransactionDynamicHeap:
t1 ⊑JH t2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(t1),
∀ ctxt ∈ t1(addr) :
∀ ref ∈ t1(addr)(ctxt) :
o1 = t1(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
o2 = t2(addr)(ctxt)(ref) ∧
dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) :
o1.values(f) ⊑V al o2.values(f)
1Here HEAP is JH; we use the same representation function for both the object heap and the transactional object heap, and supply JH or
H as a parameter as appropriate.
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consistent with the ordering on ⊑ ̂Object.
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B.2.2.3.5 Method Names Cache
A purely semantic component, to overcome potential loss of callstack information due to our choice of context (see
Table 4.2), and so to ensure at each address (m, pc) we have a conservative (i.e. a possible over-approximation)
of the set of methods that may have invoked m, we developed relation ̂MethodNamesCache. Modelling of the
method name cache ̂MethodNamesCache is as a map from address (m, pc) to contexts in which the address may
be executed, and from each context to the set of Carmel methods that may have invoked m.
̂MethodNamesCache = Address → Context→ P(Method)
̂MethodNamesCache admits the following ordering ⊑ ̂MNAMES to method name caches
mnames1,mnames2 ∈ ̂MethodNamesCache:
mnames1 ⊑ ̂MNAMES mnames2 ⇐⇒ ∀ addr ∈ dom(mnames1),











Registry(R) = M .
∀ aid ∈ dom(R) :
R(aid) = (locJCREOwnedAID, locapplet) ∧
β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, locapplet, getJHorH(locapplet).creationPoint) ⊑V al M
and define the ordering on elements r1, r2 ∈ ̂Registry:
r1 ⊑R r2 ⇐⇒ r1 ⊑V al r2
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B.2.2.4.2 Static Heap
The abstract static heap simply maps static fields to abstract values:
̂StaticHeap = Field → V̂al
with representation function:
βHStaticHeap(STATIC HEAP ) = M.
∀ f ∈ dom(STATIC HEAP ) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (STATIC HEAP (f.id)) ⊑V al M(f.id)
and define the ordering on elements k1, k2 ∈ ̂StaticHeap:
k1 ⊑K k2 ⇐⇒ dom(k1) ⊆ dom(k2) ∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(k1) : k1(f.id) ⊑V al k2(f.id)
B.2.2.4.3 Object Heap
Modelling of the abstract object heap is a map from object references to object (both class instance and array
object) values map from fields or numeric intervals to abstract values.
̂ObjectHeap = Ref → (Field ∪ (N0 × N0)) : values −→ V̂al
= Ref → Ôbject
with representation function2:
2Here HEAP is H; we use the same representation function for both the object heap and the transactional object heap, and supply JH or





⇐⇒ ∀ loc ∈ dom(HEAP ) :
o = βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, HEAP (loc).creationPoint)
∧ ∀ f ∈ dom(HEAP (loc).values) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (HEAP (loc).values(f.id)) ⊑V al M(o).values(f.id)
and extend the point-wise ordering ⊑V al to abstract object heaps h1, h2 ∈ ̂ObjectHeap:
h1 ⊑H h2 ⇐⇒ ∀ ref ∈ dom(h1) :
o1 = h1(ref) ∧
o2 = h2(ref) ∧
dom(o1.values) ⊆ dom(o2.values) ∧
∀f ∈ dom(o1.values) :
o1.values(f) ⊑V al o2.values(f)
consistent with the ordering on ⊑ ̂Object.
B.2.2.4.4 Invalidated Objects Cache
The abstract invalidated objects cache records the set of abstract object references whose related object may have
been created inside a transaction that was subsequently aborted and so members of this set should be treated
– for safety – simultaneously as being both equal to a null object reference and as a regular non-null object
reference3.
̂InvalidatedReferences = P(Ref)





Invalidated(I) = M .
∀ loc ∈ dom(I) :
β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, loc, getJHorH(loc).creationPoint) ⊑V al M
and define the ordering on elements i1, i2 ∈ ̂InvalidatedReferences:
i1 ⊑I i2 ⇐⇒ i1 ⊑V al i2
B.2.2.4.5 Exceptions Cache
The exceptions cache records the abstract reference of the exception object, the abstract context in which the
exception was thrown, and the abstract context in which the exception was caught.
̂ExceptionsCache = P(Ref × Context× Context)
Lemma B.5.1 (on page 407) proves that whenever the concrete semantics throws an exception, the program
analysis ensures, among other actions, ̂ExceptionsCache is updated appropriately. In particular, when:
SF ′ = catchException(SF, (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), getJHorH((r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType), ctdn, ion)
Then the program analysis ensures via the HANDLE predicate:












and define the ordering on elements e1, e2 ∈ ̂ExceptionsCache:
e1 ⊑E e2 ⇐⇒ e1 ⊆ e2
B.2.2.4.6 Recursive Method Calls Cache
306
When an attempt to invoke a potentially recursive method m is detected at an address addr, we store the address
addr, method to invoke m and the abstract context in which addr was attempted to invoke m.
̂RecursiveMethodsCache = P(Address×Method× Context)
̂RecursiveMethodsCache admits the following ordering ⊑REC to recursive method name caches
rmc1, rmc2 ∈ ̂RecursiveMethodsCache:
rmc1 ⊑R̂EC rmc2 ⇐⇒ rmc1 ⊆ rmc2
B.2.2.4.7 Context Graph
Whenever a possible transition from one abstract context current to another abstract context next occurs in the
program analysis clause, then (current, next) is recorded in the context graph:
̂ContextGraph = P(Context× Context)
̂ContextGraph admits the following ordering ⊑CG to abstract context graphs cg1, cg2 ∈ ̂ContextGraph:
cg1 ⊑CG cg2 ⇐⇒ cg1 ⊆ cg2
B.2.3 Abstract Analysis Domains Define Complete Lattices
Proposition B.2.1 (Analysis domains define complete lattices). The following domains are each complete lattices:
• ̂Registry = 〈 ̂Registry,⊑R〉
• ̂StaticHeap = 〈 ̂StaticHeap,⊑S〉
• ̂ObjectHeap = 〈 ̂ObjectHeap,⊑H〉
• ̂InvalidatedReferences = 〈 ̂InvalidatedReferences,⊑I〉
• ̂TransactionDynamicHeap = 〈 ̂TransactionDynamicHeap,⊑JH〉
• Ĉontext = 〈Ĉontext,⊑C〉
• ̂LocalVar = 〈 ̂LocalVar,⊑L〉
• Ŝtack = 〈Ŝtack,⊑S〉
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• ̂ExceptionsCache = 〈 ̂ExceptionsCache,⊑E〉
• ̂MethodNamesCache = 〈 ̂MethodNamesCache,⊑MNAMES〉
• ̂RecursiveMethodsCache = 〈 ̂RecursiveMethodsCache,⊑REC〉
• ̂ContextGraph = 〈 ̂ContextGraph,⊑CG〉
Proof : V̂al is a complete lattice under ordering ⊑V al as shown in Section 4.2.2.1. The orderings on domains
̂Registry, ̂StaticHeap, ̂ObjectHeap, ̂InvalidatedReferences, ̂TransactionDynamicHeap, ̂LocalVar, Ŝtack are pointwise
extensions of the ordering on V̂al i.e. ⊑V al and the result follows from Paragraph 2.15 of [DP02]. The remaining
domains are powersets of finite sets, ordered by ⊆, which are complete lattices by Examples 2.6 (2) on [DP02]
B.2.4 Abstract Domain for High-Level Base CFA Analysis
Having defined the abstract value- and analysis- domains, we may now define the high-level domain for the base
control-flow analysis analysis as the cross-product of the analysis domains:
̂Analysis = ̂Registry × ̂StaticHeap× ̂ObjectHeap×
̂InvalidatedReferences × ̂TransactionDynamicHeap×
Ĉontext× ̂LocalVar × Ŝtack × ̂ExceptionsCache×
̂MethodNamesCache× ̂RecursiveMethodsCache× ̂ContextGraph
̂Analysis admits the following ordering ⊑Analysis to abstract analysis results:
Let (R̂1, K̂1, Ĥ1, Î1, ĴH1, Ĉ1, L̂1, Ŝ1, Ê1, ̂MNAMES1, R̂EC1, ĈG1), (R̂2, K̂2, Ĥ2, Î2, ĴH2, Ĉ2, L̂2, Ŝ2, Ê2, ̂MNAMES2, R̂EC2, ĈG2)∈ ̂Analysis. Then:
(R̂1, K̂1, Ĥ1, Î1, ĴH1, Ĉ1, L̂1, Ŝ1, Ê1,
̂MNAMES1, R̂EC1, ĈG1) ⊑Analysis (R̂2, K̂2, Ĥ2, Î2, ĴH2, Ĉ2, L̂2, Ŝ2, Ê2,
̂MNAMES2, R̂EC2, ĈG2)
⇐⇒ R̂1 ⊑R R̂2 ∧
K̂1 ⊑K Ĥ2 ∧
Ĥ1 ⊑H Ĥ2 ∧
Î1 ⊑I Î2 ∧
ĴH1 ⊑H ĴH2 ∧
Ĉ1 ⊑C Ĉ2 ∧
L̂1 ⊑L L̂2 ∧
Ŝ1 ⊑S Ŝ2 ∧
Ê1 ⊑E Ê2 ∧
̂MNAMES1 ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES2 ∧
R̂EC1 ⊑REC R̂EC2 ∧
ĈG1 ⊑CG ĈG2
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and by Proposition 4.2.1 and Paragraph 2.15 of [DP02], this is simply the product/pointwise extension of the
ordering on the underlying analysis domains. ⊑Analysis allows analysis results to be compared for the same
program, and in particular to determine whether one analysis result is “smaller” than another wrt the ordering on
〈 ̂Analysis,⊑Analysis〉.
B.3 Analysis Specification.
The base control-flow analysis is specified using the constraint-based, specification-oriented and implementation-
agnostic flow-logic framework of Nielson and Nielson [NN02]. Being a specification-oriented approach, the flow-
logic framework is used to specify what it means for an analysis result (or rather a proposed analysis result) to be
acceptable (correct) with respect to a program.
The judgements of the flow-logic specification for the analysis of Carmel are of the form:
(R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=k,MAX MOD COUNT,MAX DOM DYN ARRAYBase-CFA (mn, pcn) : instr
where it is implicit:
• (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH , Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ∈ ̂Analysis;
• Base-CFA is the analysis name;
• mn.instructionAt(pcn) = instr;
• User input parameters:
– k is the maximum abstract context length i.e. the maximum number of stack frames from the concrete
callstack to include in the abstract context, as explained in Section 4.2.2.3;
– MAX MOD COUNT is the maximum number of times an abstract number may change the numeric interval
it contains before it is mapped to the well-defined minimum and maximum values the number may hold
according to its type t i.e. (⊥t,⊤t, MAX MOD COUNT), as explained in Section 4.2.1.2;
– MAX DOM DYN ARRAY is the maximum size of the domain of a dynamic array created via the new τ[ ], as
explained in Section 4.2.2.2.
Intuitively the above states that the left-hand side is an acceptable analysis for the instruction instr at ad-
dress mn.instructionAt(pcn) when analysed in any context π ∈ Ĉ(mn, pcn) and wrt the user supplied parameters
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k, MAX MOD COUNT, MAX DOM DYN ARRAY.
To give the reader a basic grounding in the flow-logic framework and how to read the rules, we shall discuss in
detail the flow-logic rules for the following Carmel bytecode instructions:
• nop
• new τ
• if t cmpop goto addr
• invokevirtual w
One of the strengths of the framework is that it is quite intuitive for those familiar with pattern-matching.
B.3.1 The nop instruction




∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pc), Ln, Sn〉〉
From the semantic rule we see:
• the callstack remains the same length – only the program counter for the top stack frame changes from
(mn, pcn) to (mn.nextAddress(pcn));
• the JCVM transitions from (mn, pcn) to (mn.nextAddress(pcn)) with no changes to R,K,H, I,HID, JH
• the JCVM transitions from (mn, pcn) is (mn.nextAddress(pcn)) with no changes to the operand stack Sn or
local variable array Ln
In Table 4.3, we detail a line-by-line explanation of the flow-logic for the nop bytecode instruction.
B.3.2 The new τ instruction
In Tables 4.4–4.5 we detail an explanation of the flow-logic for the new τ bytecode instruction, and where appro-
priate a cross-comparison between the flow-logic rule and the corresponding operational semantic rule.
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B.3.3 The if t cmpop goto addr instruction
To demonstrate the pattern-matching nature of many of the flow-logic rules, consider the if t cmpop goto addr
bytecode instruction shown on page 139:
• the possible successor addresses and contexts of (mn, pcn) are bound to π2 and π3 in the way familiar from
the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. π2 corresponds to the false
branch and π3 corresponds to the true branch;
• the abstract operand stack is bound and constrained, via:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) =M ::X1::X2
to be a sequence of at least 2 elements, with the top-most element of the abstract operand stack bound to
variable X2, the second-from-top element bound to variable X1 and the remainder (which may be the empty
sequence) to M ;
• search for all possible type-matching operands to the if t cmpop goto addr is pattern-matched, and vari-
ables bound, in the lines:
∀ {(t , Y1, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t , Y2, (mq, pcq))} ⊑S X2 :
and then passed as parameters to the abstract version of the applyBinary operator:
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
)
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {false}
)
Due to the approximation introduced by our representation, the abstract version of applyBinary has to
be able to produce both true and false for the same question, as, e.g. in abstract numbers, there may
be particular pairs of values i1 and i2, l1 ≤ i1 ≤ h1, l2 ≤ i2 ≤ h2 in the intervals (l1, h1) and (l2, h2) for
which i1 cmpop i2 is true and other pairs of values such that i1 cmpop i2 is false. For abstract object
references, we have maybe-equal-and-definitely-not-equal semantics: when the fields of the abstract
object references are identical, they may refer to the same object, and so the abstract version of the
applyBinary operator produces both true and false; where at least one field differs between abstract
object references, they definitely do not refer to the same object and so the abstract version of the
applyBinary operator produces false. See Lemma B.5.10 on page 434 for more information;
• when absApplyBinary determines false is a possible value, then the context of the false branch is repre-
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sented in the analysis: {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
We ensure the remaining stack M is represented in the analysis: M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and in the same way familiar from the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and
4.4, we ensure the local variable array. set of methods that may have invoked mn, and object state changes
recorded in the transaction buffer, and the transition from π1 to π2 are represented in the analysis results:
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
• similarly, when absApplyBinary determines true is a possible value, then the context of the true branch is
represented in the analysis: {π3} ⊑C Ĉ((mn, addr))
We ensure the remaining stack M is represented in the analysis: M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
and in the same way familiar from the nop and new τ examples discussed in great detail in Tables 4.3 and
4.4, we ensure the local variable array. set of methods that may have invoked mn, and object state changes
recorded in the transaction buffer, and the transition from π1 to π3 are represented in the analysis results:
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π3)
{(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
B.3.4 The invokevirtual w bytecode instruction
In Tables 4.6–4.7 we detail an explanation of the flow-logic for the invokevirtual w bytecode instruction, and
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In this section two fundamental properties of the base control-flow analysis and its results are formally stated and
proved:
• semantic soundness
• a Moore family property
Semantic soundness is used to establish the correctness of the program analysis i.e. that the analysis results
do indeed correctly reflect all semantically possible runtime behaviours for the properties of interest being cap-
tured, here control-flow. The Moore family property is used to prove all programs may be analysed, and that a
least/smallest analysis exists for each program.
B.4.1 Semantic Soundness
As per [Han05, NNH10], the semantic soundness of a flow-logic analysis with a small-steps semantics is proved
by establishing a subject reduction property. Before doing so, we must formally relate the concrete- and abstract-
domains. Again, following [Han05, NNH10], we do so using representation functions and correctness relations.
We have already defined the representation functions relating the concrete and abstract and analysis domains in
the opening sections of this Chapter.
We express two correctness relations.
The first correctness relation relates the callstack to the analysis results and includes the context-sensitive do-
mains. SF RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) requires each stack frame, including the operand stack, local
variable array, and set of calling methods in the callstack to be represented in the analysis, and the transaction
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buffer to be represented in in the current address (mn, pcn), to be considered correct:
SF RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
⇐⇒ SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(JH) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
The second correctness relation relates the global entities (i.e. the non-context-sensitive entities) to the analysis
results, and requires the applet registry, global heap, static heap and invalidated object references be represented
in the analysis results to be considered correct. It also invokes the first correctness relation and so requires the
callstack to be represented in the analysis results to be considered correct.
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
⇐⇒ SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
∧ βR,H,JHRegistry(R) ⊑R R̂
∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
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A final preliminary before expressing and proving the subject reduction property: a concrete semantic configuration
is said to be well-formed if it is either an initial configuration as per Section 3.7.1 or is reachable from an initial
configuration by repeated application of the configuration transitions P
∣∣∣ Config ⇒
Config
of Section 3.9. This ensures
the callstack is well-formed i.e. all the stack frames below the stack frame at the top of the callstack are suspended
method invocations.
B.4.2 Subject reduction theorem
Theorem B.4.1 (Subject Reduction Theorem). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• C’ = 〈R′,K ′, H ′, I ′, HID′, JH ′, CHN ′, SF ′〉
Then:
C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) ⇒
C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)





By case inspection. Due to time-constraints we have not been able to type up the proofs for all the atomic byte-







∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
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and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for






From the flow-logic rule, we have:









and the result follows.
B.4.2.2 Case push t c:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = push t c
t ∈ {b, s} ⇒ t2 = s
t = i ⇒ t2 = i
t = r ⇒ t2 = r
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(t2, c, (mn, pcn))
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The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(Sn::(t2, c, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
(t = r) ⇒ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{σ̂Null} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(t ∈ {b, s}) ⇒ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(s, (c, c, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(t = i) ⇒ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(i, (c, c, 0), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
which can readily be seen as the expanded form of:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::β
R,H,JH







Stack(Sn::(t2, c, (mn, pcn)))
= βR,H,JHStack(Sn)::β
R,H,JH
V al (t2, c, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::β
R,H,JH
V al (t2, c, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.3 Case pop p:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = pop n
n ∈ N0
Sn = T2 : T1
n = nbWords(T1)
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = T2
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The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for






complicated by having to prove the conditional is also satisfied:
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{
P1, . . . , Pf
}




∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , f} :
(


























Stack(Sn) ⊑S Z| ≥ 1
and so there exists Pi such that:
β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn) ⊑S Pi ∧ Pi =M : X ∧ absNbWords(X) = n ⇒
β
R,H,JH












and the result follows.
B.4.2.4 Case dup p q:
By assumption:
4See Section B.5.1 for further information.
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = dup p q
p, q ∈ N0
Sn = T2 : T1
Sn = T4 : T3
nbWords(T1) = p
nbWords(T3) = q
S = T4 : T1 : T3
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = T4 : T1 : T3
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
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∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(T4 : T1 : T3) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
complicated by having to prove the conditional is also satisfied:
{
P1, . . . , Pf
}




∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , f} :


(Pi = X2 : X1) ∧
(Pi = X4 : X3) ∧









Stack(T4 : T1 : T3) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)


















Stack(Sn) ⊑S Z| ≥ 1
and so there exists Pi such that:




Stack(Sn) ⊑S Pi ⇒
(Pi = X2 : X1 ∧ absNbWords(X1) = p) ∧ (Pi = X4 : X3 ∧ absNbWords(X3) = q) ⇒
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T1) ⊑S X1 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T2) ⊑S X2 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T3) ⊑S X3 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T4) ⊑S X4 ∧


















and the result follows.
B.4.2.5 Case swap p1 p2:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = swap p1 p2
p1, p2 ∈ N0
Sn = T3 : T2 : T1
p1 = nbWords(T1)
p2 = nbWords(T2)
S = T3 : T1 : T2
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
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whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = T3 : T1 : T2
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(T3 : T1 : T2) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
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complicated by having to prove the conditional is also satisfied:{
P1, . . . , Pf
}




∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , f} :


(Pi = X3 : X2 : X1) ∧








Stack(T3 : T1 : T2) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)


















Stack(Sn) ⊑S Z| ≥ 1
and so there exists Pi such that:
β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn) ⊑S Pi ⇒
((Pi = X3 : X2 : X1) ∧ (absNbWords(X1) = p1) ∧ (absNbWords(X2) = p2)) ⇒
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T1) ⊑S X1 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T2) ⊑S X2 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(T3) ⊑S X3 ∧







Stack(T2) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
β
R,H,JH






Stack(T3 : T1 : T2)
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
6See Section B.5.1 for further information.
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B.4.2.6 Cases numop t binop and numop t binop topt:
B.4.2.6.1 Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
(
(mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t binop) ∨ (mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t binop topt)
)
t ∈ {s, i}
Sn = A::(t, c1, (mp, pcp))::(t, c2, (mq, pcq))
¬(binop ∈ {div, rem} ∧ c2 = 0)
(t, r, (mn, pcn)) = applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq , pcq)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = A::(t, r, (mn, pcn))





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for numop t binop
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(A::(t, r, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊑S X2 :
¬
(
binop ∈ {div, rem} ∧ (l2 = 0 = h2)
)
⇒
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary(binop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca)), (t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb)), (mn, pcn))
M ::{(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(





βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((t, c2, (mq, pcq))) ⊑S X2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X1 ∧
∃ {(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c2, (mq , pcq))) ⊑V al X2 ⇒
¬(l2 = 0 = h2)
We have from the op. sem. rule, by assumption: ¬(binop ∈ {div, rem}) and utilising Lemma B.5.7 on page 430:
333
¬(l2 = 0 = h2) ∧ ¬
(
binop ∈ {div, rem}) ⇒
¬(binop ∈ {div, rem} ∧ (l2 = 0 = h2)) ⇒
M ::{(t , (l3, h3, mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
βR,H,JHStack(A) :: βNum((t, r, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒




Stack(A :: (t, r, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.6.2 Possible transition 2 of 2
By assumption:
(
(mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t binop) ∨ (mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t binop topt)
)
t ∈ {s, i}
Sn = A::(t, c1, (mp, pcp))::(t, c2, (mq, pcq))(
binop ∈ {div, rem} ∧ c2 = 0
)
SF ′ = catchException





∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P , from the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊑S X2 :
¬
(
binop ∈ {div, rem} ∧ (l2 = 0 = h2)
)
⇒
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary(binop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca)), (t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb)), (mn, pcn))
M ::{(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(





βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((t, c2, (mq, pcq))) ⊑S X2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X1 ∧
∃ {(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c2, (mq , pcq))) ⊑V al X2 ⇒
(l2 ≤ 0 ≤ h2)
We have from the op. sem. rule, by assumption:
(
binop ∈ {div, rem}) and utilising Lemma B.5.7 on page 430:
((l2 ≤ 0 ≤ h2) ∧
(
binop ∈ {div, rem})) ⇒
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂ArithmeticException )
and the result follows from Lemma B.5.1 on page 407.
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B.4.2.7 Cases numop t unop:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t neg
t ∈ {s, i}
Sn = A::(t, c, (m, apc))
(t , v, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(neg, (t, c, (m, apc)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = A::(t, v, (mn, pcn))





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for numop t unop
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(A::(t , v, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X
∀ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X :
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary(neg, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
M ::{(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Now:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, c, (m, apc))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c, (m, apc))) ⊑V al X
Utilising Lemma B.5.7 on page 430:
M ::{(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
βR,H,JHStack(A) :: βNum((t, v, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒




Stack(A :: (t, v, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
337
B.4.2.8 Cases numop t to topt:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = numop t to topt
t ∈ {s, i}
Sn = A::(t, c, (m, apc))
(topt, v, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(to, topt, (t, c, (m, apc)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = A::(topt, v, (mn, pcn))





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for numop t unop
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(A::(topt, v, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) =M ::X
∀ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X :
(topt, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary(to, topt, (t, (l1, h1, mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn),MAX MOD COUNT)
M ::{(topt, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Now:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, c, (m, apc))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊒V al βNum((t, c, (m, apc))) ⊑V al X
Utilising Lemma B.5.9 on page 433:
M ::{(topt, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
βR,H,JHStack(A) :: βNum((topt, v, (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒




Stack(A::(topt, v, (mn, pcn)))
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
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B.4.2.9 Case load t i:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = load t j
j ∈ N0
t ∈ {s, i, r}
(t, c, (mn, pca)) = Ln(j)
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(t , c, (mn, pca))





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î , ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for load t i
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn::(t, c, (mn, pca))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
By assumption:
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) = M .
∀ i ∈ dom(Ln) :
βR,H,JHV al (Ln(i)) ⊑V al M(i)
⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al (Ln(j)) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al ((t, c, (mn, pca))) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
∀ {(t, Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) :
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Combining the above:
∃ {(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) . (t, Y, (mp, pcp)) ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, c, (mn, pca))) ⇒
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
βR,H,JHStack(Sn)::β
R,H,JH
V al ((t, c, (mn, pca))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ⇒
βR,H,JHStack(Sn::(t, c, (mn, pca))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
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B.4.2.10 Case store t i:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = store t j
t ∈ {s, i, r}
j ∈ N0
Sn = A::(t, v , (m, apc))(
t ∈ {s, i} ⇒ (mq = mn ∧ pcq = pcn)
)
(
t = r ⇒ (mq = m ∧ pcq = apc)
)
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), L, S〉
S = A
L = Ln[j 7→ (t, v , (mq, pcq))]





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for store t i




∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X
∀ {(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X :
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∀ k ∈ dom(L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)) . k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k)
(t = r) ⇒ {(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j)
(t ∈ {s, i}) ⇒ {(t , Y, (mn, pcn))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j)
Now:
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βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, v, (m, apc))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, v, (m, apc))) ⊑V al X ⇒
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2) ∧
∀ k ∈ dom(L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)) . k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k) ∧
(t = r) ⇒ {(t , Y, (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ∧
(t ∈ {s, i}) ⇒ {(t , Y, (mn, pcn))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ⇒
(t ∈ {s, i}) ⇒ βR,H,JHV al ((t, v , (mn, pcn))) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ∧






From inspection of the op. sem. rule: L = Ln
j 7→

(t, v , (mn, pcn)) t ∈ {s, i}
(t, v , (m, apc)) t = r

Given we have:
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧
∀ k ∈ dom(L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)) . k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k) ∧
(t ∈ {s, i}) ⇒ βR,H,JHV al ((t, v , (mn, pcn))) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ∧
(t = r) ⇒ βR,H,JHV al ((t, v, (m, apc))) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ⇒
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
the result follows.
B.4.2.11 Case inc t j c:
By assumption:
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = inc t j c
t ∈ {s, i}
j ∈ N0
c ∈ Z
(t, a, (m, apc)) = Ln(j)
(t, r, (mn, pcn)) = applyBinary(add, (t, c, (mn, pcn)), (t, a, (m, apc)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = Sn
L = Ln[j 7→ (t, r, (mn, pcn))]





∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î , ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for inc t j c




∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
By assumption:
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) = M .
∀ i ∈ dom(Ln) :
βR,H,JHV al (Ln(i)) ⊑V al M(i)
⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al (Ln(j)) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al (t, a, (m, apc)) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j)
and so we know :
∃ {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) . βNum(t, a, (m, apc)) ⊑V al {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))}
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
∀ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) :
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary(add, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (t, (c, c, 0), (mn, pcn)), (mn, pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




. k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k)
{(t, (l3, h3, mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j)
and so we may conclude:
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∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) :
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary(add, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (t, (c, c, 0), (mn, pcn)), (mn, pcn))
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




. k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k)
{(t, (l3, h3, mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j)
which immediately gives us:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and utilising Lemma B.5.7 on page 430:
βNum(t, r, (mn, pcn))) ⊑V al {(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))}
and combining with:
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧
∀ k ∈ dom(L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)) . k 6= j : L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(k) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(k) ∧
{(t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))} ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(j) ⇒
βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) = β
R,H,JH
LocalV ar(Ln[j 7→ (t, r, (mn, pcn))]) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
the result follows.
B.4.2.12 Case goto addr:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = goto addr
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, addr), Ln, S〉
S = Sn
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∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π2 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î , ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for goto addr
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:








and the result follows.
B.4.2.13 Case if t op goto addr :
B.4.2.13.1 Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
m.instructionAt(pcn) = if t op goto addr
t ∈ {r, s}
Sn = A::(t, c2, (mq, pcq))::(t, c1, (mp, pcp))
applyBinary(op, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID,JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, addr), Ln, S〉
S = A






∧ π3 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ {π3} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π3)
∧ {(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )
∧ π3 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ′)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for if t op goto addr
the proof obligation reduces to:
βR,H,JHStack(S) = β
R,H,JH
Stack(A) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
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Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ {(t , Y1, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t , Y2, (mq, pcq))} ⊑S X2 :(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
) ⇒
{π3} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π3)
{(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
(




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Now:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((t, c2, (mq, pcq))) ⊑S X2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X1 ∧
∃ {(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, c2, (mq , pcq))) ⊑V al X2
From Lemma B.5.10 on page 434, we have
applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)) ∈ absApplyBinary




((t, c2, (mq, pcq))), (mn, pcn)

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and the result follows.
B.4.2.13.2 Possible transition 2 of 2
By assumption:
m.instructionAt(pcn) = if t op goto addr
t ∈ {r, s}
Sn = A::(t, c2, (mq, pcq))::(t, c1, (mp, pcp))
false = applyBinary(op, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = A
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.4 on page 419 and so to conclude for this case, we
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have only to show: whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
S = A::(t, r, (mn, pcn))
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.3 on page 414 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for






From the flow-logic rule, we have:
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Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2
∀ {(t , Y1, (mp, pcp))} ⊑S X1 :
∀ {(t , Y2, (mq, pcq))} ⊑S X2 :
(
absApplyBinary(cmpop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)), (t , Y2, (mq, pcq))) ⊇ {true}
)
⇒
{π3} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π3)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π3)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π3)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr )(π3)
{(π1, π3)} ⊑CG ĈG
(





L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)





Stack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X1::X2 ⇒
β
R,H,JH
Stack((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X1 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack((t, c2, (mq, pcq))) ⊑S X2 ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (ma, pca))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, c1, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X1 ∧
∃ {(t , (l2, h2,mod2), (mb, pcb))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, c2, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al X2
From Lemma B.5.10 on page 434, we have
applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)) ∈ absApplyBinary




((t, c2, (mq, pcq))), (mn, pcn)










and the result follows.
B.4.2.14 Case lookupswitch t (k i => apci)r1 , default => apcdefault:
B.4.2.14.1 Possible transition 1 of 2
By assumption:
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = lookupswitch t (k i => apci)r1 , default => apcdefault
t ∈ {s, i}
k1, . . . , kr ∈ N0
Sn = A::(t, key, (m, apc))
(∃i ∈ {1, . . . , r} . key = k i)
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, apci), Ln, S〉
S = A
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.4 on page 419 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apci)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apci)(πi)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apci)(πi)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apci)(πi)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apci)(πi)
∧ {(π0, πi)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π0 ⊑C Ĉi . π0 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π0)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(A) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apci)(πi)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π0) = M ::X
∀ {(t, (l, h,mod), (mq , pcq))} ⊑S X :
∀ p ∈ {1, . . . , r} :
l ≤ kp ≤ h ⇒
{πp} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apcp)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apcp)(πp)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apcp)(πp)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apcp)(πp)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apcp)(πp)
{(π0, πp)} ⊑CG ĈG




Stack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝi(π1) =M ::X ⇒
β
R,H,JH
Stack((t, key, (m, apc))) ⊑S X ∧
β
R,H,JH
Stack(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, key, (m, apc))) ⊑V al X ⇒
l ≤ key ≤ h ⇒ ∃p ∈ {1, . . . , r} . l ≤ kp ≤ h . kp = k i ⇒
{πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apci)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apci)(πi)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apci)(πi)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apci)(πi)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apci)(πi)
{(π0, πi)} ⊑CG ĈG
and since we have βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M , the result follows.
B.4.2.14.2 Possible transition 2 of 2
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = lookupswitch t (k i => apci)r1 , default => apcdefault
t ∈ {s, i}
k1, . . . , kr ∈ N0
Sn = A::(t, key, (m, apc))
¬(∃i ∈ {1, . . . , r} . key = k i)
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
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whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, apcdefault), Ln, S〉
S = A
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.4 on page 419 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {πdefault} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apcdefault)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
∧ {(π0, πdefault)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π0 ⊑C Ĉdefault . π0 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π0)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(A) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
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From the flow-logic rule, we have:
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π0) = M ::X
∀ {(t, (l, h,mod), (mq , pcq))} ⊑S X :
∀ v ∈ {l, . . . , h} :
( 6 ∃ p ∈ {1, . . . , r} . kp = v) ⇒
{πdefault} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apcdefault)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
{(π0, πdefault)} ⊑CG ĈG












(A) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {(t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t, key, (m, apc))) ⊑V al X ⇒
l ≤ key ≤ h ⇒ ¬∃p ∈ {1, . . . , r} . l ≤ kp ≤ h . kp = ki ⇒
{πdefault} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, apcdefault)
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑L L̂(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π0) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, apcdefault)(πdefault)
{(π0, πdefault)} ⊑CG ĈG
and since we have βR,H,JHStack(A) ⊑S M , the result follows.
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B.4.2.15 Cases arraystore t:
B.4.2.15.1 Possible transition 1 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)
(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length)(
t = b
)
((ctdn = 0) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient 6= NOT TRANSIENT) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))
(b, w, (m, apc3)) = fromShort((t1, v, (m, apc3)), b)
H′ = H[loc.values(i) 7→ (b, w, (mn, pcn))]
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I, HID, JH,CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I,HID, JH, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.6 on page 425 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
Table B.8 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:













 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t1 = s⇐ (b, w, (m, apc3)) = fromShort((t1, v, (m, apc3)), b).
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βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βNum((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end)) :
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Utilising B.5.97 on page 430: βNum((b, w, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)). From the assumptions of
the operational semantics and by definition of βR,H,JH,kContext,γn = ctdn, we may conclude:




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Combining the above:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
βNum((b, w, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊑V al Ĥ(Oq = βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))))(values)((i, i))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.2 Possible transition 2 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)
(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length)(
t = b
)
((ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))(b, w, (m, apc3)) = fromShort((t1, v, (m, apc3)), b)
H′ = H
JH′ = JH[loc.values(i) 7→ (b, w, (mn, pcn))]
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I, HID, CHN, SF′〉
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Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2 ::A1




Oq.length = (min array length,max array length)












∀ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊑S A2 :
∀ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑S A1 :
checkArrayStore
(
On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov, (t = r)
)
⇒
(h ≥ 0) ⇒











 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) :
(
(t = b) ∧ (tv = s)
)
⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2, mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq )(values)((start, end)) :
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)










 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) :
(start, end) =
{
(0, max array length), array dom size ≥ MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,
(max(0, l), min(max array length, h)), array dom size < MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
(





L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end)) :
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Table B.8: arraystore t first two cases
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Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2 ::A1




Oq.length = (min array length,max array length)












∀ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊑S A2 :
∀ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑S A1 :
checkArrayStore
(
On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov, (t = r)
)
⇒
(h ≥ 0) ⇒











 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) :
((








(t = tv = i)
))
⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)










 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) :
(start, end) =
{
(0, max array length), array dom size ≥ MAX DOM DYN ARRAY,
(max(0, l), min(max array length, h)), array dom size < MAX DOM DYN ARRAY
((








(t = tv = i)
))
⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(
γn = 1 ∧ Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Table B.9: arraystore t third until sixth cases
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∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
Table B.8 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:
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 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t1 = s⇐ (b, w, (m, apc3)) = fromShort((t1, v, (m, apc3)), b).
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βNum((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
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From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Utilising B.5.98 on page 430: βNum((b, w, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)). From the assumptions of
the operational semantics and by definition of βR,H,JH,kContext,γn = ctdn, we may conclude:




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq)) = absFromShort
(
(tv,W, (mv, pcv)), b
)
{(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mn, pcn))} ⊑V al ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Combining the above:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
βNum((b, w, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(b, (l2, h2,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊑V al ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((i, i))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.3 Possible transition 3 of 10
By assumption:
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)
(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length)(
t ∈ {s, i}
)
((ctdn = 0) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient 6= NOT TRANSIENT) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))
H′ = H[loc.values(i) 7→ (t1, v, (mn, pcn))]
JH′ = JH
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S′〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I, HID, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.6 on page 425 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
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Table B.9 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:













 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t = t1 ∈ {i, s}.
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βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βNum((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
{(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))




βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
βNum((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑V al Ĥ(Oq = βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))))(values)((i, i))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.4 Possible transition 4 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)
(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length)(
t ∈ {s, i}
)
((ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))
H′ = H
JH′ = JH[loc.values(i) 7→ (t1, v, (mn, pcn))]
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I, HID, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.6 on page 425 and so to conclude for this case, we









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
Table B.9 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:













 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
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and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t = t1 ∈ {i, s}.
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βNum((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
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Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)





L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
{(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
Combining the above:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
βNum((t1, v, (mn, pcn))) ⊑V al {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)(i, i)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.5 Possible transition 5 of 10
By assumption:
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mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)





((ctdn = 0) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient 6= NOT TRANSIENT) ∨ (ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))
H′ = H[loc.values(i) 7→ (t1, v, (m, apc3))]
JH′ = JH
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S′〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I, HID, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.6 on page 425 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
Table B.9 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:













 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t = t1 = r.
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βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
{(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))




βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑V al Ĥ(Oq = βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))))(values)((i, i))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.6 Possible transition 6 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)





((ctdn = 1 ∧ getJHorH(loc).transient = NOT TRANSIENT ∧ ¬getJHorH(loc).isGlobal))
H′ = H
JH′ = JH[loc.values(i) 7→ (t1, v, (m, apc3))]
SF′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S′〉
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H′, I, HID, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.6 on page 425 and so to conclude for this case, we









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref (r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
Table B.9 gives the relevant excerpt from the flow-logic clause for this instruction. It is worth noting that sections














 . (start ≤ j ≤ end) : 〈BLOCK〉
and:













 . (D1 ≤ j ≤ D2) : 〈BLOCK〉
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and:
• the two conditions are mutually exclusive;
• one of the two conditions must be true;
• the same set of constraints (〈BLOCK〉) are to be satisfied regardless of which condition is triggered;
in line with the explanation in Section 4.2.2.2 on how the arraystore instruction functions in the abstract analysis
i.e. array index i in the concrete semantics is represented as an abstract number (l, h,mod) . l ≤ i ≤ h storing
the value against an existing exactly-matching array index interval is preferred to adding either a fresh array index
interval or storing the value against the default all-elements array index interval, otherwise.
From the operational semantic rule, it must be t = t1 = r.
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
From the op. sem. we have (0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length).
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Since {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ∧Oq.length = (min array length,max array length) ⇒
min array length ≤ 0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length ≤ max array length ∧
l ≤ i < h ⇒
i ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} ⇒
∃ j ∈ {max(0, l), . . . ,min(max array length, h)} . i = j
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
¬
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov .isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑H Ĥ(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
(
γn = 1 ∧Oq.transient = NOT TRANSIENT∧ ¬Ov.isGlobal
)
⇒
(t = r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
(t 6= r) ⇒ {(tv,W, (mn, pcn))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)





L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
{(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)(Oq)(values)((start, end))






(S) ⊑S M ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)









(r, loc, (mp, pcp))
)
.values((i, i))
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.7 Possible transition 7 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)







〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉,
(r, locArrayStoreException, (1, 1)), java.lang.ArrayStoreException, ctdn, ion

P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, SF′〉
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∀ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊑S A2 :
∀ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊑S A1 :
¬checkArrayStore
(














((l < 0) ∨ (h ≥ min array length)) ⇒
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException)
Table B.10: arraystore t seventh until tenth cases
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The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.1 on page 407 and so to conclude for this case, we





Ref (r, locArrayStoreException, (1, 1)), ∅)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from the flowlogic clause in Table B.10 we may reason:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2 ⇒
t1 = t1 = r ∧
¬getJHorH(v).isArray ∧ ¬(getJHorH(loc).refType  getJHorH(v).refType) ⇒ ¬Ov.isArray ∧ (Ov .type 6 Oq .type)
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
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HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂ArrayStoreException)






and ∃ π1 ⊑C
Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ) and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.8 Possible transition 8 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
checkArrayStore
(
getJHorH(locn).owner, getJHorH(loc3).owner, getJHorH(loc).owner, (r, loc, (mp, pcp)), (t1, v, (m, apc3)), (t = r)
)
¬(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length)
SF′ = catchException

〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉,
(r, locArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException , (1, 1)), java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, ctdn, ion

P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.1 on page 407 and so to conclude for this case, we





Ref (r, locArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, (1, 1)), ∅)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from the flowlogic clause in Table B.10 we may reason:
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βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2 ⇒
¬(0 ≤ i < getJHorH(loc).length) ⇒ ((l < 0) ∨ (h ≥ min array length))
By definition of βR,H,JH,kContext, On = getJHorH(locn) and O3 = getJHorH(loc3). Combined with the above:
checkArrayStore
(





On.owner, O3.owner, Oq.owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException)






and ∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = βR,H,JH,kContext(SF ) and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.9 Possible transition 9 of 10
By assumption:
393
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))(
(loc = null) ∨ (loc 6= null ∧ loc ∈ (dom(H) ∪ dom(JH)) ∧ getJHorH(loc).isArray = true)
)
(loc 6= null ∧ loc 6∈ dom(I))
¬checkArrayStore
(




〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉,
(r, locSecurityException, (1, 1)), java.lang.SecurityException, ctdn, ion

P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.1 on page 407 and so to conclude for this case, we





Ref (r, locSecurityException, (1, 1)), ∅)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from the flowlogic clause in Table B.10 we may reason:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2









On.owner, O3.owner, Oq .owner, Oq, Ov , (t = r)
)
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂SecurityException)






and ∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 =
β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ) and the result follows.
B.4.2.15.10 Possible transition 10 of 10
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = arraystore t
Sn = S′ ::(r, loc, (mp, pcp))::(s, i, (mq, pcq))::(t1, v, (m, apc3))
(loc = null ∨ loc ∈ dom(I)) ⇒
H′ = H, JH′ = JH
SF′ = catchException

〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉,
(r, locNullPointerException, (1, 1)), java.lang.NullPointerException, ctdn, ion

P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN, SF′〉
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.1 on page 407 and so to conclude for this case, we





Ref (r, locNullPointerException, (1, 1)), ∅)
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from the flowlogic clause in Table B.10 we may reason:
βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ∧ Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) = M ::X::A2::A1 ⇒
βR,H,JHStack((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑S A1 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((s, i, (mq , pcq))) ⊑S A2 ∧
βR,H,JHStack((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑S X ∧
βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S M ⇒
∃ {Oq} ⊒V al {σ̂Null} ⊒V al βR,H,JHRef ((r, loc, (mp, pcp))) ⊑V al X ∧
∃ {(s, (l, h,mod), (mq, pcq))} ⊒V al βNum((s, i, (mq, pcq))) ⊑V al A1
∃ {Ov} = {(tv,W, (mv, pcv))} ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al ((t1, v, (m, apc3))) ⊑V al A2
Combining all of the above we may conclude:
HANDLE(π1, π1, σ̂NullPointerException)






and ∃ π1 ⊑C
Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ) and the result follows.
}
B.4.2.16 Case jsr addr:
By assumption:
396
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = jsr addr
P
∣∣∣ 〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 ⇒
〈R,K,H,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
whence:
SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, addr), Ln, S〉
S = Sn::(ra,mn.nextAddress(pcn), (mn, pcn))
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.4 on page 419 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
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From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )




∧ βR,H,JHStack(Sn) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)
and from (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) |=CFA P and from inspection of the flow-logic rule for





Stack(Sn::(ra,mn.nextAddress(pcn), (mn, pcn))) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:










⊑S Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1)::{(ra, mn.nextAddress(pcn), (mn, pcn))}
⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
and the result follows.
B.4.2.17 Case ret i:
By assumption:
mn.instructionAt(pcn) = ret i
(ra, addr , (mn, apc)) = L(i)
P




SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, addr), Ln, S〉
S = Sn
The form of C and C′ meet the preconditions for Lemma B.5.4 on page 419 and so to conclude for this case, we








∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
From SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG) we must have:
∃ π1 ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn) . π1 = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )









LocalV ar(Ln) = M .
∀ j ∈ dom(Ln) :
β
R,H,JH
V al (Ln(j)) ⊑V al M(i)
⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al (Ln(i)) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i)
⇒ βR,H,JHV al ((ra, addr , (mn, apc))) ⊑V al L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i)
From the flow-logic rule, we have:
∀ {(ra, addr , (mr, pcr))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(i) :
π2 = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On, ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, addr)))
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr )
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr )(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π2)
{(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Combining the above:
∃ {(ra, addr , (mr, pcr)))} ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(π1)(j) . (ra, addr , (mr, pcr)) ⊒V al βR,H,JHV al (ra, addr , (mn, apc)) ⇒
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
Ŝ(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr )(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr )(π2)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.5.3 Proof of abstract exception handling
Lemma B.5.1 (Abstract exception handler). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• C′ = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉 . SF ′ = catchException(SF, (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType), ctdn, ion)
Then:
C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,





Ref (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), ∅) ⇒
C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
Proof:
From the assumptions of this theorem we will be using the below:
〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF 〉 RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
⇒ SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
∧ βR,H,JHRegistry(R) ⊑R R̂
∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
407
SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)
⇒ SF = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln, Sn〉
∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
and the definition of βR,H,JH,kContext in Table 4.2.
By construction of βR,H,JH,kContext our choice of representation for a callstack includes the addresses of at least the
first three stack frames (including the applet lifecycle method invoked on the third stack frame) and the last two
stack frames of the callstack passed to the function, so it is always possible from a context to determine both
the address of the current method and the address of the method calling the current method. Further, from
C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) we have a sequence of such contexts representing
each method invocation in the callstack SF . Since for every method invocation in the callstack SF we have a
context containing (invokingmethod, invokedmethod) we can always calculate (a possible over-approximation9 of)
the set of its calling contexts, we have sufficient information to emulate unwinding the callstack one frame at a
time.
Both catchException and HANDLE use the findHandler function to determine whether a particular address can
handle a particular exception type. From the assumptions of this theorem, we have:
β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType = getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType ⇒
findHandler(mi, pci, βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType) ≡ findHandler(mi, pci, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType)) ⇒
findHandler(mi, pci, βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType) 6= ⊥ ⇐⇒ findHandler(mi, pci, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType)) 6= ⊥ ∧
findHandler(mi, pci, βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType) = ⊥ ⇐⇒ findHandler(mi, pci, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType)) = ⊥
and so catchException and HANDLE will action their respective clauses at the same address. This implies when
catchException matches its third clause and chooses to unwind the callstack of a callstack with a current length of
at least four by a stack frame and recursively check the next frame when
findHandler(mk, pck, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType)) = ⊥, then
HANDLE must also conclude findHandler(mk, pck, βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType) = ⊥ and in the case of an
9Note this is a potentially a set of calling context where n > k in the k-CFA.
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abstract callstack of at least four stack frames will check its calling method address for the set of possible caller
methods and recursively check those addresses using HANDLE.
∀ πInvoking = ((O1, ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), (O3, ψ3, γ3, ξ3, (m3, pc3)), X)) ⊑C Ĉ(m(k−1), pc(k−1)) :
(
{(πInvoking, πCurrent)}) 6⊆ AlreadySeen
)
⇒ HANDLE(πOriginal, πInvoking,Oexception, AlreadySeen ∪ {(πInvoking, πCurrent)})
Since pattern-matching of current and previous method is used to identify the set of possible caller contexts, we
are assured one of them must be the correct context as argued above, but we may also propagate exception
information to some extra addresses, thus hindering precision but not correctness.
Given SF ′ = catchException(SF, (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), getJHorH((r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType), ctdn, ion), then SF ′ must
have one of two forms:
Case 1: exception programatically handled by applet
In this case, we match the second clause of catchException, and for some i ∈ N, 3 ≤ i ≤ n:
SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 loci, itdi, ctdn, ion, (mi, pc′), Li, (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉
where findHandler(mi, pci, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr, pcr)).refType)) = pc′ 6= ⊥.
Now either n = i and the catchException and HANDLE functions have identified a handler for the current method/stack
frame directly, since as argued above:
findHandler(mi, pci, βR,H,JHRef (r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType) 6= ⊥ ⇐⇒ findHandler(mi, pci, getJHorH((r, loc, (mr , pcr)).refType)) 6= ⊥
or both functions have recursively checked their parent method/stack frame and found a handler at mi.
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∧ SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . . ::〈 loci, itdi, ctdn, ion, (mi, pc′), Li, (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉




















(r, locexc, (m, apc)) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pc
′)(πi)








(r, loc, (mr, pcr)), ∅) ⇒
HANDLE

πOriginal = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ∧
πCurrent = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (Oq, ψq, γq, ξq, (mq, pcq))) ∧
findHandler(mq, pcq, Oexception.refType) = pc′ 6= ⊥
 ⇒
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (mq, pc2)), . . . , (Oq, ψq, γn, ξn, (mq, pc
′))
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mq, pc
′)
{Oexception} ⊑S Ŝ(mq, pc
′)(π2)
L̂(mq, pcq)(πCurrent) ⊑L L̂(mq, pc
′)(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(πOriginal) ⊑JH ĴH(mq, pc
′)(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(πOriginal ) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(mq, pc
′)(π2)
{(Oexception, πOriginal, πCurrent)} ⊑E Ê
{(πOriginal, πCurrent)} ⊑CG ĈG
and since:
• πOriginal = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )
• ξn = itdn
• γn = ion
• (mi, pci) = (mq, pcq)




• Oexception = β
R,H,JH
Ref (r, loc, (mr, pcr))
the result follows.
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Case 2: exception reaches top-level JCRE
In this case, we match the first clause of catchException since no exception handler has been found in any of the
stack frames from n to 3:
SF ′ = 〈loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1,S1〉::〈loc2, itd2, ctdn, ion, (m2, 10),[ ], (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉












∧ SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 ::〈 loc2, itd2, ctdn, ion, (m2, 10),[ ], (r, locexc, (m, apc))〉

















(r, locexc, (m, apc)) ⊑S Ŝ(m2, 10)(πi)











(r, loc, (mr, pcr)), ∅) ⇒
HANDLE

πOriginal = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), . . . , (On,ψn, γn, ξn, (mn, pcn))) ∧
πCurrent = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2, ψ2, γ2, ξ2, (m2, pc2)), (O3 , ψ3, γ3, ξ3, (m3, pc3))) ∧
findHandler(m3, pc3, Oexception.refType) = ⊥
 ⇒
π2 = ((O1 , ψ1, γ1, ξ1, (m1, pc1)), (O2 , ψ2, γn, ξn, (m2, 10)))
{π2} ⊑C Ĉ(m2, 10)
{Oexception} ⊑S Ŝ(m2, 10)(π2)
{[]} ⊑L L̂(m2, 10)(π2)
ĴH(mn, pcn)(πOriginal) ⊑JH ĴH(m2, 10)(π2)
̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(πOriginal ) ⊑MNAMES
̂MNAMES(m2, 10)(π2)
{(Oexception, πOriginal, πCurrent)} ⊑E Ê
{(πOriginal, πCurrent)} ⊑CG ĈG
since:
• πOriginal = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF )
• ξn = itdn
• γn = ion




• Oexception = β
R,H,JH





B.5.4 Second abstract exception handling proof
Lemma B.5.2 (Abstract exception handler, JCRE owned exception with an exception reason field changed). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• loc ∈ dom(H)
•
C′ = 〈R,K,H[loc.values(f.id) 7→ (t, v , (mn, pcn))], I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉 .








Ref ((r, loc, (mr, pcr)))
)
.values(f.id) ∧
C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,





Ref (r, loc, (mr, pcr)), ∅) ⇒
C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
Proof:
From the assumptions of:
• loc ∈ dom(H)




Ref ((r, loc, (mr, pcr)))
)
.values(f.id)
• C RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
• H[loc.values(f.id) 7→ (t, v , (mn, pcn))] being the only change to the heap.
we may conclude that βH,JHDynamicHeap(H
′) ⊑H Ĥ , and the remainder follows from Lemma B.5.1 since changing
a field of an exception object cannot change the first stack frame capable of handling the reference type of the
exception.
413
B.5.5 Subject Reduction Simplification Lemma 1
Lemma B.5.3 (Only operand stack changed in transition to next address). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• C′ = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉










∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Proof:
We have {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG by assumption and so proof obligation reduces to proving:
C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
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∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
Since R,K,H and I remain unchanged in C′, proving C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
reduces to proving:
SF ′ RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG) ∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Now:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)




∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
Since SF and SF ′ are identical below the top stack frame, we have from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG):
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∀i ∈ {3, . . . , (n− 1)} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
reducing the proof obligation to:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)








∧ {πn} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)




DynamicHeap(JH) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ {βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))




























and by change of bound variable:
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∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




B.5.6 Corollary to Subject Reduction Simplification Lemma 1
Corollary B.5.4 (Only operand stack changed in intra-method transition). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• C′ = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, addr), Ln, S〉
• C RR,H,JH
Config









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, addr)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, addr)(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
Proof:




B.5.7 Subject Reduction Simplification Lemma 2
Lemma B.5.5 (Only operand stack and local variable array change in transition to next address). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• C′ = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH,CHN,SF ′〉
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), L, S〉










∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Proof:
We have {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG by assumption and so proof obligation reduces to proving:
C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
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∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
Since R,K,H and I remain unchanged in C′, proving C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
reduces to proving:
SF ′ RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG) ∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Now:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)




∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
Since SF and SF ′ are identical below the top stack frame, we have from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG):
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∀i ∈ {3, . . . , (n− 1)} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
reducing the proof obligation to:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)








∧ {πn} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)




DynamicHeap(JH) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ {βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))


























and by change of bound variable:
423









∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(L) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




B.5.8 Subject Reduction Simplification Lemma 3
Lemma B.5.6 (Only operand stack and existing object field changed in transition to next address). Let:
• P ∈ Program
• C = 〈R,K,H, I,HID, JH, CHN,SF 〉 be a well-formed semantic configuration such that P
∣∣∣ C ⇒
C′
• (r, loc, (ma, pca)) ∈ dom(H)
• C′ = 〈R,K,H[loc.values(f .id) 7→ (t, v , (mb, pcb))], I,HID, JH, CHN,SF ′〉
• SF = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉::. . . ::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, pcn), Ln,Sn〉
• SF ′ = 〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: 〈 loc2, itd2, ctd2, io2, (m2, pc2), L2, S2〉 ::. . .::〈 locn, itdn, ctdn, ion, (mn, mn.nextAddress(pcn)), Ln, S〉










∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




Ref ((r, loc, (ma, pca)))
)
.values(f .id)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
⇒ C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Proof:
We have {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG by assumption and so proof obligation reduces to proving:
C′ RR,H,JH,kConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê,
̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG)
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∧ βHStaticHeap(K ) ⊑K K̂
∧ βH,JHDynamicHeap(H) ⊑H Ĥ
∧ βR,H,JHInvalidated(I) ⊑I Î
and since H ′ = H [loc.values(f .id) 7→ (t , v , (mb, pcb))] we require only:
β
R,H,JH








′) ⊑H Ĥ . Since we have this by one of the assumptions and since R,K and I remain
unchanged in C′, proving C′ RR,H,JHConfig (R̂, K̂, Ĥ, Î, ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, Ê, ̂MNAMES, R̂EC, ĈG) reduces to proving:
SF ′ RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG) ∧ {(π1, π2)} ⊑CG ĈG
Now:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)




∧ ∀i ∈ {3, . . . , n} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
Since SF and SF ′ are identical below the top stack frame, we have from SF RR,H,JHCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ, ̂MNAMES, ĈG):
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∀i ∈ {3, . . . , (n− 1)} :
πi = β
R,H,JH,k
Context(〈 loc1, itd1, ctd1, io1, (m1, pc1), L1, S1〉 :: . . . :: 〈 loci, itdi, ctdi, ioi, (mi, pci), Li, Si〉)
∧ {πi} ⊑C Ĉ(mi, pci)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mi} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Li) ⊑L L̂(mi, pci)(πi)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(Si) ⊑S Ŝ(mi, pci)(πi)
reducing the proof obligation to:
SF ′ RR,H,JH,kCallStack (ĴH, Ĉ, L̂, Ŝ,
̂MNAMES, ĈG)








∧ {πn} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(πn)




DynamicHeap(JH) ⊑JH ĴH(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ {βR,H,JH,kContext(SF )} ⊑C Ĉ(mn, pcn)
∧ {m1, . . . ,mn} ⊑MNAMES ̂MNAMES(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))
∧ βR,H,JHLocalV ar(Ln) ⊑L L̂(mn, pcn)(β
R,H,JH,k
Context(SF ))




























and by change of bound variable:
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∧ {π2} ⊑C Ĉ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))
∧ βR,H,JHStack(S) ⊑S Ŝ(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ L̂(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑L L̂(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)
∧ ĴH(mn, pcn)(π1) ⊑JH ĴH(mn,mn.nextAddress(pcn))(π2)




B.5.9 Abstract Numerical Operations
B.5.9.1 Abstract Binary Numerical Operators
Lemma B.5.7 (Abstract number produced by result of abstract binary numerical operators contains the concrete
number produced in the op. sem.). Let:
• t ∈ {b, s, i}
• binop ∈ BinaryNumericOperator
• (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)) be valid numeric values i.e. the constants c1, c2 are in range of their type t
• (t, r, (mn, pcn)) = applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
• βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))}
• βNum(t, c2, (mq, pcq)) ⊑V al {(t , (l2, h2,mod2), (mq, pcq))}
• (t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary

binop, (t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)),




βNum(t, r, (mn, pcn)) ⊑V al {(t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))}
Proof:
By definition:
βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⇐⇒ l1 ≤ c1 ≤ h1
βNum(t, c2, (mq, pcq)) ⊑V al {(t , (l2, h2,mod2), (mq, pcq))} ⇐⇒ l2 ≤ c2 ≤ h2
Define:
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyBinary
binop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)),
(t, (l2, h2,mod2), (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)

⇐⇒ l3 = min(resulti,j ) ∧ h3 = max(resulti,j ) ∧mod3 = max(mod1,mod2)
∧
∀ i ∈ {l1, . . . , h1} ∀ j ∈ {l2, . . . , h2} :
(t, resulti,j , (mn, pcn)) = applyBinary(binop, (t, i, (mp, pcp)), (t, j, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
In particular:
(t, resultc1,c2 , (mn, pcn)) = applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
= (t, r, (mn, pcn))
and so:
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min(resulti,j) ≤ resultc1,c2 ≤ max(resulti,j) ⇒
l3 ≤ r ≤ h3
and the result follows.

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B.5.9.2 Abstract Unary Numerical Operators
Lemma B.5.8 (Abstract number produced by result of abstract unary numerical operators contains the concrete
number produced in the op. sem. First unop form). Let:
• t ∈ {b, s, i}
• unop ∈ UnaryNumericOperator
• (t, c1, (mp, pcp)) be valid numeric values i.e. the constant c1 is in range of its type t
• (t, r, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
• βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))}
• (t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary(unop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
Then:
βNum(t, r, (mn, pcn)) ⊑V al {(t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))}
Proof:
By definition:
βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⇐⇒ l1 ≤ c1 ≤ h1
Define:
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary
(
unop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn)
)
⇐⇒ l3 = min(resulti) ∧ h3 = max(resulti) ∧mod3 = mod1
∧
∀ i ∈ {l1, . . . , h1} :
(t, resulti, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, (t, i, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
In particular:
(t, resultc1 , (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
= (t, r, (mn, pcn))
and so:
min(resulti) ≤ resultc1 ≤ max(resulti) ⇒
l3 ≤ r ≤ h3
and the result follows.

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Lemma B.5.9 (Abstract number produced by result of abstract unary numerical operators contains the concrete
number produced in the op. sem. Second unop form). Let:
• t ∈ {b, s, i}
• unop ∈ UnaryNumericOperator
• (t, c1, (mp, pcp)) be valid numeric values i.e. the constant c1 is in range of its type t
• (t, r, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, optt, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
• βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))}
• (t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary(unop, optt, (t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
Then:
βNum(t, r, (mn, pcn)) ⊑V al {(t , (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn))}
Proof:
By definition:
βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⇐⇒ l1 ≤ c1 ≤ h1
Define:
(t, (l3, h3,mod3), (mn, pcn)) = absApplyUnary
(
unop, optt, (t, (l1, h1, mod1), (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn)
)
⇐⇒ l3 = min(resulti) ∧ h3 = max(resulti) ∧mod3 = mod1
∧
∀ i ∈ {l1, . . . , h1} :
(t, resulti, (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, optt, (t, i, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
In particular:
(t, resultc1 , (mn, pcn)) = applyUnary(unop, optt, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (mn, pcn))
= (t, r, (mn, pcn))
and so:
min(resulti) ≤ resultc1 ≤ max(resulti) ⇒
l3 ≤ r ≤ h3
and the result follows.

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B.5.10 Abstract Logical Operations
B.5.10.1 Abstract Binary Logical Operators
Lemma B.5.10 (Abstract boolean produced by result of abstract binary logical operators contains the concrete
boolean produced in the op. sem.). Let:
• t ∈ {r, s}
• binop ∈ ComparisonOperator
• (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)) be valid operand values according to their type t
• r ∈ {true, false} = applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
• βR,H,JHV al (t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , Y1, (mp, pcp))}
• βR,H,JHV al (t, c2, (mq, pcq)) ⊑V al {(t , Y2, (mq, pcq))}
• S ⊆ P(true, false).S 6= ∅ = absApplyBinary

binop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)),




applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)) ∈ absApplyBinary
binop, (t, (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)),





binop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)),




binop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)),
(t, Y2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)
 t = s
absApplyBinaryRef
binop, (t, Y1, (mp, pcp)),
(t, Y2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)




binop, (t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)),













binop, (t , Y1, (mp, pcp)),









Y1.type = Y2.type ∧
Y1.refType = Y2.refType ∧
Y1.isArray = Y2.isArray ∧
Y1.owner = Y2.owner ∧
Y1.entryPoint = Y2.entryPoint ∧
Y1.isGlobal = Y2.isGlobal ∧
Y1.transient = Y2.transient ∧





The proof is immediate when (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)) are abstract numbers since by definition:
βNum(t, c1, (mp, pcp)) ⊑V al {(t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp))} ⇐⇒ l1 ≤ c1 ≤ h1
βNum(t, c2, (mq, pcq)) ⊑V al {(t , (l2, h2,mod2), (mq, pcq))} ⇐⇒ l2 ≤ c2 ≤ h2
and so when c1 = i, c2 = j, applyBinary(binop, (t, c1, (mp, pcp)), (t, c2, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn)) ∈
absApplyBinaryNum

binop, (t , (l1, h1,mod1), (mp, pcp)),








applyBinary(binop, (t, i, (mp, pcp)), (t, j, (mq, pcq)), (mn, pcn))
When concrete object references are compared, the heapID may be used to conclusively answer the question
of reference/pointer equality. When heapIDs are identical, it must be the case that all the attributes of the object
reference are identical. The converse is not true, when all attributes of two object references match, this does
mean they refer to the same object. When attributes of two object references differ, they definitely do not refer to




A Reaching Definitions for Local Variables
Analysis
C.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we recast the classical Reaching Definitions analysis in a Carmel setting and define a Reaching
Definitions for Local Variable analysis capable of determining for each address in a Carmel program P the set of
possible pairs of (local variable × program counter) where each local variable may have received its definition (as-
signment). The material in this chapter reproduces and reuses the monotone framework presented in Chapter 2 of
[NNH10]. In particular, we present our reaching definitions for local variables analysis as an instance of a mono-
tone framework based on the reaching definitions analysis monotone framework instance, detail the corresponding
flow, kill and gen functions, and reproduce the general MFP solver given in [NNH10] capable of efficiently solving
the dataflow equations generated from the analysis.
Note that in Carmel every method m has a unique entry point m.firstAddress and the set of local variables at that
address corresponds to the binding of the formal parameters of the method with their runtime values, and is popu-
lated by the calling method. We include the formal parameters as the initial values for m.firstAddress. Additionally,
our analysis considers the local variables that are actually referenced in a method i.e. the local variables that are




inc t j c
of which only instructions:
store t i
inc t j c
assign new values to a local variable1.
C.2 Scope and Definition of Analysis
The scope of our analysis is per Carmel method m in P and we redefine:
Var∗ = {i | m.instructionAt(pc) ∈ {load t i , store t i , inc t i c}, (m, pc) ∈ m.addresses} ∪
{j | j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, (τi)
n
0 → τr = m.type}
Lab∗ = {pc | (m, pc) ∈ m.addresses}
and note that since P has passed bytecode verification, both of these sets must be finite, and therefore the pow-
erset of their cross-product must be finite too.
Table C.1 presents the Reaching Definitons Local Variable analysis as an instance of a monotone framework as
presented in [NNH10].
Table C.2 defines the corresponding kill and gen functions.
Table C.3 defines the flow relation to generate the intra-method control-flow.
Table C.4 reproduces the MFP solver that is capable of solving the constraints generated by the analysis.
1The load t i instruction simply reads and pushes on the top of the operand stack the value of the local variable i of type t.
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Table C.1: Monotone framework definition for Reaching Definitions for Local Variables Analysis
Reaching Definitions for Local Variables




ι {j | j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, (τi)
n
0 → τr = m.type}
E {m.firstAddress}
F flow(m,m.firstAddress)
F {f : L 7→ L | ∃lk, lg : f(l) = (l\lk) ∪ lg}
fℓ fℓ(l) = (l\killRDLV (m,m.instructionAt(ℓ)) ∪ genRDLV (m,m.instructionAt(ℓ))
Table C.2: Kill- and gen- function definition for Reaching Definitions for Local Variables Analysis
(m,m.instructionAt(ℓ)) killRDLV (m,m.instructionAt(ℓ)) genRDLV (m,m.instructionAt(ℓ))
∈ {store t i, inc t i c} {(i,m.firstAddress)} ∪
{(i, pc) |m.instructionAt(pc) ∈ {store t i, inc t i c}, pc ∈ m.addresses} {(i, ℓ)}
6∈ {store t i, inc t i c} ∅ ∅




goto addr {(ℓ, addr)} ∪ flow(m, addr)
if t op goto addr {(ℓ, addr)} ∪ {(ℓ,m.nextAddress(ℓ))} ∪ flow(m, addr) ∪ flow(m,m.nextAddress(ℓ))
if t op null goto addr





tableswitch t low => (apci)r1 , default => apcdefault




if t op goto addr
if t op null goto addr
lookupswitch t (ki => apci)r1 , default => apcdefault
tableswitch t low => (apci)r1 , default => apcdefault
}
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Table C.4: Algorithm for solving dataflow equations arising from Reaching Definitions for Local Variables Analysis
INPUT: An instance of a Monotone Framework:
(L,F , F, E, ι, f)
OUTPUT: MFP◦,MFP•
Step 1: Initialisation (of W and Analysis)
W := nil;
for all (ℓ, ℓ′) in F do
W := cons((ℓ, ℓ′),W );
for all ℓ in F or E do
if ℓ ∈ E then Analysis[ℓ] := ι
else Analysis[ℓ] := ⊥L;
Step 2: Iteration (updating W and Analysis)




if fℓ(Analysis[ℓ]) 6⊑ Analysis[ℓ′] then
Analysis[ℓ′] := Analysis[ℓ′] ⊔ fℓ(Analysis[ℓ]);
for all (ℓ′, ℓ′′) in F do
W := cons((ℓ′, ℓ′′), W);
Step 3: Presenting the result (MFP◦ and MFP•)





Initial States for Object Heap and Static
Heap
D.1 Introduction
There are certain objects the JCRE is required to create when the Java Card smartcard is first initialised, which
the JCVM assumes exist as part of the Java Card platform specification, and which are created prior to, and
exist independently from, the loading of any user applets and libraries. These framework objects created at initial-
isation are referenced in the operational semantics of Chapter 3 including the initial configurations of Section 3.7.1.
One such set of objects is the set of JCRE-owned exception objects, as defined in Section D.2.
A second set of objects contain the two global arrays, as defined in Section D.3.
The final set of miscellaneous JCRE-owned objects are defined in Section D.4.
After presenting these three sets of objects, we are able to define HInit1 and K Init2 in Sections D.5 and D.6. We
then define their abstract equivalents ĤInit and K̂ Init in Section D.7 and D.8, respectively.
To simplify the specification of these objects, we define in Table D.1 the following operator loc  H as a shorthand for
“loc is defined in the object heap with the following properties” i.e. loc ∈ dom(H) and each field of the associated
1HInit being the initial object heap of a freshly initialised JCVM referenced in the initial configurations of Section 3.7.1
2K Init being the initial static heap of a freshly initialised JCVM referenced in the initial configurations of Section 3.7.1
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Table D.1: A Succinct Notation for Defining Objects in the domain of object heap H
D.2 JCRE–owned exceptions
As per [Ora11a], to encourage resource savings via re-use of exception objects, the JCVM is required to create,
hold a reference to, and designate as a JCRE temporary entry point object, at least one instance of each of the
following exception objects, which are thrown either automatically by the JCVM during execution of Applet code,










owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,

















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,

















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,

















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,

















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,

















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),
length : 0
heapID : −15













owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),
length : 0
heapID : −16













owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),
length : 0
heapID : −17














owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),
length : 0
heapID : −18




D.3 JCRE–owned global arrays
The JCRE specification mandates3 two global arrays:
• the APDU buffer held by the APDU object4 and associated with the Applet lifecycle method process(APDU
apdu)
• the installation buffer bArray associated with the Applet lifecycle method install(byte[] bArray, short
bOffset, byte bLength)
Due to the variation in hardware resources available to different smartcards, the JCRE specification [Ora11b]
dictates a maximum size for the install buffer, and a minimum size and a maximum size for the APDU buffer
supporting extended APDU lengths. We abstract these here for the concrete objects; this poses no problem for
our program analysis as we allow the length attribute to be an interval of possible lengths for abstract array objects.
37 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC APDU BUFFER LENGTH ≤ Short.MAX VALUE
0 ≤ CARD SPECIFIC INSTALL BUFFER LENGTH ≤ 127
3Section 6.2.2 of [Ora11b]









refType : byte[ ],
isArray : true,
owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : true,
transient : CLEAR ON DESELECT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),




0 7→ (b, 0, (1, 1)),
. . . ,












refType : byte[ ],
isArray : true,
owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : true,
transient : CLEAR ON DESELECT,
creationPoint : (1, 1),




0 7→ (b, 0, (1, 1)),
. . . ,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : no ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,
















owner : (JCRE, JCRE),
entryPoint : temporary ,
isGlobal : false,
transient : NOT TRANSIENT,







Note that we do not fill in the fields for locAPDUObject as we intercept method calls to e.g. getBuffer() to ensure the
locAPDUBuffer is returned.
D.5 Initial State for Object Heap - HInit
We may now define the following framework objects created at initialisation and which are referenced in the oper-
ational semantics of Chapter 3 including the initial configurations of Section 3.7.1.
























D.6 Initial State for Static Heap - K Init
In contrast to HInit, which has remained unchanged for many releases, each release of the Java Card specification
defines more static constants and so in the interest of brevity it is best to generate K Init from the appropriate
constants javadoc files e.g. in version 3.0.1:
javacard specifications-3 0 1-RR/classic/api classic/constant-values.html
there are over 300 static constants, a sample of which are reproduced here for example:
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_MEDIA_CONTACTLESS_TYPE_A = -128
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_MEDIA_CONTACTLESS_TYPE_B = -112
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_MEDIA_DEFAULT = 0
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_MEDIA_MASK = -16
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_MEDIA_USB = -96
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_T0 = 0
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public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_T1 = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.PROTOCOL_TYPE_MASK = 15
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_ERROR_IO = -3
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_ERROR_NO_T0_GETRESPONSE = -1
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_ERROR_NO_T0_REISSUE = -4
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_ERROR_T1_IFD_ABORT = -2
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_FULL_INCOMING = 2
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_FULL_OUTGOING = 6
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_INITIAL = 0
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_OUTGOING = 3
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_OUTGOING_LENGTH_KNOWN = 4
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_PARTIAL_INCOMING = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.APDU.STATE_PARTIAL_OUTGOING = 5
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.BAD_LENGTH = 3
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.BUFFER_BOUNDS = 2
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.ILLEGAL_USE = 1
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.IO_ERROR = 4
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.NO_T0_GETRESPONSE = 170
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.NO_T0_REISSUE = 172
public static final short javacard.framework.APDUException.T1_IFD_ABORT = 171
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.CLA_ISO7816 = 0
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE = -126
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.INS_SELECT = -92
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA = 5
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA = 0
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_EXT_CDATA = 7
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_INS = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_LC = 4
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_P1 = 2
public static final byte javacard.framework.ISO7816.OFFSET_P2 = 3
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_APPLET_SELECT_FAILED = 27033
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_BYTES_REMAINING_00 = 24832
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 28160
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public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_COMMAND_CHAINING_NOT_SUPPORTED = 26756
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED = 27014
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED = 27013
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_CORRECT_LENGTH_00 = 27648
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_DATA_INVALID = 27012
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_FILE_FULL = 27268
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_FILE_INVALID = 27011
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND = 27266
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED = 27265
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2 = 27270
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED = 27904
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_LAST_COMMAND_EXPECTED = 26755
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_NOT_SUPPORTED = 26753
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_NO_ERROR = -28672
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND = 27267
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_SECURE_MESSAGING_NOT_SUPPORTED = 26754
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED = 27010
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_UNKNOWN = 28416
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_WARNING_STATE_UNCHANGED = 25088
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_WRONG_DATA = 27264
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH = 26368
public static final short javacard.framework.ISO7816.SW_WRONG_P1P2 = 27392
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.ARRAY_TYPE_BOOLEAN = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.ARRAY_TYPE_BYTE = 2
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.ARRAY_TYPE_INT = 4
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.ARRAY_TYPE_OBJECT = 5
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.ARRAY_TYPE_SHORT = 3
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_DESELECT = 2
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_RESET = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_PERSISTENT = 0
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT = 2
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET = 1
public static final byte javacard.framework.JCSystem.NOT_A_TRANSIENT_OBJECT = 0
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public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_AES = 2
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_DES = 1
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_DSA_PRIVATE = 4
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC = 3
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_EC_F2M_PRIVATE = 6
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_EC_F2M_PUBLIC = 5
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_EC_FP_PRIVATE = 8
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_EC_FP_PUBLIC = 7
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_HMAC = 9
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_KOREAN_SEED = 10
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_RSA_CRT_PRIVATE = 13
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE = 12
public static final byte javacard.security.KeyBuilder.ALG_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC = 11
public static final short javacard.security.KeyBuilder.LENGTH_AES_128 = 128
D.7 Abstract Initial State for Object Heap - ĤInit




































































































































D.8 Abstract Initial State for Object Heap - K̂ Init
The abstract equivalent of the static heap of the newly initial JCVM K Init is K̂ Init and it is defined:
βHStaticHeap(K Init) ⊑K K̂ Init
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Appendix E
Design and implementation of the
Fulgurite iterative worklist solver
E.1 Overview
In this Chapter we present a high–level view of the design and implementation of the Fulgurite iterative work-
list solver, which we have developed to compute the least solution to the constraints generated by the extended
control–flow analysis of Chapter 5 for any Carmel program P meeting the requirements of Section 1.3. As detailed
in Chapter 6, from the least solution to the extended control–flow analysis for P , we are able to generate a family
of integer linear programming problems, one for each applet lifecycle method in P per registered applet whose
solution yields the worst-case resource-usage for that applet lifecycle method1.
We have chosen to implement Fulgurite as a Java application for a variety of reasons, including:
• each abstract value can be represented as an object, and each finite set of states into which an attribute may
be partitioned can be represented as a typesafe enum, facilitating future extensibility and maintenance;
• Java’s built-in Collections framework of discrete mathematical structures including sets, sequences and maps
matches the core requirements of the worklist solver;
• adding support for new Java Card API methods is straight-forward, facilitating upgrades of the solver to handle
new editions of Java Card Classic;
1In Section 6.4, we specify the loop validation conditions for being able to determine for each applet lifecycle method whether we can
determine the worst-case resource-usage analysis for that applet lifecycle method from the least solution to the constraints generated by the
extended control–flow analysis. Where the validation conditions are not met for a particular registered applet and applet lifecycle method
combination, the worst-case resource-usage for that combination is unknown.
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• greatly simplifies the implementation of abstract numeric operations, since the same numeric data types in
Java Card are available in Java, with the same semantics;
• modifying the implementation of the program analysis clause for a particular bytecode instruction is straight-
forward. In particular, handling of each bytecode instruction is delegated to a particular method and abstract
values are implemented as immutable objects to isolate, as far as possible, the effect of each clause;
• existence of mature third party libraries such as SableCC2 (for parser generation and tree-walking facilities)
and WALA libraries3 (which we use for graphing functions including computation of dominator relations for
natural loop identification);
• excellent debugging and unit testing tools available;
• should Java Card applications ever get sufficiently large that computation of the extended control–flow anal-
ysis would benefit from concurrent processing, it would be straight-forward to modify the solver to employ
standard techniques to allow this e.g. an appropriate source of splitting4 the workload would be by package
i.e. P is partitioned into a number of packages and each thread computes the least solution for its partition,
then a final single-threaded pass over the packages ensures least-solution is reached (assuring inter-package
inter-applet communications are handled).
E.2 Implementation of Abstract Values in Fulgurite
Since the program analyses of Chapters 4 and 5 are both first-order analyses, it seems appropriate to begin with
how we implement abstract values in Fulgurite.
E.2.1 Individual Values
A UML diagram of the hierarchy of the implementation of abstract values in Fulgurite is given in Figure E.1. The
root node is AbstractValue. Figures E.2, E.3 and E.4 provide more granular information of the UML hierarchy,
particularly the input- parameters and return types of methods.
At a high-level, the correspondence between abstract values in the program analysis and implementation types in
Fulgurite is as follows:
• an abstract value corresponds to an instance of AbstractValue;
2http://www.sablecc.org/
3http://wala.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/Main Page
4Using the streams, Spliterator and fork-join threading patterns of Java 7 and 8
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• an abstract return address corresponds to an instance of AbstractReturnAddress;
• an abstract object reference corresponds to an instance of AbstractObjectReference;
• an abstract number corresponds to an instance of AbstractCarmelNumber, as well as being an instance of
AbstractValue:
– an abstract byte number corresponds to an instance of AbstractByteNumber;
– an abstract short number corresponds to an instance of AbstractShortNumber;
– an abstract integer number corresponds to an instance of AbstractIntegerNumber;
Recapping and summarising Sections 4.2.1 ff :
Val = Num+ Ref + RetAddr
β
R,H,JH





Ref (t , Y, (mn, pcn)) = (t , Z1, (mn, pcn)) t = r
βReturnAddress(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) = (t , Z2, (mn, pcn)) t = ra
βNum(t , Y, (mn, pcn)) = (t , Z3, (mn, pcn)) t ∈ {b, s, i}
for some Z1, Z2, Z3, and noting from Section 3.4:
nbWords : Value∗ → N0
nbWords : ǫ = 0
nbWords : (t, Y, (mn, pcn)) =


2, t = i
1, otherwise




(ti, Yi, (mi, pci))
)









































































































































































































































































































































































We are reminded of the following:
• both concrete- and abstract- values have an operand type t and an associated runtime address label (mn, pcn),
both of which are preserved in each of the representation functions;
• the size of the concrete- and abstract- values in terms of stack words is available via the nbWords function and
is determined solely by the value’s operand type t, which as noted above is preserved by all the representation
functions;
• the least-upper-bound (LUB) of two abstract values is well-defined and is typically the union of the two values,
except for numeric types with the same operand type and address, in which case the LUB produces a single
abstract value where the lower end of the resulting numeric interval contained within the abstract value is set
to the minimum of the lower intervals of the LUB operands, the upper end of the resulting numeric interval is
set to the maximum of the upper intervals of the LUB operands, and the modification count of the resulting
abstract val is set to the maximum of the modification counts of the LUB operands;
• the form of Z1, Z2, Z3 is dependent solely on the value’s operand type t, which as noted above is preserved
by all the representation functions, which determines the representation function applied.
These properties are enshrined in the root node AbstractValue of the implementation tree of abstract values in
Fulgurite, as shown in Figure E.1. AbstractValue defines a set of methods to answer the question of what the
operand type of an abstract value is:







and defines another pair of methods which ensure, respectively, the LUB operation is defined for all pairs of abstract




In accordance with the third point above, in AbstractValueBaseImpl we provide a default implementation of the
LUB operator to be the union of the two operands where the two operands are from different operand types5 and
delegate to a new method in the same class:
protected SortedSet<AbstractValue> LUBSameClass(AbstractValue otherValue)
the responsibility for appropriate handling of the LUB for two abstract values of the same type. In AbstractValueBaseImpl,
we define LUBSameClass(AbstractValue otherValue) to be the union of the two operands and this behaviour is
inherited (and is the correct implementation) for abstract return addresses (modelled by AbstractReturnAddress)
and abstract object references (modelled by AbstractObjectReference). In contrast, the implementation of the
LUBSameClass operator in the abstract numeric types AbstractByteNumber, AbstractShortNumber and
AbstractIntegerNumber produces a single-value where both operands have the same address and are of the
same class, and otherwise produces the union of the operands, as expected.









in Fulgurite as instances of the Java class CarmelLUBTreeSet whose method
isLessThan(CarmelLUBTreeSet) corresponds to the strict partial order:
X.isLessThan(Y) ⇐⇒ X ⊑V al Y ∧X 6= Y
and whose methods add and addAll correspond to
⊔
V al. In particular, once abstract value(s) are requested
to be added to a set of abstract values, via the add and addAll methods, the LUB is recalculated. Appropriate
thread–synchronization6 ensures reads from, and writes to, this critical collection class are sequenced/coherent.
We are interested in the strict partial order because in our worklist algorithm it is always the case that Y = Fj(X)
for some monotone function Fj , and our real interest is whether or not some abstract entity has increased or not.
Some maps use CarmelLUBTreeSet directly e.g. the abstract static heap:
protected final Map<CarmelField, CarmelLUBTreeSet> K = new TreeMap<CarmelField, CarmelLUBTreeSet>();
Other classes use CarmelLUBTreeSet indirectly e.g.
5implementation class ≡ operand type
6Every public method of CarmelLUBTreeSet is synchronized.
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• the implementation of the abstract operand stack CarmelOperandStack is as a sequence of CarmelLUBTreeSets.
Further the analysis entity Ŝ is implemented as a map:
Map<CarmelAddress, Map<AbstractContextSequenceInterface, CarmelOperandStack>> S =
new TreeMap<CarmelAddress, Map<AbstractContextSequenceInterface, CarmelOperandStack>>();
• the implementation of the abstract local variable array CarmelLocalVarArray is as a map
from key to CarmelLUBTreeSet
Further the analysis entity L̂ is implemented as a map:
Map<CarmelAddress, Map<AbstractContextSequenceInterface, CarmelLocalVarArray>> L =
new TreeMap<CarmelAddress, Map<AbstractContextSequenceInterface, CarmelLocalVarArray>>();
E.3 Fulgurite worklist algorithm
The Fulgurite worklist algorithm is principally coded in the Fulgurite class. The Main class is the entry-point class
and passes to the Fulgurite class all the information required from parsing the input files, and access to the utility
classes to be able to make all the decisions required of the solver e.g.
• to enumerate all the types of a class instance to see e.g. whether a checkcast instruction should succeed;
• to determine the bytecode instructions that are “leaders” [Zha] in a Carmel method, so that methods may be
decomposed into basic blocks;
• to pre-calculate the reaching definitions for local variable analysis and retain the reaching definitions for all
if statements;
• to be able to resolve dynamic method lookup;
• to represent in the analysis results the initial configurations via the loadInitialAppletContexts() method.
prior to the worklist iteration.
Tables E.2 to E.4 show the heart of the worklist algorithm, encoded in the Fulguritemethod performLFPCalculation().
Note how closely it mirrors the algorithm presented in Section 4.7. As can be seen from the cited tables, the work-
list algorithm delegates the handling of each bytecode instruction, and the high-level objects it needs, to its own
abstractmethod. Table E.4 details an excerpt of some of these abstractmethods. This delegation is a deliberate
design pattern to aid clarity, and to keep the size of Fulgurite manageable. Other classes flesh out the abstract
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methods e.g. CommonCodeFulgurite contains the handling of most bytecode instructions, and ArraysFulgurite
handles the array bytecode instructions and APIContextFulgurite handles the Java Card API methods.
As described above, Fulgurite delegates the handling of each program analysis clause to its own method. As
an example of the implementation of one of the program analysis clause, Table E.5 details the implementation of
binary numeric operations i.e. bytecode instructions of the form numop t binop. Tables E.6 and E.7 show the
implementation of binary numerical operators for integer addition, and short subtraction, respectively. The other
binary numerical operators’ implementation follow a similar pattern i.e. to iterate over all combinations from least
to greatest over each of the binary operators operands, perform the primitive arithmetic over the appropriate data
type for each operand combination, and record the least and greatest of the primitive arithmetic results, across all
the combinations.
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Figure E.1: UML diagram showing the implementation hierarchy of abstract values in Fulgurite. Method parameters
have been omitted due to space consideration. Fuller details given in Figures E.2, E.3 and E.4
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Figure E.2: UML diagram showing the high-level interfaces and base abstract class in Fulgurite
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Figure E.3: UML diagram showing the abstract number values in Fulgurite
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Figure E.4: UML diagram showing the abstract object reference and abstract return address values in Fulgurite
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"[outer loop=%d, inner loop=%d, Workload size=%d, shouldIterateOverWorklist=%s, addr =(%s,%s)]%n",
outerLoopIterationCount, innerLoopIterationCount, W.size(), shouldIterateOverWorklist,
(carmelAddress.getMethod() == null) ? "" : carmelAddress.getMethod().getFqMethodName(),
(carmelAddress.getPc() == null) ? "" : carmelAddress.getPc().getPcLabel());
}
if (carmelInstruction == null) {
nextAddress = null;
}






CarmelInstructionArguments instructionArguments = carmelAddress.getInstructionArguments();
for (AbstractContextSequenceInterface context : contexts) {
if (context.getCurrentContextDepth() <= 2) {
continue;
}
nextAddressContextSequence = (nextAddress != null) ? context.getContext(context, nextAddress)
: null;
if (nextAddressContextSequence == null
&& carmelInstruction.isIntraMethodInvocationInstruction()) {
throw new RuntimeException("Could not find a next address for " + carmelAddress);
}
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Table E.3: Excerpt from the core of the Fulgurite worklist algorithm, Part 2
switch (carmelInstruction) {
case NOP:
nop(context, carmelAddress, (NoArguments) instructionArguments);
break;
case PUSH_T_C:
push_t_c(context, carmelAddress, (PushTCArguments) instructionArguments);
break;
case POP_P:
pop_p(context, carmelAddress, (PopPArguments) instructionArguments);
break;
case DUP_P_D:
dup_p_d(context, carmelAddress, (DupPDArguments) instructionArguments);
break;
case SWAP_P1_P2:
swap_p1_p2(context, carmelAddress, (SwapP1P2Arguments) instructionArguments);
break;
case NEW_T_CLASS:
className = ((NewClassInstanceArgument) instructionArguments).getClassName();
refType = new RefTypeArgument(className, false);
if (!(refType.isRefType())) {
throw new RuntimeException("new <class instance> not reference type "
+ instructionArguments + " at " + carmelAddress);
}
ptci = getCarmelClass(className, refType.isArray(), carmelAddress);
if (ptci == null) {
throw new RuntimeException(
"parsed class null " + instructionArguments + " at " + carmelAddress);
}
new_t_class(context, carmelAddress, ptci, refType);
break;
case CHECKCAST_T:
checkcast_t(context, carmelAddress, (RefTypeArgument) instructionArguments);
break;
case INSTANCEOF_T:
instanceof_t(context, carmelAddress, (RefTypeArgument) instructionArguments);
break;
case GETSTATIC_F:
if (this.addressFieldCache.get(carmelAddress) == null) {
CarmelField findCarmelField = null;
String requiredFieldName = ((FieldArguments) instructionArguments).getFieldName();
findCarmelField = getCarmelField(requiredFieldName, true);
if (findCarmelField == null) {
throw new RuntimeException(








Table E.4: Excerpt from the core of the Fulgurite worklist algorithm, Part 3
abstract protected void nop(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
NoArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void push_t_c(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
PushTCArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void pop_p(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
PopPArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void dup_p_d(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
DupPDArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void swap_p1_p2(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
SwapP1P2Arguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void unop_no_opt_t_numeric(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
UNOP_NO_OPT_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void unop_t_numeric(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
UNOP_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void binop_no_opt_t_numeric(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context,
CarmelAddress carmelAddress, BINOP_NO_OPT_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments)
throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void binop_t_numeric(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
BINOP_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void load_t_i(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
LoadTIArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void store_t_i(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
StoreTIArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void inc_t_i_c(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
IncTICArguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void goto_addr(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
CarmelAddress gotoAddr) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void if_t_op_goto_addr(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
IfTOpGotoAddrArguments instructionArguments, CarmelAddress gotoAddr)
throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void if_t_op_null_goto_addr(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context,
CarmelAddress carmelAddress, IfTOpNullGotoAddrArguments instructionArguments, CarmelAddress gotoAddr)
throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void lookupswitch(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
Map<Integer, CarmelAddress> instructionArguments, String t, CarmelAddress defaultPC)
throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void tableswitch(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress, String t,
CarmelAddress[] orderedOffsetsAddresses, CarmelAddress defaultOffsetAddress, int low)
throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void new_t_array(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
ParseTimeCarmelClassOrInterface ptci, RefTypeArgument refType) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void new_t_class(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
ParseTimeCarmelClassOrInterface ptci, RefTypeArgument refType) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void checkcast_t(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
RefTypeArgument instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void instanceof_t(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
RefTypeArgument instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void getstatic_f(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
CarmelField getStaticField) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void putstatic_f(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
CarmelField findCarmelField) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void getfield_f(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
CarmelField findCarmelField) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
abstract protected void getfield_this_f(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
CarmelField findCarmelField) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException;
470
@Override
protected void binop_no_opt_t_numeric(AbstractContextSequenceInterface context, CarmelAddress carmelAddress,
BINOP_NO_OPT_T_NUMERIC_Arguments instructionArguments) throws IllFormedCarmelOperandStackException {
this.initialiseVariables(carmelAddress, context);
String t = instructionArguments.getT();
Set<AbstractCarmelNumber> s2Set = null;
Set<AbstractCarmelNumber> s1Set = null;
AbstractCarmelNumber s3 = null;
if (topElementOfStack != null && opStack.depth() >= 2) {
s2Set = topElementOfStack.getAbstractCarmelShortOrIntegerNumber(t);
if (s2Set != null) {
// Throw away values off operand stack
opStack = opStack.popTopElement();
s1Set = opStack.peek().getAbstractCarmelShortOrIntegerNumber(t);
BinaryNumericOperator binop = instructionArguments.getBinop();
final boolean binopEqualsDivOrRem = (binop.equals(BinaryNumericOperator.DIV)
|| binop.equals(BinaryNumericOperator.REM));
if (s1Set != null) {
opStack = opStack.popTopElement();
for (AbstractCarmelNumber s1 : s1Set) {
for (AbstractCarmelNumber s2 : s2Set) {





if (!(s2.isZero() && binopEqualsDivOrRem)) {
s3 = s2.apply(binop, s1, s2, instructionArguments, carmelAddress);
addCarmelOpStackAndLocalVarArray(opStack.push(s3), localVarArray,












AbstractCarmelNumber an1, AbstractCarmelNumber an2,
CarmelInstructionArguments instructionArguments,
CarmelAddress carmelAddress) {
final long an1Low = an1.getMin();
final long an1High = an1.getMax();
final long an2Low = an2.getMin();
final int an2High = an2.getMax();
final int currentModCount = 1 + Math.max(an1.getCurrentModCount(),
an2.getCurrentModCount());
AbstractShortNumber result = null;
TreeSet<Short> ofShorts = new TreeSet<Short>();
Short f;
Short l;
for (long i = an1Low; i <= an1High; i++) {
for (long j = an2Low; j <= an2High; j++) {
ofShorts.add((short) (((short) i) - ((short) j)));

















AbstractCarmelNumber an1, AbstractCarmelNumber an2,
CarmelInstructionArguments instructionArguments,
CarmelAddress carmelAddress) {
final long an1Low = an1.getMin();
final long an1High = an1.getMax();
final long an2Low = an2.getMin();
final long an2High = an2.getMax();
final int currentModCount = 1 + Math.max(an1.getCurrentModCount(),
an2.getCurrentModCount());
AbstractIntegerNumber result = null;
TreeSet<Integer> ofIntegers = new TreeSet<Integer>();
Integer f = null;
Integer l = null;
int k = 0;
for (long i = an1Low; i <= an1High; i++) {
for (long j = an2Low; j <= an2High; j++) {
k = (int) ((int) i + (int) j);
ofIntegers.add(k);













Figure E.7: Implementation of add method for abstract integer numbers
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